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Abstract 
 
In the digital age, there has been a phenomenal rise in the number of photos people 
capture, share, and manipulate—a trend that shows no sign of slowing. Furthermore, 
research shows that photos—authentic and manipulated—are powerful; they can change 
people’s memories for distant and recent experiences, beliefs about past actions, 
intentions for future actions, and judgements. Yet there is currently limited research 
exploring the effects of digital photography on memory, cognition, and behaviour. 
Part One of this thesis comprises of a program of research that examines people’s 
ability to discriminate between authentic and manipulated images. Advances in digital 
technology mean that the creation of visually compelling photographic fakes is growing 
at an incredible speed. Despite the prevalence of manipulated photos in our everyday 
lives, there is a lack of research directly investigating the applied question of people’s 
ability to detect photo forgeries. The research in Chapter 3 addresses this question. 
Across two experiments, people showed an extremely limited ability to detect and locate 
manipulations of real-world scenes. Chapters 4 and 5 explore ways that might help 
people to detect image forgeries. Specifically, the research investigates the extent to 
which people can identify inconsistencies in shadows and reflections. The results 
suggest that people are reasonably insensitive to shadow and reflection information and 
indicate that such image properties might not help people to distinguish between 
authentic images and manipulated ones. 
Part Two of this thesis examines how the act of taking photos can affect people’s 
memory. Digital technology has revolutionised the ease with which people capture 
photos and accordingly there has been a remarkable rise in the number of photos that 
people take. The results of five experiments and a mini meta-analysis suggest that taking 
photos has only a small, or plausibly no, effect on people’s memories. 
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Chapter 1 : 
Introduction 
 
“If I could tell the story in words, I wouldn’t need to lug a camera.” 
Lewis Hine (1973) 
 
People are able to rapidly and effortlessly process visual information. Just a glance 
at an image is often enough to glean its basic meaning (Potter, 1975; Thorpe, Fize, & 
Marlot, 1996). The ease with which people interpret visual information can help to 
explain why photography has had such a phenomenal impact on the world—as the cliché 
goes, a picture is worth a thousand words. Accordingly, photos are used across almost 
all domains, including law enforcement, photojournalism, politics, and advertising. 
More recently, even laypeople can easily upload and share their personal photos with the 
world. Research clearly demonstrates the powerful influence of photos: news stories 
with photos get more attention than text alone (Moses, 2002), and on social media, posts 
with photos get more likes and shares than those without (Bakhshi, Shamma, Kennedy, 
& Gilbert, 2015). Photography has now become so interwoven with modern society that 
it is almost impossible to imagine life without it. Yet cameras and photography are a 
relatively new technology. Less than 200 years have passed since the invention of 
photography, and now, it is ubiquitous. 
A brief history of photography 
Drawing with light 
Centuries before photography was invented, people were aware of the basic 
principle of the camera: that light entering through a small hole in the wall of a dark 
room forms an inverted and horizontally reversed image of the scene outside (Galassi, 
1981; Newhall, 1982). In fact, some of the earliest art—in the form of cave drawings—
might have been created by tracing the light projections caused by sunlight entering 
through small holes in the cave walls (Gatton, 2009). The use of light projections to 
create images of the world was formalised in the 16th century with the invention of the 
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camera obscura (Gernsheim, 1986; Newhall, 1982). The early camera obscura created 
blurry and undetailed projections but by the 18th century a vastly improved version was 
available and artists commonly used these devices as an aid for painting and drawing 
(Newhall, 1982; Steadman, 2001). Projecting the light, however, proved easier than 
preserving it: even when using a camera obscura, the resulting picture was still largely 
dependent on the individual’s artistic ability (Newhall, 1982; Wright, 2016). Thus there 
remained a desire to make the image projections permanent, giving scientists the 
impetus to continue their search for a method to both produce and preserve images. 
The chemical effects of light 
Advances in the understanding of the chemical effects of light proved important 
for the development of photography (Gernsheim, 1986). Such scientific advances 
revealed a way to permanently fix images and led to the world’s first successful 
permanent photograph from nature: Niépce’s View from the Window at Le Gras 
(Gernsheim, 1977, 1986). Over the next two decades, attempts were made to refine and 
simplify the photographic process, the most successful of these attempts being the 
daguerreotype and calotype methods (Gernsheim, 1986; Graham, 1984; Larsen, 2008). 
Yet both of these processes were far from perfect—the main strength of the 
daguerreotype was its quality while the calotype marked the first successful attempt at a 
negative-positive photographic process. The appeal of having a negative from which 
numerous prints could be made was quickly recognised and scientists focused their 
interest on developing the negative-positive photographic process (Gernsheim, 1986; 
Hand, 2012; Mullins, 2013; Slater, 1991). A significant development came in the 1880’s 
when Kodak’s founder, George Eastman, introduced flexible photographic film and the 
first portable film camera (Larsen, 2008). The camera’s accompanying advertising 
slogan “You press the button, we do the rest.” conveyed that, for the first time in history, 
photographers were not required to process and develop their own photos—literally 
anyone could point the camera and shoot. Accordingly, a new era in photography 
began—an era that prevailed for the next century. 
From chemicals to bits—the digitalisation of light 
The invention of the charge-coupled device (CCD) marked one of the most 
important steps in the development of digital photography (Ghosh, 2017). A CCD image 
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sensor is made up of a grid of light sensitive silicon cells, called pixels (Felber, 2002). 
When these pixels are exposed to light, they generate electrical charge that is 
proportional to the intensity of the light hitting them. Using electronic technology, the 
charge can be measured precisely and then converted into a digital copy of the light 
patterns hitting the sensor. This invention paved the way for digital photography. The 
first commercially available digital camera was released in 1990 and although this 
camera produced low-resolution, black and white photos, it nonetheless came with a 
hefty USD1000 price tag (Trenholm, 2007). Unsurprisingly, the combination of low 
quality and high price proved an unsuccessful formula. Over the next few years, 
companies worked to address the quality issue but digital cameras remained 
unaffordable to the masses. The key turning point came when the digital photography 
industry shifted to use cheaper image sensor technology—specifically, the 
complementary metal-oxide semiconductor (CMOS) image sensor (Felber, 2002; 
Ghosh, 2017). As a result, by 2002, a 2.1 megapixel camera could be purchased for 
USD100. And in 2003, for the first time, digital cameras outsold film cameras, a trend 
that has continued ever since (Camera & Imaging Products Association, 2017). 
The success of the stand-alone digital camera industry has been relatively short-
lived; the industry reached its peak in 2010, producing 121 million cameras, but this 
number fell drastically to just 23 million in 2016 (Camera & Imaging Products 
Association, 2017; Djudjic, 2017; Hillen, 2017). Does this mean that people are taking 
fewer photos now than in the past? Far from it. Estimates suggest that 1 trillion photos 
were taken in 2015—nearly triple the number taken in 2010 (Lee, 2016). Furthermore, 
projections indicate that the number of photos captured each year will continue to grow 
exponentially (Heyman, 2015; Lee, 2016). Yet the stand-alone digital camera is no 
longer the preferred device for capturing photos—most people now take photos with a 
camera phone (Hillen, 2017; Lee & Stewart, 2016). What is more, modern camera 
phones are not only capable of capturing high-quality photos but also allow users to 
instantly share the photos they take (Larsen & Sandbye, 2014). 
A picture is worth a thousand words, or is it? 
Clearly, digital technology has revolutionised photography in the sense that 
people, arguably, have more photos than they know what to do with. Digitalisation has 
18 
 
also revolutionised photography in another sense; photos have never been easier to 
manipulate. Image manipulation is not a recent phenomenon; in fact, it is almost as old 
as photography itself (Guilshan, 1992). The famous portrait of Abraham Lincoln, shown 
in Figure 1.1, is a fake; it was created circa 1860 by joining together a lithograph print 
taken from a daguerreotype of Lincoln with a photo of Southern politician John C. 
Calhoun (Farid, 2006). Stalin was also a fan of image manipulation, requesting the use 
of cumbersome darkroom techniques to airbrush his enemies out of photos, and Hitler 
did the same. It is even possible to find early examples of airbrushing for aesthetic 
purposes: in a trade manual for photographers dating back to 1875, two portraits of a 
woman are shown, one printed from an untouched negative and the other from a 
retouched negative (Sheehan, 2014). The retouching successfully gives the impression 
of a smoother, lighter complexion, fuller cheeks and well-rested eyes. Thus, image 
manipulation did exist before the advent of digital photography, however, it is important 
to bear in mind that making alterations to analogue photos was—and still is—a 
complicated and costly process that was the exception rather than the rule (Parry, 2009). 
Therefore it was fairly reasonable to believe in the integrity of analogue photos because, 
more often than not, these photos provided a truthful depiction of reality (Farid, 2009a). 
 
 
Figure 1.1. The portrait of Abraham Lincoln on the left is a fake, created by compositing 
Lincoln’s head onto the photo of John C. Calhoun shown on the right. Photo source: 
Library of Congress. 
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Contrast this situation with that of today where digital technology allows photos to 
be manipulated in ways that were entirely impossible a few decades ago (Farid, 2009b). 
As image manipulation technology continues to develop, the creation of sophisticated 
and convincing forgeries will only become easier. Not only is this technology powerful, 
it is also more affordable than ever before. Nowadays, image manipulation software is 
available at little or no cost and allows users to create sophisticated alterations with 
ease—digital photos can be altered by almost anyone, it no longer necessarily takes skill 
or expertise (Parry, 2009). And even if these dedicated image manipulation software 
packages prove too complicated, most cameras, including camera phones, now come 
bundled with powerful manipulation tools that allow users to apply image enhancements 
at the click of a button. One of the most popular photo-editing phone apps, Facetune, 
allows users to reshape noses, whiten teeth, remove blemishes, perfect skin, and even 
add a smile (King, 2015). Furthermore, a newly purchased Samsung Galaxy S7 comes 
with a default beauty setting enabled, meaning that if the user does not change it, all 
photos are automatically altered to some extent (Cherrington, 2016). 
As a result of the development of image manipulation technology, altering digital 
photos is now ubiquitous. News stories frequently reveal fraudulent photos or question 
the integrity of photos in the public domain (Tooth, 2011). What is more, these news 
stories reveal that image manipulation happens across a wide range of areas, including 
photojournalism, political campaigns, scientific publishing, sport, fashion, and music 
(e.g., Marszal, 2015; Pearson, 2006; Peters, 2010; Turner, 2016). These days, even 
casual photographers use image manipulation to their advantage. In one such case, 
shortly after Dinesh and Tarakeshwari Rathod were hailed as the first Indian couple to 
reach the summit of Mount Everest, the Nepalese authorities launched an official 
investigation to determine whether the pair had in fact manipulated their verification 
photos (Safi, 2016). The investigation revealed that the couple had superimposed their 
faces and the Indian flag onto another climber’s photos. Likewise, there were many 
instances of fake photos circulating during the 2016 United States presidential 
campaign, including a manipulated image showing an immigration officer arresting an 
undocumented immigrant at a polling station (Garcia, 2016). Even after the conclusion 
of the presidential campaign, in March 2017, a crudely manipulated image depicting 
former President Barack Obama in handcuffs having been arrested for wiretapping 
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President Donald Trump circulated the web (Gillin, 2017). Despite the unsophisticated 
manipulation in the Obama example, the image was still shared thousands of times on 
social media. 
In the digital age, people are inundated with photos, both authentic and 
manipulated. Digital photography is the result of a number of phenomenal technological 
achievements and is generally viewed as a positive development. But should we also be 
concerned by the changes brought about by digital photography? What impact, for 
example, does this constant exposure to photos have on human memory, cognition, and 
behaviour? 
The effects of photos on memory and cognition 
The constructive nature of memory 
Remembering allows us to do something seemingly magical. We can relive our 
experiences by bringing the past into the present. In reality though, memory is fragile—
decades of research has shown that memories are not an exact, unchanged record of the 
past (for a review, see Loftus, 2017). Rather, remembering involves a constructive 
process that is prone to a variety of errors and distortions (Schacter, 2013). As a result of 
this constructive process, memories can be drastically changed or created (Loftus, 2003). 
In a recent TED talk, Elizabeth Loftus (2013) proposed a new analogy for human 
memory, suggesting that, far from the misconception that memory acts as a recording 
device, it is instead more like an entry in Wikipedia—something that you and other 
people can change. 
One of the earliest demonstrations of memory’s constructive nature dates back to 
1932 when Sir Frederic Bartlett showed that what people remember is not necessarily an 
accurate record of events, but rather is influenced by internal factors, specifically, 
people’s expectations and beliefs. Bartlett’s methods and findings were controversial at 
the time and largely dismissed (Johnston, 2001). Yet, the underlying idea that people’s 
memories do not always perfectly match what actually happened was picked up decades 
later, and this time researchers were also interested in how external factors can influence 
memory. 
21 
 
A highly influential finding in psychology is the misinformation effect (Loftus, 
1975; Loftus & Hoffman, 1989; Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978). This effect refers to the 
finding that exposure to misleading postevent information can influence a person’s 
memory for an event. In the early misinformation effect studies, subjects witnessed an 
event, such as a traffic accident, and then later read descriptions of what they saw. 
Crucially, half of the subjects received misleading descriptions—for instance a stop sign 
in the original event was referred to as a yield sign in the description—while the other 
half received consistent descriptions. In a later test of their memory for the originally 
witnessed event, subjects given the misinformation tended to adopt that information as 
their memory—they were more likely to report that they originally saw a yield sign than 
subjects who were not given misinformation (Loftus et al., 1978). This finding 
demonstrates the alarming ease with which people can be misled about what they have 
seen and thus raises questions about the reliability of eyewitness testimony. Since this 
seminal study, many replications and extensions of the misinformation effect have been 
conducted (for a review, see Loftus, 2005). 
Taking these misinformation effect findings a step further, in the 1990s memory 
scientists showed that people could construct false memories of entire events (e.g., 
Hyman, Husband, & Billings, 1995; Loftus & Pickrell, 1995; Porter, Yuille, & Lehman, 
1999). One of the earliest attempts involved a relatively simple procedure in which adult 
subjects read narrative descriptions of four childhood events, three of which were 
genuine and one that was false. The false event, for instance, might describe how the 
subject got lost in a shopping mall for an extended period when they were about 5 years-
old (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995). The researchers checked with the subjects’ families to 
ensure that the subject had not experienced the false event as a child. After attending a 
series of suggestive interviews where subjects worked to remember details of all four 
events, 25% came to believe, wholly or partially, that as a child they got lost in a mall 
and were eventually helped by an elderly lady. This paradigm for introducing false 
memories of entire events is known as the familial-informant false-narrative procedure 
(Lindsay, Hagen, Read, Wade, & Garry, 2004) and has been used to explore the power 
of suggestive techniques and repeated retrieval. Thus, memory researchers have known 
for a long time that narrative descriptions of counterfactual childhood events can lead 
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people to generate false memories for entire events. It was only recently, however, that 
scientists started to examine the power of photos to induce wholly false memories. 
Photos and childhood memories 
In the early 2000s, researchers adapted the familial-informant false-narrative 
procedure to determine whether doctored photos of childhood events might also lead 
people to develop false memories (Wade, Garry, Read, & Lindsay, 2002). Over a 1-2 
week period, adult subjects worked at remembering moderately significant childhood 
events depicted in photos. Three of the photos were real, depicting one-off events like a 
special childhood birthday party, a school trip, or a cultural event, and one photo was a 
fake—a doctored image that depicted the subject taking a childhood hot air balloon ride. 
By the end of the study period, 50% of subjects claimed to have at least some memory 
of the hot air balloon ride even though their family confirmed this event never happened. 
Extending the lost in the mall research (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995), this finding shows that 
people can be led to remember wholly false childhood experiences using postevent 
information in the form of photos. 
Critics have suggested, however, that subjects might not be constructing false 
memories, per se, but uncovering true memories of actual experiences. In response to 
such criticism, researchers have examined whether photos encourage people to develop 
false memories for implausible or impossible events (Braun, Ellis, & Loftus, 2002; 
Grinley, 2002; Strange, Sutherland, & Garry, 2006). In one study, subjects evaluated 
advertisements for a Disney resort (Braun et al., 2002). Half viewed a generic advert that 
did not show any cartoon characters, the other half viewed a fake advert that featured 
Bugs Bunny (an impossible scenario because Bugs Bunny is a Warner Brothers 
character, not Disney). After a delay, subjects were asked about their own experiences of 
visiting Disneyland as a child, and 16% of those who viewed the fake advert claimed 
that they remembered meeting Bugs Bunny on their trip. 
Other research has shown that photos do not necessarily have to be manipulated in 
order to aid the construction of false memories: Authentic photos can facilitate the 
creation of false memories too (Garry, Strange, Bernstein, & Kinzett, 2005; Lindsay et 
al., 2004; Strange, Garry, Bernstein, & Lindsay, 2011). In one study, subjects attempted 
to “remember” a childhood event that never actually happened—putting a bright green 
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gooey Slime toy in a teacher’s desk in Grade 1 or 2 (aged 5 or 6 years-old) (Lindsay et 
al., 2004). Subjects worked to recall the event in one of two conditions: half of the 
subjects read a verbal description of the false event, the other half read the description 
and also viewed their real school class photo from the time. Just 23% of the description-
only subjects stated that they remembered the false event, while 65% of subjects who 
also saw the class photo “remembered” putting Slime in a teacher’s desk. Importantly, 
although the photo was related to the event it did not provide any evidence that the event 
really occurred, that is, the photo was non-probative. Yet it still inflated the likelihood 
that subjects “remembered” the event. 
Can photos affect recent memories? 
In addition, several other studies have shown that doctored images and videos are 
a powerful form of suggestion that can lead people to “remember” wholly false 
experiences, including false memories of recent events (Frenda, Knowles, Saletan, & 
Loftus, 2013; Nash & Wade, 2009; Nash, Wade, & Lindsay, 2009; Sacchi, Agnoli, & 
Loftus, 2007). For example, one study showed that photos can change people’s 
memories of news and political events (Sacchi et al., 2007). Sacchi et al. manipulated 
two photos, one of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protest in Beijing, and another from the 
2003 Iraq war protest in Rome. For the Beijing protest, the original photo showing a 
lone Chinese student facing the tank was manipulated to show crowds of spectators. For 
the Rome event the manipulations, for instance adding angry-looking protestors and 
police officers wearing riot gear, made the peaceful protest look more aggressive than it 
was in reality. After viewing a photo of each of the protests—one being the original 
version and the other being the manipulated version—subjects answered some questions 
about the two events. The results revealed that subjects who viewed the manipulated 
Beijing image estimated that more people had been involved in the event than those who 
viewed the original version. Similarly, subjects who viewed the manipulated Rome 
image described the protest as being more violent and negative than subjects who saw 
the original photo. Furthermore, subjects who saw the manipulated Rome image said 
they were less likely to participate in future protests than those who saw the original 
photo. These results indicate that visual information that contradicts the original event 
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can change people’s memories of the events, and also influence how they intend to act in 
the future. 
In the largest false memory study to date, over 5,000 subjects viewed descriptions 
of three true and one (of five) fabricated political events (Frenda et al., 2013). The true 
event descriptions were shown alongside an authentic photo, while the fabricated event 
description was shown with an image that had been manipulated to portray the false 
event. One false event, for example, depicted President Obama shaking the hand of 
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Overall, 50% of subjects reported that they 
remembered the fabricated event happening. Furthermore, of those subjects who said 
they remembered the false event, 27% stated that they even remembered seeing the false 
event happen on the news. Importantly, this study used a large, diverse sample and real-
world political content, and the results converge with previous findings showing that 
photos can influence people’s memories. 
So far, the research discussed illustrates the incredible power of photos, both 
authentic and manipulated, to influence people’s memories, beliefs, and behavioural 
intentions. An important question, however, concerns whether photos can also influence 
how people think they have acted in the past. Could photos make people believe they 
have behaved in a way they have not? In one study exploring this question, subjects 
performed some actions and imagined performing others (e.g., open the envelope) 
(Henkel, 2011). A week later subjects viewed photos of the actions in their completed 
state (e.g., an opened envelope). The photos included a mixture of the actions the subject 
performed and imagined performing, as well as new actions that were neither performed 
nor imagined. Another week later, subjects completed a surprise source memory test in 
which they had to determine which actions they had originally performed and which 
they had imagined. The results revealed that seeing the photos of the completed actions 
made subjects more likely to falsely claim that they had performed, rather than simply 
imagined performing, the action. Further, seeing photos of the new actions made 
subjects more likely to claim that they had originally performed or imagined performing 
the new actions. To rule out the possibility that the effect was caused by repeated 
exposure to the actions and thus increased familiarity, Henkel ran another study using a 
similar procedure. The results indicated that viewing a photo of an action once had a 
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similar effect on memory errors to reading a textual description of the action four times. 
Therefore, photos can lead people to believe they have acted in ways that they have not. 
Of course, remembering opening an envelope when in fact you only imagined 
doing so might seem mundane and inconsequential. Consider, though, that law 
enforcement officers sometimes use photos to cue suspects’ and witnesses’ memories in 
criminal investigations (Kassin et al., 2007). In the laboratory, research has 
demonstrated that witnesses are more likely to falsely identify an innocent person in a 
line-up if they viewed that person beforehand in a mug shot (Deffenbacher, Bornstein, & 
Penrod, 2006). Therefore, this research suggests that the use of such techniques could 
potentially lead someone to falsely remember performing or witnessing an action; an 
error that could have extremely serious consequences. 
Photos and judgements 
Not only do photos influence people’s memories of past and recent events, they 
can also affect people’s judgements about the truth of a claim (Newman, Garry, 
Bernstein, Kantner, & Lindsay, 2012). More specifically, subjects judged whether a 
series of trivia claims, for instance “Macadamia nuts are in the same evolutionary family 
as peaches”, were true or false. Trivia statements accompanied by a non-probative photo 
(i.e., a photo that was related to the claim but did not reveal whether the claim was true 
or false) were more frequently judged to be true than statements presented without a 
photo, an effect called “truthiness” (Newman et al., 2012). Therefore, when making 
rapid judgments about the truth of a claim, the mere presence of a non-probative photo 
can lead people to believe that claim. This truthiness effect also persists over time; 
subjects returning to the lab 48-hours after making judgements about trivia statements 
were still more likely to judge the statements that had previously been presented with 
photos to be true (Fenn, Newman, Pezdek, & Garry, 2013). Perhaps what seems most 
surprising about these findings is that the photos are related to the event but provide no 
evidence that the event actually happened—photos can nudge people towards believing 
the claims are true, regardless of whether those claims are true or not. Non-probative 
photos can also nudge people to “remember” fabricated childhood events—recall the 
Slime prank (Lindsay et al., 2004). Taken together, this body of research shows that 
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even non-probative photos can act as powerful cues that people will draw on to inform 
their judgements and memories. 
Summary 
In the digital age, there has been a phenomenal rise in the number of photos people 
capture, share, and manipulate—a trend that shows no sign of slowing. Research clearly 
demonstrates that photos—authentic and manipulated—are powerful; they can change 
people’s memories for distant and recent experiences, beliefs about past actions, 
intentions for future actions, and judgements. Therefore, it is critically important to gain 
further understanding of the effects of digital photography on memory, cognition, and 
behaviour. Chapter 2 identifies some of the real-world implications of photography in 
the digital age and outlines the current program of research.  
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Chapter 2 : 
Real-World Implications of Photo Manipulation in the Digital Age 
 
“Photography allows us to uncritically think. We imagine that photographs provide a 
magic path to truth.” 
Errol Morris (2011) 
 
Consequences of digitally manipulating images 
The rise of photo manipulation has consequences across almost all domains, from 
law enforcement and national security, through to scientific publishing, politics, media, 
and advertising. As outlined in Chapter 1, photos are extremely persuasive. People have 
a misplaced trust in the integrity of photos—often placing too much faith in the 
reliability and accuracy of photos (Kelly & Nace, 1994; Parry, 2009; Sturken & 
Cartwright, 2009). Worryingly, however, it has never been easier for images to 
misrepresent the truth. 
Photo evidence on trial 
One reason to be concerned about the rise of photo manipulation is that photos are 
routinely used in legal proceedings. Photos can be used to explain or illustrate the 
testimony of a witness (Mnookin, 1998; Parry, 2009; Peterson, 2010); for example, a 
photo of the crime scene can help a witness to more precisely explain where and how the 
crime occurred. In addition, photos can be used as substantive evidence; that is, to prove 
the truth of a fact at issue. For example, a defendant’s claim to have never met the victim 
could be disproved by photo evidence showing these two people together. To give 
another example, if a defendant testifies that they were at home on the evening of the 
crime, photo evidence showing them anywhere other than at home that evening 
disproves that aspect of their testimony. In the United States, the admissibility of 
photographic evidence has long been governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence 
(Robinson, 2013). When these rules were enacted in 1975, photos were presumed to be 
reliable sources of information for two main reasons. First, the complex and costly task 
of altering analogue photos meant that it was reasonable to assume that photos were, 
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more often than not, truthful. Second, even if analogue photos were altered, these 
manipulations were relatively easy to detect (Parry, 2009). In the 1990s, however, the 
criminal justice system started to use digital photography and now digital has become 
the norm (Johnson, 2012). Digital photos are far easier to manipulate, and the resulting 
fakes can be extremely difficult to detect (Farid, 2006). Yet despite these important 
differences an advisory group to the Federal Rules of Evidence has concluded that 
changes to the rules are not necessary (Hannon, 2014; Johnson, 2012; Robinson, 2013). 
Therefore, digital photos are admissible as evidence on the same grounds as analogue 
photos (Facciola & Barrett, 2016; Federal Rules of Evidence, 1975; Galves, 2000; J. L. 
Moore, 2010; Parry, 2009; Paul, 2008). 
Typically, then, admitting digital photos simply requires a witness to testify that 
the photo portrays the subject matter fairly and accurately (Federal Rules of Evidence, 
1975; Peterson, 2010). When photos are used as substantive evidence, as opposed to 
illustrate witness testimony, the rules further stipulate that the photo should be the 
original—this is known as the best evidence rule (Federal Rules of Evidence, 1975; 
Parry, 2009). Of course, with analogue photography it is possible to use the negative to 
determine whether the photo is the original, but identifying the original version of a 
digital photo can be extremely difficult. As such, the best evidence rule is outdated and, 
even for substantive photo evidence, witness testimony often provides the basis for 
determining whether a photo is admitted into evidence or not (Parry, 2009). 
Furthermore, courts will admit digitally enhanced photos into evidence providing 
that there is adequate expert testimony concerning the digital enhancement process 
(Guilsham, 1992; Parry, 2009). Essentially, someone who is considered to hold expert 
knowledge about the program used to enhance the photo is required to testify about the 
method of enhancement and to confirm that the enhancement has not, intentionally or 
through negligence, resulted in the manipulation of data (Guthrie & Mitchell, 2007). 
Therefore, digital photos are usually admissible as evidence providing that either a lay or 
expert witness testifies that the photo offers a fair and accurate representation of the 
subject matter. These reasonably general and relaxed criteria concerning the admission 
of photographic evidence might have been sufficient in the analogue age when it was 
reasonable to believe in the integrity of images (Mnookin, 1998; Parry, 2009). In the 
digital age, however, the integrity of images has been eroded due to the ease of photo 
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manipulation and these guidelines may no longer be viable (e.g., Facciola & Barrett, 
2016; Farid, 2009b; Parry, 2009; Porter, 2014). Indeed, the attempt to simply assimilate 
digital within the existing rules for analogue photo evidence has inevitably put the courts 
at a heightened risk of fraud (Mnookin, 1998; Paul, 2004; Porter, 2014). 
Worryingly, the availability of powerful and affordable digital-editing tools means 
that nearly anyone can create a manipulation that is difficult to detect. For instance, with 
only a small amount of practice using manipulation software, a layperson can remove a 
bruise or scar, change a license plate, or even add a person to a scene (Farid, 2008). 
Furthermore, with this ease of creating sophisticated digital fakes, even honest witnesses 
might inadvertently testify to the authenticity of a photo, unaware that it has been 
changed (Parry, 2009). This scenario is not that farfetched given that witnesses often 
testify about the information captured in photos months, or even years, after a crime. 
Therefore, a number of legal scholars have suggested that the standards set for 
authentication are not sufficient to prevent manipulated photos becoming evidence that a 
jury will trust (e.g., Mnookin, 1998; Parry, 2009; Porter, 2014). Despite the danger of 
admitting fraudulent digital photos into evidence, lawyers and courts very rarely 
challenge them. One possible explanation is a lack of awareness in the legal community 
regarding the features of digital photos that make them less reliable than analogue 
photos; regardless of the format, photos are still considered inherently trustworthy and 
objective (Mnookin, 1998; Sturken & Cartwright, 2009). Other than running the risk of 
photo forgeries being used unfairly as evidence in legal cases, this lack of challenge to 
the way that digital photos are admitted as evidence means that the issues perpetuate. It 
is possible, then, that the inappropriate use of digital photos could contribute to wrongful 
convictions. 
The legal case of Alfred Swinton illustrates the potential dangers of having lax 
criteria for admitting digital photos in court and having judges and jurors who are too 
willing to trust photos. In 2001, Swinton was sentenced to 60 years in prison for the 
murder of Carla Terry (Baron, 2008; Connecticut v. Swinton, 2004). Terry was murdered 
a decade earlier in 1991, and although Swinton was arrested at the time, the charges 
were dismissed based on insufficient evidence (Connecticut v. Swinton, 2004). By the 
end of the 1990s, technology had advanced and a new image-enhancing software, Lucis 
Pro, became available to Connecticut’s State Police Forensic Science Lab (Baron, 2008). 
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The prosecution used this software to enhance photos of bite marks on the victim’s body 
(Connecticut v. Swinton, 2004). With these photos now clearly showing the victim’s bite 
marks, the prosecution were able to go a step further and overlay Swinton’s bite pattern 
using Adobe Photoshop® software. Dr Constantine Karazulas, a forensic odontologist, 
presented this new photo evidence to corroborate his testimony that the defendant’s bite 
pattern was a match for the bite marks on the victim’s body. With this new evidence, 
Swinton was convicted. 
Swinton maintained his innocence and in 2004 appealed to the Connecticut 
Supreme Court contesting, primarily, the use of the new digitally enhanced photo 
evidence (Connecticut v. Swinton, 2004; Guthrie & Mitchell, 2007). To adhere to the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, enhanced photos must be corroborated through expert 
testimony to assure the court about the adequacy and reliability of the digital 
enhancement process (Guilsham, 1992; Parry, 2009). The defence stated that such 
testimony was not provided and thus the digitally enhanced photo evidence had been 
improperly admitted as evidence. The Court ruled that there was sufficient expert 
testimony given in support of the Lucis Pro enhanced photos of the victim’s bite marks 
but not for the overlay photos created using Adobe Photoshop (Connecticut v. Swinton, 
2004; Guthrie & Mitchell, 2007). Therefore the Court held that the trial court had acted 
improperly when admitting these overlay photos. That said, the Court also determined 
that the defendant had been able to effectively discredit the use of these photos through 
the testimony of his own expert witness. In conclusion, the Court considered the 
improper admission of these photos had been harmless and rejected the defendant’s 
appeal (Connecticut v. Swinton, 2004; Guthrie & Mitchell, 2007). 
At the time of writing the Swinton case has again made the news (Altimari & 
Owens, 2017). New DNA testing indicates that Swinton is highly unlikely to be the 
source of the bites. Furthermore, the prosecution’s forensic odontologist, Karazulas, has 
recanted his original testimony, admitting in a signed affidavit that many thousands of 
individuals could be responsible for the bite marks (Altimari & Owens, 2017). The 
Innocence Project has presented a petition for a new trial and are seeking to overturn 
Swinton’s murder conviction. 
Although it remains possible that Swinton is guilty of murdering Terry, new DNA 
evidence suggests it is near impossible that Swinton was the source of the bite marks. 
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And yet it was the digitally altered photos of these bite marks that provided the 
necessary evidence to take the Swinton case to trial. As outlined in Chapter 1, research 
shows that photos do not need to offer evidence of an event or fact to affect people’s 
judgements (Lindsay et al., 2004; Newman et al., 2012). In this case, it is possible that 
the digitally altered photos biased the jury to believe the claims made by Karazulas. As 
the Supreme Court pointed out, the defence did have an opportunity to discredit 
Karazulas’s testimony yet when jurors are given conflicting claims about the truth, 
photos often help them to judge where the truth lies (Newman & Feigenson, 2013; 
Parry, 2009). Even when photos are used as an illustration, to clarify something rather 
than to corroborate it, they can reinforce beliefs, or even persuade a jury to believe in the 
truth of the statements they accompany (Parry, 2009). 
The Swinton case also demonstrates the ease with which courts will admit digitally 
altered photos. What does this mean for photos that are manipulated intentionally to 
deceive the court? Would those involved in the case be able to determine the 
authenticity of the photo? Assuming people are unable to detect that these photos have 
been altered, it suggests that they too will act as powerful, albeit fraudulent, cues for the 
jury to make judgements of truth in a court of law. Thus it is important to understand 
whether people are able to identify photo forgeries. 
Digital photo manipulation and well-being 
Another reason to be concerned about photo manipulation is that it has become 
standard for advertisers and magazine editors to use digital photo-editing software to 
alter a person’s appearance (Kee & Farid, 2011). On the one hand, these alterations can 
include relatively minor retouching, for instance whitening teeth, and removing a few 
wrinkles and blemishes. Or the alterations can be more extreme and incorporate liberal 
changes to body shape, for instance lengthening legs, and trimming the waist and 
stomach (Sheehan, 2014). Continual exposure to photos in the media of impossibly thin, 
tall, wrinkle- and blemish-free models and celebrities contributes to the formation of 
unrealistic beauty goals and aspirations such as the creation of a thin-body ideal (Fallon, 
1990; Heinberg, 1996; Morry & Staska, 2001; Owen & Spencer, 2013; Stice, Schupak-
Neuberg, Shaw, & Stein, 1994; Stice & Shaw, 1994). A body of research now suggests a 
link exists between the internalisation of unattainable physical beauty and body 
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dissatisfaction, negative affect, or even eating disorders (e.g., Grabe, Ward, & Hyde, 
2008; Groesz, Levine, & Murnen, 2002; Thompson & Heinberg, 1999; Thompson & 
Stice, 2001). Some researchers have proposed that the media’s portrayal of the ideal 
appearance sets difficult-to-achieve, if not impossible, standards of physical beauty and 
thinness, thereby creating a discrepancy between expectation and reality (Thompson, 
Heinberg, Altabe, & Tantleff-Dunn, 1999; Tiggemann & McGill, 2004). It is this 
discrepancy that can lead to psychological problems as well as put people at risk of 
engaging in dangerous eating and exercise behaviour. 
Unfortunately, the problem of setting impossible standards for beauty has been 
exacerbated by the fact that the magic of digital retouching is no longer reserved for 
those appearing in the fashion, entertainment, and advertising industries—literally 
anyone can airbrush a photo (Sheehan, 2014), and they regularly do. In fact, it has 
become so normal to airbrush photos that in 2012 Jesse Rosten, a TV-commercial 
director, created a parody commercial for a beauty product dubbed Fotoshop by Adobé. 
The commercial mocks the ease with which digital software can be used to implement a 
variety of techniques to drastically transform appearance (Sheehan, 2014). The parody 
clearly struck a chord with the general public, reaching 5 million views in just a few 
days. Although Rosten’s parody commercial takes a sarcastic and humorous view of 
extreme digital retouching, we know that such practices can have extremely serious 
consequences. People are increasingly bombarded with airbrushed photos, not only of a 
specific group of celebrities and models, but also of their friends and family (Sheehan, 
2014). The barrage of photos depicting an idealised standard of beauty that is 
unattainable, unhealthy, and of course unreal, is ever-growing and reinforces the 
perception of a discrepancy between expectation and reality. Ultimately, then, people are 
judging themselves against something that is not real, against a digitally created ideal. 
Evidence suggests that these fake photos carry meaning and influence people both 
psychologically and physically. This issue of continually subjecting people to idealised 
standards of beauty is widely recognised. A handful of celebrities are rejecting digital 
retouching in an attempt to promote positive body image messages to young girls and 
boys around the world (Baron, 2008). For example, when GQ featured an excessively 
airbrushed photo of Kate Winslet on its cover the actor famously responded to affirm 
that she does not look like the photo of her, and nor does she desire to (Baron, 2008; 
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Sheehan, 2014). More recently, Winslet signed a new contract with global beauty brand 
L’Oréal but stipulated a clause to prevent airbrushing being used on any of her photos 
(Saul, 2015). Taking a similar stance, Dame Helen Mirren refused to allow airbrushed 
photos of her to be used in her first campaign for L’Oréal (Young & Silverman, 2014). 
The pervasiveness of digital retouching to alter a person’s appearance has also led 
to the implementation of more formalised interventions (Gladstone, 2016). In 2012, 
Israeli lawmakers adopted the Weight Restriction Law in an attempt to diminish the 
unrealistic standards of physical beauty in two ways; the body mass index (BMI)-based 
hiring requirement and the advertisement-labelling requirement (Levush, 2012). Of 
particular relevance here is the advertisement-labelling requirement which focuses on 
digitally manipulated images and stipulates that any image showing a model whose 
appearance has been altered must feature a clear and prominent disclaimer label to 
indicate this is the case. Similar laws have been passed in Italy, Spain, and most recently 
France (“France Bans Extremely Thin Models,” 2017; Wallwork, 2015). The United 
Kingdom are also considering such legislation (Clark, 2016; Hooton, 2016). 
Many applaud these legislative movements to challenge the permeation of 
unrealistic standards of physical beauty, however, the changes are not without criticism 
(Gladstone, 2016). Advertisers and publishers continue to resist any such legislation and 
criticise the limitations it places on free expression and artistic freedom (Kee & Farid, 
2011; Turley, 2012). Yet, criticism aside, an important outstanding question is whether 
the strategy of using disclaimer labels to indicate to viewers that the photos have been 
retouched actually works. Research does suggest that viewing healthy weight models—
as in the Dove Campaign for Real Beauty—results in a more healthy body ideal and 
more positive affect than viewing very thin models (Owen & Spencer, 2013). 
Furthermore, there is some evidence to suggest that women at risk of developing eating 
disorders are less likely to act on diet urges after viewing images of healthy weight 
models as opposed to underweight models (Fister & Smith, 2004). Yet simply adding a 
label to a photo to say it has been digitally altered does not prevent people from viewing 
a model who is impossibly thin or attractive. In addition, the labels do not differentiate 
between minor alterations and modifications that dramatically alter a person’s 
appearance (Kee & Farid, 2011). Therefore, is a disclaimer label enough? Recent 
findings suggest not. Several studies have shown that adding disclaimer labels to 
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indicate an image as altered failed to offer protective effects across various measures 
including body dissatisfaction, negative affect, or intent to diet (Ata, Thompson, & 
Small, 2013; Bissell, 2006; Harrison & Hefner, 2014; Tiggemann, Slater, Bury, 
Hawkins, & Firth, 2013). Moreover, in a recent study, researchers found that exposure to 
a thin-body ideal image with a disclaimer label that used the specific wording suggested 
by the French law—“This image has been altered to modify a person’s bodily 
appearance.”—resulted in increased accessibility to negative thoughts (Selimbegović & 
Chatard, 2015). Some researchers have hypothesised that disclaimer labels might 
actually encourage viewers to direct more, rather than less, visual attention to the 
model’s body than they normally would (Selimbegović & Chatard, 2015; Tiggemann et 
al., 2013). These results suggest that using disclaimer labels on airbrushed photos might 
have counter-productive effects and accentuate the precise problems they were intended 
to address. 
It is encouraging that steps are being taken to address the negative impact of the 
ubiquity of idealised and unrealistic representations of physical beauty. It is unfortunate, 
however, that the implemented “solutions” have not been formulated on the basis of 
sound empirical research. With several countries choosing to enact disclaimer-related 
legislation, it is important to note that doing so might have undesirable consequences 
and act to reinforce the very problems the legislation was intended to mitigate. As it 
stands, there is a real risk of inadvertently accentuating the problem rather than 
improving it. The lack of empirical research showing positive effects of disclaimer 
labels highlights an urgent need for a more comprehensive research program. One area 
of research that has not been explored is whether people can in fact identify when photos 
have been airbrushed. A better understanding of how people perceive digitally altered 
photos will be helpful to inform and guide policy makers and legislators towards the 
most effective forms of intervention. 
Consequences of taking so many photos 
Although the frequency with which photos are altered has grown phenomenally in 
the digital age, the actual practice of manipulating images is nearly as old as 
photography itself. A relatively recent development, however, is people’s tendency to 
take so many photos. Digital technology has revolutionised the ease with which people 
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capture photos (Whittaker, Bergman, & Clough, 2010). Given the remarkable rise in the 
number of photos that people take, scientific research has recently begun to explore the 
ways that taking so many photos might be affecting people.  
Of particular interest is the question of how the act of taking photos might affect 
people’s memory. One popular suggestion is that people take photos to help them to 
remember—in the future the photos can act as a memory trigger to help bring to mind 
past experiences (e.g., Chalfen, 1987; Harrison, 2002; Whittaker et al., 2010). Others 
have suggested, however, that taking photos might in fact do the opposite; that is, taking 
photos might impair people’s ability to remember the past because their attention is 
focused on capturing their experiences on camera rather than on the experience per se 
(Mols, Broekhuijsen, van den Hoven, Markopoulos, & Eggen, 2015). In support of the 
latter suggestion, a recent study revealed that the act of taking photos can impair 
people’s memory for the photographed content (Henkel, 2014). The new effect, termed 
the photo-taking impairment effect is an interesting finding and has great importance 
given that the number of photos taken continues to increase exponentially each year 
(Heyman, 2015). Of course, the question of how photography can influence human 
memory has only been an important consideration since people began to take so many 
photos. Therefore, there are many outstanding empirical questions to explore. Further 
research is required to help gain a better understanding of why and how taking photos 
can impair memory and also to more generally advance theoretical knowledge about the 
workings of human memory. 
Thesis aims and outline 
This thesis comprises of two parts and aims to extend current understanding of the 
effect of digital photography on memory and cognition. Although it is likely that people 
regularly make judgements about image authenticity, there is surprisingly little research 
looking at people’s ability to perceive image manipulation. Further, it is evident that in 
some situations incorrectly accepting a manipulated image as authentic can have 
extremely serious consequences. Therefore, Part One of this thesis comprises of a 
program of research that examines people’s ability to discriminate between authentic 
and manipulated images. Part Two of this thesis examines how the act of taking photos 
can affect people’s memory. 
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The main aims of this thesis are to: 
1. Examine the extent to which people are able to discriminate between authentic and 
manipulated photos of real-world scenes. 
2. Explore people’s ability to make use of two image properties—shadows and 
reflections—to help distinguish between authentic images and manipulated ones. 
3. Investigate how taking photos affects people’s memory of the photographed 
content. 
 
Part One comprises of Chapters 3 to 5. Chapter 3 examines an important, yet 
previously unexplored, question: can people detect and locate manipulations in photos of 
real-world scenes? Chapters 4 and 5 then examine whether people can make use of 
information from two image properties—shadows and reflections—to help to distinguish 
between authentic and manipulated images. In Part Two of this thesis, Chapters 6 and 7 
further explore people’s recent tendency to take so many photos and the potential effect 
this has on memory. Finally, Chapter 8 presents a general discussion of these seven 
chapters, framing the findings within the context of the wider literature, identifying 
possible limitations, and outlining possible areas for further research. 
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Part One 
Chapter 3 : 
Can people identify original and manipulated photos of real-world 
scenes 
 
“... faking has enjoyed a quantum leap with the advent of computerized manipulation. 
Now, with digital cameras, there is no “original” to compare... Fraudulent practice is 
easy and detection difficult, and photography will never be the same again.” 
Philip Jones Griffiths (n.d.) 
 
Introduction 
In 2015, one of the world’s most prestigious photojournalism events—The World 
Press Photo Contest—was shrouded in controversy following the disqualification of 22 
entrants, including an overall prize winner, for manipulating their photo entries. News of 
the disqualifications led to a heated public debate about the role of photo manipulation 
in photojournalism. World Press Photo responded by issuing a new code of ethics for the 
forthcoming contest that stipulated entrants “must ensure their pictures provide an 
accurate and fair representation of the scene they witnessed so the audience is not 
misled” (World Press Photo, n.d.). They also introduced new safeguards for detecting 
manipulated images, including a computerised photo-verification test for entries 
reaching the penultimate round of the competition. The need for such a verification 
process highlights the difficulties competition organisers face in trying to authenticate 
images. If photography experts cannot spot manipulated images, what hope is there for 
amateur photographers or other consumers of photographic images? This is the question 
we aimed to answer. That is, to what extent can lay people distinguish authentic photos 
from fakes? 
Digital image and manipulation technology has surged in the previous decades. 
People are taking more photos than ever before. Estimates suggested that one trillion 
photos would be taken in 2015 alone (Worthington, 2014), and that, on average, more 
than 350 million photos per day are uploaded to Facebook—that is over 14 million 
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photos per hour or 4000 photos per second (Smith, 2013). Coinciding with this increased 
popularity of photos is the increasing frequency with which they are being manipulated. 
Although it is difficult to estimate the prevalence of photo manipulation, a recent global 
survey of photojournalists found that 76% regard photo manipulation as a serious 
problem, 51% claim to always or often enhance in-camera or RAW (i.e., unprocessed) 
files, and 25% admit that they, at least sometimes, alter the content of photos (Hadland, 
Campbell, & Lambert, 2015). Together these findings suggest that we are regularly 
exposed to a mix of real and fake images. 
The prevalence and popularity of manipulated images raises two important 
questions. First, to what extent do manipulated images alter our thinking about the past? 
We know that images can have a powerful influence on our memories, beliefs, and 
behaviour (e.g., Newman et al., 2012; Wade et al., 2002; Wade, Green, & Nash, 2010). 
Merely viewing a doctored photo and attempting to recall the event it depicts can lead 
people to remember wholly false experiences, such as taking a childhood hot air balloon 
ride or meeting the Warner Brothers character Bugs Bunny at Disneyland (Braun et al., 
2002; Sacchi et al., 2007; Strange et al., 2006). Thus, if people cannot differentiate 
between real and fake details in photos, manipulations could frequently alter what we 
believe and remember. 
Second, to what extent should photos be admissible as evidence in court? Laws 
governing the use of photographic evidence in legal cases, such as the Federal Rules of 
Evidence (1975), have not kept up with digital change (Parry, 2009). Photos were once 
difficult to manipulate; the process was complex, laborious, and required expertise. Yet 
in the digital age, even novices can use sophisticated image-editing software to create 
detailed and compelling fake images. The Federal Rules of Evidence state that the 
content of a photo can be proven if a witness confirms it is fair and accurate. Put another 
way, the person who took the photo, any person who subsequently handles it, or any 
person present when the photo was taken, is not required to testify about the authenticity 
of the photo. If people cannot distinguish between original and fake photos, then 
litigants might use manipulated images to intentionally deceive the court, or even testify 
about images, unaware they have been changed. 
Unfortunately, there is no simple solution to prevent people from being fooled by 
manipulated photos in everyday life or in the criminal arena (Parry, 2009). But the 
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newly emerging field of image forensics is making it possible to better protect against 
photo fraud (e.g., Farid, 2006). Image forensics uses digital technology to determine 
image authenticity, and is based on the premise that digital manipulation alters the 
values of the pixels that make up an image. Put simply, the act of manipulating a photo 
leaves behind a trace, even if only subtle and not visible to the naked eye (Farid, 2009a). 
Given that different types of manipulations—for instance, cloning, retouching, 
splicing—affect the underlying pixels in unique and systematic ways, image forensic 
experts can develop computer methods to reveal image forgeries. Such technological 
developments are being implemented in several domains, including law, 
photojournalism, and scientific publishing (Oosterhoff, 2015). The vast majority of 
image authenticity judgments, however, are still made by eye, and to our knowledge 
only one published study has explored the extent to which people can detect 
inconsistencies in images. 
Farid and Bravo (2010) investigated how well people can make use of three 
cues—shadows, reflections, and perspective distortion—that are often indicative of 
photo tampering. The researchers created a series of computer-generated scenes 
consisting of basic geometrical shapes. Some scenes, for instance, were consistent with a 
single light source whereas others were inconsistent with a single light source. When the 
inconsistencies were obvious, that is, when shadows ran in opposite directions, 
observers were able to identify tampering with nearly 100% accuracy. Yet when the 
inconsistencies were subtle, for instance, where the shadows were a combination of 
results from two different light positions on the same side of the room, observers 
performed only slightly better than chance. These preliminary findings, based on 
computer-generated scenes of geometric objects, suggest that the human visual system is 
poor at identifying inconsistencies in such images. 
In the current study we examined whether people are similarly poor at detecting 
inconsistencies within images of real-world scenes. On the one hand, we might expect 
people to perform even worse if trying to detect manipulations in real-world photos. 
Research shows that real-world photos typically contain many multi-element objects that 
can obscure distortions (Bex, 2010; Hulleman & Olivers, 2015). For example, people 
with the visual impairment metamorphopsia often do not notice any problems with their 
vision in their everyday experiences, yet the impairment is quite apparent when they 
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view simple stimuli, such as a grid of evenly spaced horizontal and vertical lines 
(Amsler, 1953; Bouwens & Meurs, 2003). We also know that people find it more 
difficult to detect certain types of distortions, such as changes to image contrast, in 
complex real-world scenes than in more simplistic stimuli (Bex, 2010; Bex, Solomon, & 
Dakin, 2009). In sum, if people find it particularly difficult to detect manipulations in 
complex real-world scenes, then we might expect our subjects to perform worse than 
Farid and Bravo’s (2010) subjects. 
On the other hand, there is good reason to predict that people might do well at 
detecting manipulations in real-world scenes. Visual cognition research suggests that 
people might detect image manipulations using their knowledge of the typical 
appearance of real-world scenes. Real-world scenes share common properties, such as 
the way the luminance values of the pixels are organised and structured (Barlow, 1961; 
Gardner-Medwin & Barlow, 2001; Olshausen & Field, 2000). Over time, the human 
visual system has become attuned to such statistical regularities and has expectations 
about how scenes should look. When an image is manipulated, the structure of the image 
properties change, which can create a mismatch between what people see and what they 
expect to see (Craik, 1943; Friston, 2005; Rao & Ballard, 1999; Tolman, 1948). Thus, 
based on this real-world scene statistics account, we might predict that people should be 
able to use this “mismatch” as a cue to detecting a manipulation. If so, our subjects 
should perform better than chance at detecting manipulations in real-world scenes. 
Although there is a lack of research directly investigating the applied question of 
people’s ability to detect photo forgeries, people’s ability to detect change in a scene is 
well-studied in the field of visual cognition. Notably, change blindness is the striking 
finding that, in some situations, people are surprisingly slow, or entirely unable, to detect 
changes made to, or find differences between, two scenes (e.g., Pashler, 1988; Simons, 
1996; Simons & Levin, 1997). In some of the early studies, researchers demonstrated 
observers’ inability to detect changes made to a scene during an eye movement 
(saccade) using very simple stimuli (e.g., Wallach & Lewis, 1966), and later, in complex 
real-world scenes (e.g., Grimes, 1996). Researchers have also shown that change 
blindness occurs even when the eyes are fixated on the scene: the flicker paradigm, for 
instance, simulates the effects of a saccade or eye blink by inserting a blank screen 
between the continuous and sequential presentation of an original and changed image 
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(Rensink, O’Regan, & Clark, 1997). It often requires a large number of alternations 
between the two images before the change can be identified. Furthermore, change 
blindness persists when the original and changed images are shown side by side (Scott-
Brown, Baker, & Orbach, 2000), when change is masked by a camera cut in motion 
pictures (Levin & Simons, 1997), and even when change occurs in real-world situations 
(Simons & Levin, 1998). 
Such striking failures of perception suggest that people do not automatically form 
a complete and detailed visual representation of a scene in memory. Therefore, to detect 
change, it might be necessary to draw effortful, focused attention to the changed aspect 
(Simons & Levin, 1998). So which aspects of a scene are most likely to gain focused 
attention? One suggestion is that attention is guided by salience; the more salient aspects 
of a scene attract attention and are represented more precisely than the less salient ones. 
In support of this idea, research has shown that changes to more important objects are 
more readily detected than changes made to less important objects (Rensink et al., 
1997). Other findings, however, indicate that observers sometimes miss even large 
changes to central aspects of a scene (Simons & Levin, 1998). Therefore, the question of 
what determines scene saliency continues to be explored. Specifically, researchers 
disagree about whether the low-level visual salience of objects in a scene, such as 
brightness (e.g., Lansdale, Underwood, & Davies, 2010; Pringle, Irwin, Kramer, & 
Atchley, 2001; Spotorno & Faure, 2011) or the high-level semantic meaning of the scene 
(Stirk & Underwood, 2007) has the most influence on attentional allocation. 
What other factors affect people’s susceptibility to change blindness? One robust 
finding in the signal detection literature is that the ability to make accurate perceptual 
decisions is related to the strength of the signal and the amount of noise (Green & Swets, 
1966). Signal detection theory has been applied to change detection. In one study, 
observers judged whether two sequentially presented arrays of coloured dots remained 
identical or if there was a change (Wilken & Ma, 2004). Crucially, the researchers 
manipulated the strength of the signal in the change trials by varying the number of 
coloured dots in the display that changed, while noise (total set size) remained constant. 
Performance improved as a function of the number of dots in the display that changed 
colour—put simply, greater signal resulted in greater change detection. 
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Given the lack of research investigating people’s ability to detect photo forgeries, 
change blindness offers a highly relevant area of research. A key difference between the 
change blindness research and our current experiments, however, is that our change 
detection task does not involve a comparison of two images; therefore, representing the 
scene in memory is not a factor in our research. That is, subjects do not compare the 
original and manipulated versions of an image. Instead, they make their judgment based 
on viewing only a single image. This image is either the original, unaltered image or an 
image that has been manipulated in some way. 
In the current study, we explored people’s ability to identify common types of 
image manipulations that are frequently applied to real-world photos. We distinguished 
between physically implausible versus plausible manipulations. For example, a 
physically implausible image might depict an outdoor scene lit only by the sun with a 
person’s shadow running one way and a car’s shadow running the other way. Such 
shadows imply the impossible: two suns. Alternatively, when an unfamiliar face is 
retouched in an image it is quite plausible; eliminating spots and wrinkles or whitening 
teeth do not contradict physical constraints in the world that govern how faces ought to 
look. In our study, geometrical and shadow manipulations made up our implausible 
manipulation category, while airbrushing and addition or subtraction manipulations 
made up our plausible manipulation category. Our fifth manipulation type, super-
additive, presented all four manipulation types in a single image and thus included both 
categories of manipulation. 
We had a number of predictions about people’s ability to detect and locate 
manipulations in real-world photos. We expected the type of manipulation—implausible 
versus plausible—to affect people’s ability to detect and locate manipulations. In 
particular, people should correctly identify more of the physically implausible 
manipulations than the physically plausible manipulations given the availability of 
evidence within the photo. We also expected people to be better at correctly detecting 
and locating manipulations that caused more change to the pixels in the photo than 
manipulations that caused less change. 
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Experiment 1 
Method 
Subjects and design 
A total of 707 subjects (M = 25.8 years, SD = 8.8, range = 14–82; 460 male, 226 
female, 21 declined to respond) completed the task online. A further 17 subjects were 
excluded from the analyses because they had missing response time data for at least one 
response on the detection or location task. There were no geographical restrictions and 
subjects did not receive payment for taking part, but they did receive feedback on their 
performance at the end of the task. Subject recruitment stopped when we reached at least 
100 responses per photo. We used a within-subjects design in which each person viewed 
a series of ten photos, half of which had one of five manipulation types applied, and half 
of which were original, non-manipulated photos. We measured people’s accuracy in 
determining whether a photo had been manipulated or not and their ability to locate 
manipulations. 
Stimuli 
We obtained ten coloured images (JPEG format), 1600 × 1200 pixels, that depicted 
people in real-world scenes from Google Image search (permitted for non-commercial 
re-use with modification). We used GNU Image Manipulation Program® (GIMP, 
Version 2.8) to apply five different, commonly used manipulation techniques: (a) 
airbrushing, (b) addition or subtraction, (c) geometrical inconsistency, (d) shadow 
inconsistency, and (e) super-additive (manipulations a to d included within a single 
image). For the airbrushing technique, we changed the person’s appearance by 
whitening their teeth, removing spots, wrinkles, or sweat, or brightening their eye 
colour. For the addition or subtraction technique, we added or removed objects, or parts 
of objects. For example, we removed links between tower columns on a suspension 
bridge and inserted a boat into a river scene. For geometrical inconsistencies, we created 
physically implausible changes, such as distorting angles of buildings or sheering trees 
in different directions to others to indicate inconsistent wind direction. For shadow 
inconsistencies, we removed or changed the direction of a shadow to make it 
incompatible with the remaining shadows in the scene. For instance, flipping a person’s 
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face around the vertical axis causes the shadow to appear on the wrong side compared 
with the rest of the body and scene. For the super-additive technique we presented all 
four previously described manipulation types in one photo. Figure 3.1 shows examples 
of the five manipulation types. 
In total, we had ten photos of different real-world scenes. The non-manipulated 
version of each of these ten photos was used to create our original photo set. To generate 
the manipulated photos, we applied each of the five manipulation types to six of the ten 
photos, creating six versions of each manipulation for a total of 30 manipulated photos. 
This gave us an overall set of 40 photos. Subjects saw each of the five manipulation 
types and five original images but always on a different photo. 
Image-based saliency cues can determine where subjects direct their attention; 
thus, we checked whether our manipulations had changed the salience of the 
manipulated area within the image. To examine this, we ran the images through two 
independent saliency models: the classic Itti-Koch model (Itti & Koch, 2000; Itti, Koch, 
& Niebur, 1998) and the Graph-Based Visual Saliency (GBVS) model (Harel, Koch, & 
Perona, 2006). To summarise, we found that our manipulations did not inadvertently 
change the salience of the manipulated regions. See Appendix A for details of these 
analyses. 
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Figure 3.1. Samples of manipulated photos. (a) Original photo; (b) airbrushing—
removal of sweat on the nose, cheeks, and chin, and removal of wrinkles around the 
eyes; (c) addition or subtraction—two links between the columns of the tower of the 
suspension bridge removed; (d) geometrical inconsistency—top of the bridge is sheered 
at an angle inconsistent with the rest of the bridge; (e) shadow inconsistency—face is 
flipped around the vertical axis so that the light is on the wrong side of the face 
compared with lighting in the rest of the scene; (f) super-additive—combination of all 
previously described manipulations. Original photo credit: Vin Cox, CC BY-SA 3.0 
license. Photos b–f are derivatives of the original and licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0. 
46 
 
Procedure 
Subjects answered questions about their demographics, attitudes towards image 
manipulation, and experiences of taking and manipulating photos. Subjects were then 
shown a practice photo and instructed to adjust their browser zoom level so that the full 
image was visible. Next, subjects were presented with ten photos in a random order and 
they had an unlimited amount of time to view and respond to each photo. We first 
measured subjects’ ability to detect whether each photo had been manipulated by asking 
“Do you think this photograph has been digitally altered?” Subjects were given three 
response options: (a) “Yes, and I can see exactly where the digital alteration has been 
made”; (b) “Yes, but I cannot see specifically what has been digitally altered”; or (c) 
“No.” For the manipulated photos, we considered either of the “yes” responses as 
correct; for original photos we considered “no” as correct. Following a “yes” response, 
we immediately measured subjects’ ability to locate the manipulation by presenting the 
same photo again with a 3 × 3 grid overlaid1 (see Figure 3.2 for an example). Subjects 
were asked to: “Please select the box that you believe contains the digitally altered area 
of the photograph (if you believe that more than one region contains digital alteration, 
please select the one you feel contains the majority of the change).” On average, 
manipulations spanned two regions in the grid. For the analyses we considered a 
response to be correct if the subject clicked on a region that contained any of the 
manipulated area or a nearby area that could be used as evidence that a manipulation had 
taken place—a relatively liberal criterion. Subjects received feedback on their 
performance at the end of the study. 
                                                          
1 In Experiment 2, subjects attempted to localise the manipulation regardless of their response in the 
detection task. 
47 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Example of a photo with the location grid overlaid. Photo credit: Vin Cox, 
CC BY-SA 3.0 license. 
 
Results and discussion 
An analysis of the response time data suggested that subjects were engaged with 
the task and spent a reasonable amount of time determining which photos were 
authentic. In the detection task, the mean response time per photo was 43.8 s (SD = 73.3 
s) and the median response time 30.4 s (interquartile range 21.4, 47.7 s). In the location 
task, the mean response time was 10.5 s (SD = 5.7 s) and the median response time 9.1 s 
(interquartile range 6.5, 13.1 s). Following Cumming’s (2012) recommendations, we 
present our findings in line with the estimation approach by calculating a precise 
estimate of the actual size of the effects. 
Overall accuracy on the detection task and the location task 
We now turn to our primary research question: To what extent can people detect 
and locate manipulations of real-world photos? For the detection task, we collapsed 
across the two “yes” response options such that if subjects responded either “Yes, and I 
can see exactly where the digital alteration has been made” or “Yes, but I cannot see 
48 
 
specifically what has been digitally altered”, then we considered this to be a “yes” 
response. Thus, chance performance was 50%. Overall performance on the detection 
task was better than chance; a mean 66% of the photos were correctly classified as 
original or manipulated, 95% confidence interval (CI)2 [65%, 67%]. Subjects’ ability to 
distinguish between original (72% correct) and manipulated (60% correct) photos of 
real-world scenes was reliably greater than zero, discrimination (d') = 0.80, 95% CI 
[0.74, 0.85]. Moreover, subjects showed a bias towards saying that photos were real; 
response bias (c) = 0.16, 95% CI [0.12, 0.19]. Although subjects’ ability to detect 
manipulated images was above chance, it was still far from perfect. Furthermore, even 
when subjects correctly indicated that a photo had been manipulated, they could not 
necessarily locate the manipulation. Collapsing over all manipulation types, a mean 45% 
of the manipulations were accurately located, 95% CI [43%, 46%]. To determine chance 
performance in the location task, we need to take into account that subjects were asked 
to select one of nine regions of the image. Therefore, subjects had less chance of being 
correct by guessing in the location task than the detection task. On average, the 
manipulations were contained within two of the nine regions. But because the chance of 
being correct by guessing varied for each image and each manipulation type, we ran a 
Monte Carlo simulation to determine the chance rate of selecting the correct region. 
Table 3.1 shows the results from 1 million simulated responses. Overall, chance 
performance was 24%; therefore, collectively, subjects performed better than chance on 
the location task. Overall, the results show that people have some (above chance) ability 
to detect and locate manipulations, although performance is far from perfect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 We report 95% confidence intervals to provide an estimate of the size of the effect—in 95% of cases, the 
population mean will fall within this range of values (Cumming, 2012). 
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Table 3.1 
Mean number of regions (out of a possible nine) containing manipulation and results of 
Monte Carlo simulation to determine chance performance in the location task by 
manipulation type and overall 
 Number of regions 
 
% correct by chance 
Manipulation Type M 
 
M 95% CI 
Airbrushing 1.83 
 
20 [20, 21] 
Add/Sub 1.33 
 
17 [17, 17] 
Geometry 1.50 
 
19 [18, 19] 
Shadow 1.67 
 
15 [15, 15] 
Super-Additive 4.33 
 
48 [48, 48] 
Overall 2.13  24 [24, 24] 
Note. CI = confidence interval. For each manipulation type, we show the mean number of regions that 
contained the manipulation across all six images. The manipulation type “Overall” is the mean number of 
manipulated regions across all six images and all five manipulation types. To determine chance 
performance in the location task, we ran a Monte Carlo simulation of 1 million responses based on the 
number of regions manipulated for each image and manipulation type. 
 
Ability to detect and locate by manipulation type 
We predicted that people’s ability to detect and locate manipulations might vary 
according to the manipulation type. Figure 3.3 shows subjects’ accuracy on both the 
detection and the location task by manipulation type. In line with our prediction, subjects 
were better at detecting manipulations that included physically implausible changes 
(geometrical inconsistencies, shadow inconsistencies, and super-additive manipulations) 
than images that included physically plausible changes (airbrushing alterations and 
addition or subtraction of objects). 
It was not the case, however, that subjects were necessarily better at locating the 
manipulation within the photo when the change was physically implausible. Figure 3.4 
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shows the proportion of manipulated photo trials in which subjects correctly detected a 
manipulation and also went on to correctly locate that manipulation, by manipulation 
type. Across both physically implausible and physically plausible manipulation types, 
subjects often correctly indicated that photos were manipulated but failed to then 
accurately locate the manipulation. Furthermore, although the physically implausible 
geometrical inconsistencies were more often correctly located, the shadow 
inconsistencies were only located equally as often as the physically plausible 
manipulation types—airbrushing and addition or subtraction. These findings suggest that 
people may find it easier to detect physically implausible, rather than plausible, 
manipulations, but this is not the case when it comes to locating the manipulation. 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Mean proportion of correct “detect” and “locate” decisions by type of photo 
manipulation. The dotted line represents chance performance for detection. The grey 
dotted lines on the locate bars represent chance performance by manipulation type in the 
location task. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
51 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Mean proportion of correct “locate” decisions when subjects correctly 
detected that the photo was manipulated (i.e., correctly said “Yes” on the detection task). 
The grey dotted lines on the bars represent chance performance for each manipulation 
type. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Image metrics and accuracy 
To understand more about people’s ability to identify image manipulations, we 
examined how the amount of change in a photo affects people’s accuracy in the 
detection and location tasks. When an image is digitally altered, the structure of the 
underlying elements—the pixels—are changed. This change can be quantified in 
numerous ways but we chose to use Delta-E76 because it is a measure based on both 
colour and luminance (Robertson, 1977). To calculate Delta-E, we first converted the 
images in Matlab® to L*a*b* colour space because it has a dimension for lightness as 
well as colour. Next we calculated the difference between corresponding pixels in the 
original and manipulated versions of each photo. Finally, these differences were 
averaged to give a single Delta-E score for each manipulated photo. A higher Delta-E 
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value indicates a greater amount of difference between the original and the manipulated 
photo.3 We calculated Delta-E for each of the 30 manipulated photos. 
Figure 3.5 shows the log Delta-E values on the x-axis, where larger values indicate 
more change in the colour and luminance values of pixels in the manipulated photos 
compared with their original counterpart. The proportions of correct detection (Figure 
3.5a) and location (Figure 3.5b) responses for each of the manipulated photos are 
presented on the y-axis. We found a positive relationship between the Delta-E measure 
and the proportion of photos that subjects correctly detected as manipulated, albeit not 
reaching significance: r(28) = 0.34, p = .07.4 Furthermore, the Delta-E measure was 
positively correlated with the proportion of manipulations that were correctly located, 
r(28) = 0.41, p = .03. As predicted, these data suggest that people might be sensitive to 
the low-level properties of real-world scenes when making judgments about the 
authenticity of photos. This finding is especially remarkable given that our subjects 
never saw the same scene more than once and so never saw the original version of a 
manipulated image. This finding fits with the proposition that disrupting the underlying 
pixel structure might exacerbate the difference between the manipulated photos and 
people’s expectations of how a scene should look. Presumably, these disruptions make it 
easier for people to accurately classify manipulated photos as being manipulated. We 
can also interpret these findings based on a signal detection account—adding greater 
signal (in our experiment, more change to an image, as measured by Delta-E) results in 
greater detection of that signal (Green & Swets, 1966; Wilken & Ma, 2004). 
 
                                                          
3 One limitation of the Delta-E measure is that a global change to an image, for instance adjusting the 
brightness of the entire image, would result in a high Delta-E value, yet such a change is likely to be 
difficult to detect. That said, in our research we are only concerned with local image changes and therefore 
Delta-E provides a useful measure. 
4 This is based on a two-tailed test, given that we would predict that detection rates would increase with 
the amount of change, we might consider a one-tailed test to be appropriate. With a one-tailed test, the 
relationship between Delta-E and the proportion of photos correctly detected as manipulated would be 
significant at the .035 level. 
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Figure 3.5. Mean proportion of correctly detected (a) and located (b) image 
manipulations by extent of pixel distortion as measured by Delta-E. The graphs show 
individual data points for each of the 30 manipulated images. 
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Next, we tested whether there was a relationship between the mean amount of 
change and the mean proportion of correct detection (Figure 3.6a) and location (Figure 
3.6b) responses by the category of manipulation type. As Figure 3.6 shows, there was a 
numerical, but non-significant, trend for a positive relationship between amount of 
change and the proportion of photos that subjects correctly detected as manipulated: 
r(3) = 0.68, p = .21. There was also a numerical trend for a positive relationship between 
amount of change and the proportion of manipulations that were correctly located: 
r(3) = 0.69, p = .19. 
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Figure 3.6. Mean proportion of correctly detected (a) and located (b) image 
manipulations by extent of pixel distortion as measured by Delta-E. The graphs show the 
mean values for each of the five categories of manipulation type. 
 
Individual factors in detecting and locating manipulations 
To determine whether individual factors play a role in detecting and locating 
manipulations, we gathered subjects’ demographic data, attitudes towards image 
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manipulation, and experiences of taking and manipulating photos. We also recorded 
subjects’ response times on the detection and location tasks. 
To determine how each factor influenced subjects’ performance on the 
manipulated image trials, we conducted two generalized estimating equation (GEE) 
analyses—one for accuracy on the detection task and one for accuracy on the location 
task. Specifically, we conducted a repeated measures logistic regression with GEE 
because our dependent variables were binary with both random and fixed effects (Liang 
& Zeger, 1986). For the detection task, we ran two additional repeated measures linear 
regression GEE models to explore the effect of the predictor variables on signal 
detection estimates d' and c. The results of the GEE analyses are shown in Table 3.2. In 
the detection task, faster responses were more likely to be associated with accurate 
responses than slower responses. There was also a small effect of people’s general belief 
about the prevalence of manipulated photos in their everyday lives on accuracy in the 
detection task. Those who believe a greater percentage of photos are digitally 
manipulated were more likely to correctly identify manipulated photos than those who 
believe a lower percentage of photos are digitally manipulated. Further, the results of the 
signal detection analysis suggest that this results from a difference in ability to 
discriminate between original and manipulated photos, rather than a shift in response 
bias—those who believe a greater percentage of photos are digitally manipulated 
accurately identified more of the manipulated photos without an increased false alarm 
rate. General beliefs about the prevalence of photo manipulation did not have an effect 
on people’s ability to locate the manipulation. This pattern of results is somewhat 
surprising. It seems intuitive to think that a general belief that manipulated photos are 
prevalent simply makes people more likely to report that a photo is manipulated because 
they are generally sceptical about the veracity of photos rather than because they are 
better at spotting fakes. Although interesting, the small effect size and counterintuitive 
nature of the finding indicate that it is important to replicate the result prior to drawing 
any strong conclusions. The only variable that had an effect on accuracy in the location 
task was gender; males were slightly more likely than females to correctly locate the 
manipulation within the photo. 
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Table 3.2 
Results of the GEE binary logistic and linear regression models to determine variables 
that predict accuracy on the detect and locate tasks 
Predictor 
Detect  Locate 
B OR [95% CI] p  B OR [95% CI] p 
Response time        
Accuracy 0.11 1.11 [1.08, 1.15] <.001  - - - 
d' -0.01 0.99 [0.98, 1.01] .31  - - - 
c 0.01 1.01 [1.00, 1.02] .10  - - - 
General beliefs about 
percentage of images 
manipulated = High (71-
100%) 
       
Accuracy 0.20 1.22 [1.06, 1.41] .01  0.11 1.11 [0.98, 1.26] .10 
d' 0.16 1.17 [1.05, 1.30] .01  - - - 
c -0.05 0.96 [0.90, 1.02] .16  - - - 
Gender = Female        
Accuracy 0.05 1.05 [0.90, 1.23] .50  -0.16 0.86 [0.75, 0.98] .03 
d' -0.06 0.95 [0.84, 1.06] .35  - - - 
c -0.05 0.95 [0.89, 1.02] .15  - - - 
Interest in photography = 
Interested 
       
Accuracy 0.06 1.07 [0.92, 1.24] .41  0.04 1.05 [0.92, 1.19] .51 
d' -0.02 0.98 [0.88, 1.10] .73  - - - 
c -0.05 0.96 [0.89, 1.03] .20  - - - 
Frequency of taking 
photos = daily/weekly 
       
Accuracy -0.15 0.86 [0.73, 1.01] .07  -0.07 0.94 [0.81, 1.08] .35 
d' -0.08 0.92 [0.81, 1.04] .18  - - - 
c 0.01 1.01 [0.94, 1.09] .71  - - - 
Note. CI = confidence interval. B and odds ratios (OR) estimate the degree of change in (a) accuracy on 
the task (based on the manipulated image trials), (b) d', or (c) c associated with one unit change in the 
independent variable. An odds ratio of 1 indicates no effect of the independent variable on accuracy; 
values of 1.5, 2.5, and 4.0 are generally considered to reflect small, medium, and large effect sizes, 
respectively (Rosenthal, 1996). The category order for factors was set to descending to make the 
reference level 0. The reference groups are: General beliefs about percentage of images 
manipulated = Low (0–70%), Gender = Male, Interest in photography = Not Interested, Frequency of 
taking photos = Monthly/yearly/never. For response time (RT) we divided the data into eight equal 
groups (level 1 represents the slowest RTs (≥43.4 s) and level 8 the fastest RTs (≤8.4 s)). The 21 subjects 
who chose not to disclose their gender were excluded from these analyses leaving a total sample of 
n = 686. Given that subjects only responded on the location task if they said “yes”, the photo had been 
manipulated, we did not have location response time data for all of the trials and therefore were unable to 
consider response time on the location task. Because we did not have a fixed number of choices per 
condition in the location task, we were unable to calculate the degree of change in d' or c associated with 
the predictor variables. 
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Together these findings show that individual factors have relatively little impact 
on the ability to detect and locate manipulations. Although shorter response times were 
associated with more correct detections of manipulated photos, we did not manipulate 
response time so we cannot know whether response time affects people’s ability to 
discriminate between original and manipulated photos. In fact, our response time 
findings might be explained by a number of perceptual decision making models, for 
example, the drift diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978). Yet determining the precise 
mechanism that accounts for the association between shorter response times and greater 
accuracy is beyond the scope of the current paper. 
Experiment 1 indicates that people have some ability to distinguish between 
original and manipulated real-world photos. People’s ability to correctly identify 
manipulated photos was better than chance, although not by much. Our data also suggest 
that locating photo manipulations is a difficult task, even when people correctly indicate 
that a photo is manipulated. We should note, however, that our study could have 
underestimated people’s ability to locate manipulations in real-world photos. Recall that 
subjects were only asked to locate manipulations on photos that they thought were 
manipulated. It remains possible people might be able to locate manipulations even if 
they do not initially think that a photo has been manipulated. We were unable to check 
this possibility in Experiment 1, so we addressed this issue in Experiment 2 by asking 
subjects to complete the location task for all photos, regardless of their initial response in 
the detection task. If subjects did not think that the photo had been manipulated, we 
asked them to make a guess about which area of the image might have been changed. 
We also created a new set of photographic stimuli for Experiment 2. Rather than 
sourcing photos online, we captured a unique set of photos on a Nikon D40 camera in 
RAW format, and prior to any digital editing, converted the files to PNGs. There are two 
crucial benefits to using original photos rather than downloading photos from the web. 
First, by using original photos we could be certain that our images had not been 
previously manipulated in any way. Second, when digital images are saved, the data are 
compressed to reduce the file size. JPEG compression is lossy in that some information 
is discarded to reduce file size. This information is not generally noticeable to the human 
eye (except at very high compression rates when compression artefacts can occur); 
however, the process of converting RAW files to PNGs (a lossless format) prevented 
59 
 
any loss of data in either the original or manipulated images and, again, ensured that our 
photos were not manipulated in any way before we intentionally manipulated them. 
Experiment 2 
Method 
Subjects and design 
A total of 659 subjects (M = 25.5 years, SD = 8.2, range = 13–70; 362 male, 283 
female, 14 declined to respond) completed the study online. A further 32 subjects were 
excluded from the analyses because they had missing response time data for at least one 
response on the detection or location task. As in Experiment 1, subjects did not receive 
payment for taking part but were given feedback on their performance at the end of the 
study. We stopped collecting data once we reached 100 responses per photo. The design 
was similar to that of Experiment 1. 
Stimuli 
We took our own photos in RAW format at a resolution of 3008 × 2000 pixels and 
converted them to PNGs with a resolution of 1600 × 1064 pixels prior to any digital 
editing. We checked the photos to ensure there were no spatial distortions caused by the 
lens, such as barrel or pincushion distortion. The photo manipulation process was the 
same as in Experiment 1. We applied the five manipulation techniques to six different 
photos to create a total of 30 manipulated photos. We used the non-manipulated version 
of these six photos and another four non-manipulated photos to give a total of ten 
original photos. Thus, the total number of photos was 40. As in Experiment 1, we ran 
two independent saliency models to check whether our manipulations had influenced the 
salience of the region where the manipulation had been made. See Appendix A for 
details of the saliency analyses. Similar to Experiment 1, our manipulations made little 
difference to the salience of the regions of the image. 
Procedure 
The procedure was similar to that used in Experiment 1, except for the following 
two changes. First, subjects were asked to locate the manipulation regardless of their 
response in the detection task. Second, subjects were asked to click on one of 12, rather 
than nine, regions on the photo to locate the manipulation. We increased the number of 
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regions on the grid to ensure that the manipulations in the photos spanned two regions, 
on average, as per Experiment 1. 
Results and discussion 
As in Experiment 1, subjects spent a reasonable amount of time examining the 
photos. In the detection task, the mean response time per photo was 57.8 s (SD = 271.5 
s) and the median 24.3 s (interquartile range = 17.3 to 37.4 s). In the location task, the 
mean response time was 10.9 s (SD = 27.0 s) and the median 8.2 s (interquartile 
range = 6.1 to 11.2 s). 
Overall accuracy on the detection task and the location task 
Overall accuracy in the detection task was slightly lower than that observed in 
Experiment 1, but still above chance: Subjects correctly classified 62% of the photos as 
being original or manipulated (cf. 66% in Experiment 1), 95% CI [60%, 63%]. Subjects 
had some ability to discriminate between original (58% correct) and manipulated (65% 
correct) photos, d' = 0.56, 95% CI [0.50, 0.62], replicating the results from Experiment 
1. Again, this provides some support for the prediction that the match or mismatch 
between the information in the photo and people’s expectation of what real-world scenes 
look like might help people to identify original and manipulated real-world photos. In 
contrast to Experiment 1, however, subjects did not show a bias towards saying that 
photos were authentic: c = −0.07, 95% CI [−0.10, −0.04]. It is possible that asking all 
subjects to search for evidence of a manipulation—the location task—regardless of their 
answer in the detection task, prompted a more careful consideration of the scene. In line 
with this account, subjects in Experiment 2 spent a mean of 14 s longer per photo on the 
detection task than those in Experiment 1. 
Recall that the results from Experiment 1 suggested that subjects found the 
location task difficult, even when they correctly detected the photo as manipulated. Yet, 
we were unable to conclusively say that location was more difficult than detection 
because we did not have location data for the manipulated photo trials that subjects 
failed to detect. In Experiment 2 we gathered those data, but before we could directly 
compare subjects’ ability to detect manipulated photos with their ability to locate the 
manipulations within, we had to correct for guessing. For the detection task, chance 
performance was the same as Experiment 1, 50%. For the location task, however, there 
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were two differences to Experiment 1. First, subjects were asked to select one of 12, 
rather than one of nine, image regions. Second, we used a new image set; thus, the 
number of regions manipulated for each image and manipulation type changed. 
Accordingly, we ran a separate Monte Carlo simulation to determine the chance rate of 
selecting the correct region. Table 3.3 shows that overall chance performance in the 
location task was 17%. 
 
Table 3.3 
Mean number of regions (out of a possible 12) containing manipulation and results of 
Monte Carlo simulation to determine chance performance in the location task by 
manipulation type and overall 
 Number of regions 
 
% correct by chance 
Manipulation Type M  M 95% CI 
Airbrushing 1.50  12 [12, 13] 
Add/Sub 1.33  11 [11, 11] 
Geometry 1.33  11 [11, 11] 
Shadow 1.33  11 [11, 11] 
Super-Additive 4.67  39 [39, 39] 
Overall 2.03  17 [17, 17] 
Note. CI = confidence interval. For each manipulation type, we show the mean number of regions 
that contained the manipulation across all six images. The manipulation type “Overall” is the mean 
number of manipulated regions across all six images and all five manipulation types. To determine 
chance performance in the location task, we ran a Monte Carlo simulation of 1 million responses 
based on the number of regions manipulated for each image and manipulation type. 
 
Subjects performed better than chance on the location task: a mean 56% of the 
manipulations were accurately located, 95% CI [55%, 58%]. Given that a mean 62% of 
the manipulated images were accurately detected and a mean 56% of the manipulations 
located, it seems that performance was very roughly similar on the two tasks. But this 
interpretation does not take into account how subjects would perform by chance alone. 
A fairer approach is to compare subjects’ performance on the detection and location 
tasks with chance performance on those two tasks. For the detection task, subjects 
detected a mean 12% more manipulated images than would be expected by chance 
alone, 95% CI [10%, 13%]. Yet, somewhat surprisingly, subjects located a mean 39% 
more of the manipulations than would be expected by chance alone, 95% CI [38%, 
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41%]. This finding suggests that people are better at the more direct task of locating 
manipulations than the more generic one of detecting if a photo has been manipulated or 
not. Although this potential distinction between people’s ability to detect and locate 
manipulations is an interesting finding, the reason for it is not immediately apparent. 
One possibility is that our assumption that each of the 12 image regions has an equal 
chance of being picked is too simplistic—perhaps certain image regions never get 
picked (e.g., a relatively featureless area of the sky). If so, including these never picked 
regions in our chance calculation might make subjects’ performance on the location task 
seem artificially high. To check this possibility, we ran a second chance performance 
calculation. 
In Experiment 2, even when subjects did not think that the image had been 
manipulated, they still attempted to guess the region that had been changed. Therefore, 
we can use these localisation decisions in the original (non-manipulated) versions of the 
six critical photos to determine chance performance in the task. This analysis allows us 
to calculate chance based on the regions (of non-manipulated images) that people 
actually selected when guessing rather than assuming each of the 12 regions has an 
equal chance of being picked. Using this approach, Table 3.4 shows that overall chance 
performance in the location task was 23%. Therefore, even based on this chance 
localisation level, subjects still located a mean 33% more of the locations than would be 
expected by chance alone, 95% CI [32%, 35%]. This finding supports the idea that 
subjects are better at the more direct task of locating manipulations than detecting 
whether a photo has been manipulated or not. 
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Table 3.4 
Chance performance in location task by manipulation type and overall based on mean 
number of subjects choosing the manipulated region in the original version of the image 
 % correct by chance  
 Image  
Manipulation Type A B C D E F Overall 
Airbrushing 19 31 28 28 23 20 25 
Add/Sub 24 5 15 3 3 1 9 
Geometry 11 12 17 2 26 12 13 
Shadow 20 16 28 39 4 5 19 
Super-Additive 74 63 44 72 33 26 53 
Overall Image 30 25 27 29 18 13 23 
Note. For each of the six critical images and each of the five manipulation types, we show the 
probability that the manipulated region of the image was selected by chance in the original version 
of the image. The “Overall” column denotes the mean probability of selecting the manipulated 
regions for that manipulation type across all six images A-F. The “Overall image” is the mean 
probability of selecting the manipulated regions for that image across all manipulation types. Each 
image had a minimum of 101 responses. 
 
Ability to detect and locate by manipulation type 
On the manipulated photo trials, asking subjects to locate the manipulation 
regardless of whether they correctly detected it allowed us to segment accuracy in the 
following ways: (i) accurately detected and accurately located (hereafter, DL), (ii) 
accurately detected but not accurately located (DnL), (iii) inaccurately detected but 
accurately located (nDL), or (iv) inaccurately detected and inaccurately located (nDnL). 
Intuitively, it seems most practical to consider the more conservative accuracy—DL—as 
correct, especially in certain contexts, such as the legal domain, where it is crucial to 
know not only that an image has been manipulated, but precisely what about it is fake. 
That said, it might be possible to learn from the DnL and nDL cases to try to better 
understand how people process manipulated images. 
Figure 3.7 shows the proportion of DL, DnL, nDL, and nDnL responses for each 
of the manipulation types. The most common outcomes were for subjects to both 
accurately detect and accurately locate manipulations, or both inaccurately detect and 
inaccurately locate manipulations. It is interesting, however, that on almost a fifth (18%) 
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of the manipulated photo trials, subjects accurately detected the photo as manipulated 
yet failed to locate the alteration. For 10% of the manipulated trials, subjects failed to 
detect but went on to successfully locate the manipulation. Subjects infrequently 
managed to detect and locate airbrushing manipulations; in fact it was more likely that 
subjects made DnL or nDL responses. Although this fits with our prediction that 
plausible manipulations would be more difficult to identify than implausible ones, the 
pattern of results for geometrical inconsistency, shadow inconsistency, and addition or 
subtraction do not support our prediction. Subjects made more DL responses on the 
plausible addition or subtraction manipulation photos than on either of the implausible 
types, geometrical manipulations and shadow manipulations. Why, then, are subjects 
performing better than expected by either of the chance measures on the addition or 
subtraction manipulations and worse than expected on the airbrushing ones? One 
possibility is that people’s ability to detect image manipulations is less to do with the 
plausibility of the change and more to do with the amount of physical change caused by 
the manipulation. We now look at this hypothesis in more detail by exploring the 
relationship between the image metrics and people’s ability to identify manipulated 
photos. 
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Figure 3.7. Mean proportion of manipulated photos accurately detected and accurately 
located (DL); accurately detected, inaccurately located (DnL); inaccurately detected, 
accurately located (nDL) and inaccurately detected, inaccurately located (nDnL) by 
manipulation type. The dotted horizontal lines on the bars represent chance performance 
for each manipulation type from the results of the Monte Carlo simulation. The full 
horizontal lines on the bars represent chance performance for each manipulation type 
based on subjects’ responses on the original image trials. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. 
 
Image metrics and accuracy 
Recall that the results from Experiment 1 suggested a relationship between the 
correct detection and location of image manipulations and the amount of disruption the 
manipulations had caused to the underlying structure of the pixels. Yet, the JPEG format 
of the images used in Experiment 1 created some (re-compression) noise in the Delta-E 
measurements between different images; thus, we wanted to test whether the same 
finding held with the lossless image format used in Experiment 2. As shown in Figure 
3.8, we found that the Delta-E measure was positively correlated with the proportion of 
photos that subjects correctly detected as manipulated (r(28) = 0.80, p < .001) and the 
proportion of manipulations that were correctly located (r(28) = 0.73, p < .001). These 
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Pearson correlation coefficients are larger than those in Experiment 1 (cf. detect r = 0.34 
and locate r = 0.41 in Experiment 1). It is possible that the re-compression noise in the 
JPEG images in Experiment 1 obscured the relationship between Delta-E and detection 
and localisation performance. To check whether there was a stronger relationship 
between Delta-E and people’s ability to detect and locate image manipulations in 
Experiment 2 than Experiment 1, we converted the correlation coefficients to z values 
using Fisher’s transformation. There was a significantly stronger correlation between the 
Delta-E and detection in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1: z = −2.74, p = .01. Yet 
because we had good reason to predict a stronger relationship in Experiment 2 than 
Experiment 1 (based on the JPEG re-compression noise), it might be fairer to consider 
the p value associated with a one-tailed test, p = .003. The correlation between Delta-E 
and accurate localisation was not significantly stronger in Experiment 2 than in 
Experiment 1 based on a two-tailed test (z = −1.81, p = .07), but was based on a one-
tailed test (p = .04). Therefore, it is possible that the global (re-compression) noise in the 
Delta-E values in Experiment 1 weakened the association between the amount of change 
and people’s ability to identify manipulations. This finding suggests that Delta-E is a 
more useful measure for local, discrete changes to an image than it is for global image 
changes, such as applying a filter. 
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Figure 3.8. Mean proportion of correctly detected (a) and located (b) image 
manipulations by extent of pixel distortion as measured by Delta-E. The graphs show 
individual data points for each of the 30 manipulated images. 
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Of course, the whole point of manipulating images is to fool observers, to make 
them believe that something fake is in fact true. Therefore, it might not be particularly 
surprising to learn that people find it difficult to spot high quality image manipulations. 
Yet it is surprising to learn that, even though our subjects never saw the same image 
more than once, this ability might be dependent on the amount of disruption between the 
original and manipulated image. The positive relationship between the accurate 
detection and localisation of manipulations and Delta-E suggests that it might be 
possible to develop a metric that allows for a graded prediction about people’s ability to 
detect and locate image manipulations. The possibility that a metric could be used to 
predict people’s ability to identify image manipulations is an exciting prospect; 
however, further research is needed to check that this finding generalises across a wider 
variety of images and manipulation types. Our findings suggest that manipulation type 
and the technique used to create the manipulation, for instance, cloning or scaling, might 
be less important than the extent to which the change affects the underlying pixel 
structure of the image. To test this possibility, we next consider the relationship between 
the Delta-E values and the proportion of (a) correct detection and (b) location responses 
by the category of manipulation type. 
Our findings in Experiments 1 and 2 show that subjects’ ability to detect and 
locate image manipulations varied by manipulation type, yet, in Experiment 2 the 
differences were not adequately explained by the plausibility of the manipulation. That 
is, subjects accurately detected and located more of the addition or subtraction 
manipulations than the geometry, shadow, or airbrushing manipulations. One possibility 
is that the five categories of manipulation type introduced different amounts of change 
between the original and manipulated versions of the images. If so, we might expect 
these differences in amount of change to help explain the differences in subjects’ 
detection and localisation rates across these categories. 
To check this, we calculated the mean proportion of correct detections, 
localisations, and Delta-E values for each of the five categories of manipulation type. As 
Figure 3.9 shows, there was a positive correlation between the amount of change and the 
proportion of correct detections (r(3) = 0.92, p = .03) and the proportion of correct 
localisations (r(3) = 0.95, p = .01). These results suggest that the differences in detection 
and localisation rates across the five manipulation types are better accounted for by the 
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extent of the physical change to the image caused by the manipulation, rather than the 
plausibility of that manipulation. Yet, given that subjects did not have the opportunity to 
compare the manipulated and original version of the scene, it is not entirely obvious why 
amount of change predicts accuracy. 
 
 
Figure 3.9. Mean proportion of correctly detected (a) and located (b) image 
manipulations by extent of pixel distortion as measured by Delta-E. The graphs show the 
mean values for each of the five categories of manipulation type. 
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Our results suggest that the amount of change between the original and 
manipulated versions of an image is an important factor in explaining the detectability 
and localisation of manipulations. Next we considered whether any individual factors 
are associated with improved ability to detect or locate manipulations. 
Individual factors in detecting and locating manipulations 
Using GEE analyses, we again explored various factors that might affect people’s 
ability to detect and locate manipulations. As discussed, we were able to use liberal or 
stringent criteria for our classification of detection and location accuracy on the 
manipulated image trials. Accordingly, we ran three models: the first two used the 
liberal classification for accuracy (and replicated the models we ran in Experiment 1), 
and the other examined the more stringent classification, DL. As in Experiment 1, for 
the detection task, we also ran two repeated measures linear regression GEE models to 
explore the effect of the predictor variables on signal-detection estimates d' and c. We 
included the same factors used in the GEE models in Experiment 1. The results of the 
GEE analyses are shown in Table 3.5. 
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Table 3.5 
Results of the GEE binary logistic and linear regression models to determine variables 
that predict accuracy in the detect and locate tasks 
Predictor B OR [95% CI] p 
 Detect (DL and DnL) 
Response time    
Accuracy 0.13 1.14 [1.10, 1.18] <.001 
d' -0.01 0.99 [0.98, 1.01] .40 
c 0.004 1.00 [0.99, 1.01] .42 
General belief about percentage of images manipulated = 
High (71-100%) 
   
Accuracy 0.16 1.18 [1.02, 1.36] .03 
d' 0.09 1.09 [0.97, 1.23] .14 
c -0.04 0.96 [0.90, 1.03] .25 
Gender = Female    
Accuracy -0.01 0.99 [0.86, 1.15] .92 
d' -0.03 0.97 [0.86, 1.09] .60 
c -0.01 0.99 [0.93, 1.06] .82 
Interest in photography = Interested    
Accuracy 0.17 1.19 [1.02, 1.39] .03 
d' 0.04 1.04 [0.92, 1.18] .56 
c -0.05 0.95 [0.89, 1.02] .18 
Frequency of taking photos = daily/weekly    
Accuracy -0.01 0.99 [0.84, 1.17] .91 
d' -0.07 0.93 [0.82, 1.07] .31 
c -0.05 0.95 [0.88, 1.02] .18 
Accuracy Locate (DL and nDL) 
Response time 0.10 1.11 [1.08, 1.14] <.001 
General belief about percentage of images manipulated = 
High (71-100%) 
-0.01 0.99 [0.87, 1.12] .84 
Gender = Female -0.10 0.91 [0.80, 1.03] .14 
Interest in photography = Interested 0.16 1.17 [1.02, 1.34] .02 
Frequency of taking photos = daily/weekly -0.08 0.92 [0.80, 1.06] .27 
Accuracy Detect and locate (DL) 
Response time: Detect 0.17 1.19 [1.15, 1.23] <.001 
Response time: Locate 0.13 1.14 [1.11, 1.18] <.001 
General belief about percentage of images manipulated = 
High (71-100%) 
0.05 1.05 [0.91, 1.20] .51 
Gender = Female -0.13 0.88 [0.77, 1.01] .07 
Interest in photography = Interested 0.20 1.22 [1.06, 1.41] .01 
Frequency of taking photos = daily/weekly -0.09 0.92 [0.78, 1.07] .28 
Note. CI = confidence interval. B and odds ratios (OR) estimate the degree of change in (a) accuracy on the 
task (based on the manipulated image trials), (b) d', or (c) c associated with one unit change in the 
independent variable. An odds ratio of 1 indicates no effect of the independent variable on accuracy; 
values of 1.5, 2.5, and 4.0 are generally considered to reflect small, medium, and large effect sizes, 
respectively (Rosenthal, 1996). The category order for factors was set to descending to make the reference 
level 0. The reference groups are: General beliefs about percentage of images manipulated = Low (0–70%), 
Gender = Male, Interest in photography = Not Interested, Frequency of taking 
photos = Monthly/yearly/never. For response time (RT) we divided the data into eight equal groups with 
level 1 representing the slowest RTs (detect ≥47.1 s; locate ≥18.9 s) and level 8 the fastest (detect ≤8.1 s; 
locate ≤2.7 s). The 14 subjects who chose not to disclose their gender were excluded from these analyses, 
leaving a total sample of n = 645. Because we did not have a fixed number of choices per condition in the 
location task, we were unable to calculate the degree of change in d' or c associated with the predictor 
variables. 
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Using the more liberal accuracy classification, that is, both DL and DnL responses 
for detection, we found that three factors had an effect on likelihood to respond 
correctly: response time, general beliefs about the prevalence of photo manipulation, and 
interest in photography. As in Experiment 1, faster responses were more likely to be 
correct than slower responses. Also replicating the finding in Experiment 1, those who 
believe a greater percentage of photos are digitally manipulated were slightly more 
likely to correctly identify manipulated photos than those who believe a lower 
percentage of photos are digitally manipulated. In addition, in Experiment 2, those 
interested in photography were slightly more likely to identify image manipulations 
correctly than those who are not interested in photography. For the location task, using 
the more liberal accuracy classification, that is, both DL and nDL responses, we found 
that two factors had an effect on likelihood to respond correctly. Again there was an 
effect of response time: In the location task, faster responses were more likely to be 
correct than slower responses. Also those with an interest in photography were slightly 
more likely to correctly locate the manipulation within the photo than those without an 
interest. Next we considered whether any factors affected our more stringent accuracy 
classification, that is, being correct on both the detection and location tasks (DL). The 
results revealed an effect for two factors on likelihood to respond correctly. Specifically, 
there was an effect of response time with shorter response times being associated with 
greater accuracy. There was also an effect of interest in photography, with those 
interested more likely to correctly make DL responses than those not interested. 
Our GEE models in both Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that shorter response times 
were linked with more correct responses on both tasks. As in Experiment 1, this 
association might be explained by several models of perceptual decision making; 
however, determining which of these models best accounts for our data is beyond the 
scope of the current paper. 
Conclusion 
In two separate experiments we have shown, for the first time, that people’s ability 
to detect manipulated photos of real-world scenes is extremely limited. Considering the 
prevalence of manipulated images in the media, on social networking sites, and in other 
domains, our findings warrant concern about the extent to which people may be 
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frequently fooled in their daily lives. Furthermore, we did not find any strong evidence 
to suggest that individual factors, such as having an interest in photography or beliefs 
about the extent of image manipulation in society, are associated with improved ability 
to detect or locate manipulations. 
Recall that we looked at two categories of manipulations—implausible and 
plausible—and we predicted that people would perform better on implausible 
manipulations because these scenes provide additional evidence that people can use to 
determine if a photo has been manipulated. Yet the story was not so simple. In 
Experiment 1, subjects correctly detected more of the implausible photo manipulations 
than the plausible photo manipulations, but in Experiment 2, the opposite was true. 
Further, even when subjects correctly identified the implausible photo manipulations, 
they did not necessarily go on to accurately locate the manipulation. It is clear that 
people find it difficult to detect and locate manipulations in real-world photos, regardless 
of whether those manipulations lead to physically plausible or implausible scenes. 
Research in the vision science literature may help to account for these findings. 
We know that people might have a simplified understanding of the physics in our world 
(Cavanagh, 2005; Mamassian, 2008). Studies have shown, for instance, that the human 
visual system is relatively insensitive to the physically impossible cast shadows created 
by inconsistent lighting in a scene (Ostrovsky, Cavanagh, & Sinha, 2005; see also 
Chapter 4 of this thesis). It is not necessarily the case that people ignore shadows 
altogether, but rather that the visual system processes shadows rapidly and uses them 
only as a generic cue. Put simply, as long as the shadow is roughly correct then we 
accept it as being authentic (Bonfiglioli, Pavani, & Castiello, 2004; Ostrovsky et al., 
2005; Rensink & Cavanagh, 2004). Similarly, people use shortcuts to interpret 
geometrical aspects of a scene; if the geometry is close enough to people’s expectation, 
then it is accepted as accurate (Bex, 2010; Howe & Purves, 2005; Mamassian, 2008). 
Furthermore, the change blindness literature also highlights people’s insensitivity to 
shadow information. Research has shown that people are slower to detect changes to 
cast shadows than changes to objects (Wright, 2005), even when the shadow changes 
affect the overall meaning of the scene (Ehinger, Allen, & Wolfe, 2016). It follows, 
then, that when trying to distinguish between real and manipulated images, our subjects 
do not seem to have capitalised on the evidence in the implausible manipulation photos 
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to determine whether they were authentic or not. It remains to be seen whether it is 
possible to train people to make use of physically implausible inconsistencies; perhaps 
one possibility would entail “teaching” the visual system to make full use of physical 
properties of the world as opposed to automatically simplifying them. 
Although the plausibility of a manipulation might not be so important when it 
comes to detecting manipulated images, we found that the extent to which the 
manipulation disrupts the underlying structure of the pixels might be important. Indeed, 
we found a positive correlation between the image metric (Delta-E) we used to measure 
the difference between our original and manipulated photos and the likelihood that the 
photo was correctly classified as manipulated. In other words, the manipulations that 
created the most change in the underlying pixel values of the photo were most likely to 
be correctly classified as manipulated. Of course, from the perspective of signal 
detection theory, it follows that adding greater signal results in greater detection of that 
signal (Green & Swets, 1966; Wilken & Ma, 2004). 
Although this might seem intuitive, recall that our subjects never saw the same 
scene more than once. That is, they never saw the non-manipulated versions of any of 
the manipulated photos that they were shown; despite this, their ability to detect the 
manipulated photos was related to the extent of change in the pixels. It seems possible 
that our subjects might have been able to compare the manipulated photo with their 
expectations about what the scene “should” look like in terms of scene statistics. In 
doing this, subjects might have found the manipulated photos with less change, and thus 
smaller Delta-E values, were more similar to their prior expectations of what the world 
looks like—resulting in those photos being incorrectly accepted as authentic more often. 
At the same time, the manipulated photos with more change, and thus larger Delta-E 
values, might have been more difficult to match to a prior expectation—resulting in 
these photos more often being correctly identified as manipulated. It seems that this 
difference in ease of finding a match to prior knowledge and expectation for the 
manipulated photo helped subjects to make an accurate decision. If this is the case, then 
one might speculate that it could be possible to develop a metric that will predict 
people’s ability to detect and locate manipulations of real-world scenes. A future 
investigation using a wider range of stimuli where subjects see more than one of each 
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manipulation type might consider whether there is an interaction between Delta-E and 
manipulation type. 
On a different note, our research highlights a potential opportunity to improve 
people’s ability to spot manipulations. In Experiment 2, we were able to compare 
subjects’ ability on the two tasks: detection and location. We were surprised to find that 
subjects performed better on the location task than on the detection task. Although this is 
an interesting finding, the reason for it is not immediately apparent. One possibility is 
that these two tasks might encourage subjects to adopt different strategies and that 
subjects are better at the more direct task of locating manipulations than the generic one 
of detecting whether a photo has been manipulated or not. 
Our research provides a first look at people’s ability to detect and locate 
manipulations of real-world images. A strength of the current method—applying each of 
the five different manipulation types to the same image—is that we know the differences 
in subjects’ performance is owing to the manipulation itself rather than the specific 
image. A drawback, however, is that the difficulty of finding or generating a set of 
suitable images that allowed all of the manipulation types to be applied reduced the total 
number of photos that could be tested to some degree. Although, ideally, future work 
might extend the range of images tested, we nonetheless note the close consistency in 
results that we obtained across the two different and independent image sets used in 
Experiments 1 and 2. 
Future research might also investigate potential ways to improve people’s ability 
to spot manipulated photos. Our findings suggest, however, that this is not going to be a 
straightforward task. We did not find any strong evidence to suggest there are individual 
factors that improve people’s ability to detect or locate manipulations. That said, our 
findings do highlight various possibilities that warrant further consideration, such as 
training people to make better use of the physical laws of the world, varying how long 
people have to judge the veracity of a photo, and encouraging a more careful and 
considered approach to detecting manipulations. What our findings have shown is that a 
more careful search of a scene, at the very least, might encourage people to be sceptical 
about the veracity of photos. Of course, increased scepticism is not perfect because it 
comes with an associated cost: a loss of faith in authentic photos. Yet, until we know 
more about how to improve people’s ability to distinguish between real and fake photos, 
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a sceptical approach might be wise, especially in contexts such as law, scientific 
publication, and photojournalism where even a small manipulation can have ethically 
significant consequences. 
But what should we be sceptical about? Are some changes acceptable and others 
not? Should the context of the manipulation be taken into account? Though we are 
unable to answer these complex questions here, we can offer some points for thought. 
Although it is true that all image manipulations are to some extent deceptive, not all 
manipulations are intentionally deceptive. This distinction is an important one and raises 
the possibility that people do not set out to detect all image manipulations but instead are 
primarily concerned about forgeries that have been created with the intention to deceive 
the viewer. Of course, people might expect that all images provided as evidence, for 
instance news images, have been subjected to rigorous validation processes. It is 
unlikely, however, that people set themselves the same standard for detecting 
manipulation in everyday contexts. Perhaps more important than being able to identify 
all instances of manipulation, people are most concerned about the extent to which they 
can trust the message conveyed from the image. Although this poses an interesting 
question, our results suggest that people might struggle to detect image manipulations 
based on either of these definitions. In the current research, not only did subjects find it 
difficult to accurately locate the specific aspects of the image that had been altered, they 
also found it difficult to distinguish original, truthful photos from manipulated, 
untruthful ones. 
In light of the findings presented in this paper, it is not surprising that World Press 
Photo have introduced a computerised photo-verification test to their annual photo 
contest. But ultimately, this is only a competition. What do our findings mean for other 
contexts in which an incorrect decision about the veracity of a photo can have 
devastating consequences? Essentially, our results suggest that guidelines and policies 
governing the acceptable standards for the use of photos, for example, in legal and 
media domains, should be updated to reflect the unique challenges of photography in the 
digital age. We recommend that this is done soon, and that psychological scientists work 
together with digital forensic experts and relevant end-users to ensure that such policies 
are built on sound empirical research. 
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Chapter 4 : 
Can people identify geometric inconsistencies in cast shadows? 
 
“For me, a landscape does not exist in its own right, since its appearance changes at 
every moment; but the surrounding atmosphere brings it to life - the air and the light, 
which vary continuously.” 
Claude Monet (1891) 
Introduction 
On May 23rd 2016, Dinesh and Tarakeshwari Rathod were hailed as the first 
Indian couple to conquer Mount Everest (Boone, 2016). Yet the couple’s celebrations 
were short lived; three weeks after their incredible triumph, fellow mountaineers filed a 
complaint stating that the couple never made it to the summit and that the photos 
provided to evidence their success were forgeries. The complainants revealed several 
contradictions in the couple’s summit photos. Of particular interest was the date and 
time stamp on the photos—6.25am on May 23rd 2016. Crucially, these camera setting 
details did not match the time indicated by the direction of the shadows in the scene. 
Instead, the direction of the shadows suggested the photo was taken around 5 hours later 
in the day, closer to noon (Boone, 2016). Following an investigation, the Nepalese 
government confirmed that the couple had indeed faked their summit photos and 
subsequently imposed a ban to prevent them from mountaineering in Nepal for the next 
10 years (Safi, 2016). This example highlights the possibility that shadow information 
could offer a useful means to determine whether photos are authentic or manipulated. 
Thus the work in the current chapter explores whether people can identify when the 
shadows in a scene are consistent or inconsistent with a single light source, and 
considers the theoretical implications for detecting image forgeries and our 
understanding of how the visual system processes shadow information. 
Illumination conditions, that is the position and intensity of the light source, can 
strongly influence the appearance of a scene. Shadows, for example, are not intrinsic or 
stable properties of a scene but instead are the result of the interaction between the world 
and its illumination (Baxandall, 1995; Rensink & Cavanagh, 2004). An object’s shadow 
will appear differently, or disappear altogether, when lighting conditions change for 
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instance. This chapter focuses on cast shadows that are formed when an opaque object 
obstructs the light and prevents it from illuminating an external surface, such as the 
ground. Since light travels in a straight line, it is known that a point in a shadowed 
region, its corresponding point on the shadow-casting object, and the light source must 
all lie on a single straight line (Farid, 2016; Farid & Bravo, 2010; Kee, O’Brien, & 
Farid, 2013). This relationship means that shadows provide information about the 
geometry of the scene and can be used to reason about the location of the illuminating 
light source (Casati, 2004; Farid, 2016; Farid & Bravo, 2010). The physical laws that 
constrain the behaviour of light in the 3-D world—either real or virtual—also apply to 2-
D images (Farid, 2016; Kajiya, 1986). That is, when taking a photo (or rendering an 
image from a virtual environment) the interaction of light and the 3-D objects in the 
scene is captured in the geometry of the 2-D image.5 
In fact, the constraint that connects the shadow, the shadow-casting object, and the 
light source permits a surprisingly simple image-based geometric technique for 
objectively verifying the authenticity of shadows. As Figure 4.1a shows, to use this 
technique, simply locate any point on a shadow and its corresponding point on the 
object, then draw a line through them. Repeat this process for as many corresponding 
shadow and object points as possible, and the point at which these lines intersect is the 
location of the light source. Now consider if a new object is added to the scene, for 
example a bus stop. As Figure 4.1b shows, the geometric analysis offers a powerful 
technique to objectively analyse the plausibility of this scene. Using the same principle, 
the line connecting the bus stop’s shadow and the corresponding point on the object does 
not intersect the scene’s light source. Therefore, this inconsistency indicates that the 
image has been tampered with—and demonstrates how shadows can be helpful in 
detecting forgeries (Farid, 2016; Kee et al., 2013). Research has shown that this shadow-
based analysis provides a useful forensic tool (Kee et al., 2013), but the question of 
whether people can use shadow information to help identify image forgeries remains 
largely unexplored. 
                                                          
5 In a 3-D scene a line connects the shadow point and object point, and intersects the light source. The 
transformation of the 3-D world coordinates to 2-D image coordinates means that in a 2-D image of the 
scene, the line connects the images of the shadow point and object point, and intersects the projected 
image of the light source (e.g., Kee et al., 2013). 
79 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Example of using the shadow-based analysis technique: (a) the lines 
connecting the corresponding points of the shadows and objects intersect at a single 
point, indicating that the shadows are consistent with a single light source; (b) the same 
scene is shown with a bus stop added—the line connecting the bus stop’s shadow and 
the corresponding point on the object does not intersect the scene light source, 
highlighting an inconsistency. 
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On the one hand, we might predict that people will be able to make use of shadow 
information to help identify image forgeries. Shadows convey important information 
about the arrangement and spatial position of objects in a scene and numerous studies 
have demonstrated that the human perceptual system makes use of such information to 
understand the world (Dee & Santos, 2011). In particular, studies have shown that 
shadow information supports the perception of depth and spatial position of objects in a 
scene (Allen, 1999; Kersten, Knill, Mamassian, & Bülthoff, 1996; Kersten, Mamassian, 
& Knill, 1994; Mamassian, Knill, & Kersten, 1998; Tarr, Kersten, & Bülthoff, 1998). 
And although the evidence is mixed, there is some suggestion that shadow information 
supports object recognition (Castiello, 2001; Cavanagh & Leclerc, 1989; Leek, Davitt, & 
Cristino, 2015; Tarr et al., 1998; but see Braje, Legge, & Kersten, 2000). Furthermore, a 
number of studies have shown that people are sensitive to changes in lighting direction 
in controlled settings using simplistic stimuli (e.g., Khang, Koenderink, & Kappers, 
2006; Koenderink, Van Doorn, & Pont, 2004; O’Shea, Agrawala, & Banks, 2010). In 
one of the first studies to investigate the perception of inconsistent shadows, people 
completed a visual search task to determine whether a target cube that was illuminated 
from a different direction than the distractor cubes was present or absent in a series of 
displays (Enns & Rensink, 1990). Subjects rapidly identified the presence or absence of 
the target cube, suggesting that the human visual system can process complex visual 
properties, such as lighting direction, at a preattentive stage and in parallel across the 
image. This remarkable ability to perceive shadow information suggests that such 
information might also help in the detection of image forgeries. 
On the other hand, there is also evidence to support the opposite prediction: that 
people will not be able to make effective use of shadow information. In Enns and 
Rensink’s (1990) study, all of the cubes in the display were identical in shape, size, and 
orientation and it has been proposed that this object homogeneity might account for 
subjects’ ability to automatically identify illumination inconsistencies. To check, other 
researchers ran an extension of the original study, this time using cubes that were 
randomly orientated in space to better represent real-world situations (Ostrovsky et al., 
2005). In contrast to the results of the original study, people had difficulty recognising 
when the objects in the display were illuminated from a consistent or inconsistent 
direction. In a follow-up experiment, using real-world scenes that were presented for 
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either 1000, 2000, or 5000 ms, people again had surprising difficulty identifying 
illumination inconsistencies. Interestingly, however, subjects’ performance improved 
with longer presentation times suggesting that detecting lighting inconsistencies requires 
a relatively slow scan of the scene and involves processing objects serially rather than in 
parallel. Perhaps people are able to estimate the lighting direction for an individual 
object (Enns & Rensink, 1990), but difficultly arises when the task involves computing 
and accumulating the lighting direction for a number of different objects across the 
entire scene (Ostrovsky et al., 2005). 
More recently, Farid and Bravo (2010) investigated whether people could make 
use of shadow cues in a scene to detect lighting inconsistencies. The researchers created 
a number of computer-generated scenes depicting simple geometric shapes. Half of the 
scenes were illuminated by a single light source that generated consistent shadows in the 
scene; the other half were illuminated by two different light sources that generated 
inconsistent shadows in the scene. Subjects were given an unlimited amount of time to 
judge whether the scenes portrayed shadows that were consistent or inconsistent with a 
single light source. When the inconsistencies were obvious—lights on opposite sides of 
the scene and shadows that ran in opposite directions—subjects showed an almost 
perfect ability (95.5%) to detect the inconsistent scenes. Yet when the inconsistencies 
were subtle—shadows that were a result of two light sources in slightly different 
locations on the same side of the scene—subjects detected just 52.8% of the inconsistent 
shadow scenes. Although subjects had difficulty determining whether the shadows in 
these scenes were consistent or inconsistent with a single light source, the near-perfect 
performance on trials where the lights were on opposite sides of the scene suggests that 
there might be a point at which lighting inconsistencies become noticeable. 
Indeed, attempts have been made to quantify the point at which people notice 
lighting inconsistencies in images of outdoor scenes (Lopez-Moreno, Sundstedt, 
Sangorrin, & Gutierrez, 2010; Tan, Lalonde, Sharan, Rushmeier, & O’Sullivan, 2015). 
For example, Tan et al. created inconsistent scenes with varying degrees of error 
between the original and second light source. The researchers used real-world scenes in 
Experiment 1 but owing to difficulties controlling the lighting conditions they ran a 
second experiment using computer-generated scenes. Generally, subjects detected more 
of the inconsistent scenes when the angle difference between the two lighting positions 
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was larger than when it was smaller. Yet the results were not conclusive; there were 
instances in which the smallest illumination changes were noticed and the largest 
changes were not. These results indicate that the extent of error between the two light 
sources is not the only factor that affects the sensitivity of the human perceptual system 
to lighting inconsistencies—other factors might also be important, such as scene content 
and layout (Xia, Pont, & Heynderickx, 2016). It is important to note, however, that in 
this experiment the inconsistent light source was moved in relatively coarse 30° 
increments from the original light source (Tan et al., 2015). Therefore, it remains to be 
seen whether more granular angle differences between the original and inconsistent light 
position affect the judgement of lighting inconsistencies in a similar way. 
In sum, previous research has shown that people can make effective use of shadow 
information for certain perceptual tasks, including estimating the lighting direction in 
scenes consisting of simple geometric shapes. Yet a growing body of research suggests 
that the ability to estimate lighting direction does not extend to more complex stimuli. It 
remains unknown, however, whether people might be able to identify consistent and 
inconsistent shadows when there is enough information in the scene and sufficient time 
to make a judgment. The research presented in the current chapter examined this 
possibility. New image stimuli were created for Experiment 1a that contained a number 
of objects with well-defined edges and clearly visible shadows. These features made it 
possible for subjects to use the shadow-based analysis and determine the position of the 
light source by finding the intersection of the lines that connect the corresponding points 
of shadows and shadow-casting objects. Indeed, subjects were instructed to use the 
shadows in the scene to guide their judgement. Under these circumstances, people might 
be able to make effective use of the shadow information in the scenes to judge whether 
the shadows are consistent or inconsistent with a single light. In addition, we further 
explore the possibility of a perceptual threshold for detecting illumination 
inconsistencies in scenes. 
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Experiment 1a 
Method 
Subjects and Design 
A total of 69 students (M = 18.9 years, SD = 2.2, range = 17-31; 62 women, 7 
men) from Warwick University completed the experiment online in return for course 
credit. A further 11 subjects were excluded from the analyses, 8 who had missing 
response time data for at least one response on the task and 3 who failed to understand 
instructions. Subject recruitment continued until we reached a minimum of 20 responses 
per image (the stimulus set consisted of four consistent shadow images and eight 
inconsistent shadow images, further details of the images are provided in the following 
Stimuli section). The design was within-subjects: each subject viewed a series of four 
computer-generated images, half of which had consistent shadows, and half of which 
were manipulated to show inconsistent shadows. Using a two-alternative forced choice 
method (2AFC), we measured people’s accuracy in determining whether an image had 
consistent or inconsistent shadows. 
Stimuli 
To create five different outdoor city scenes, we used a 3-D cityscape model from 
turbosquid.com and a 3-D animation software called Maya® (2016; Autodesk, Inc.). To 
represent a real-world outdoor environment lit by the sun, each scene was illuminated by 
a single light source. Each scene included a target object—a lamppost—and its 
corresponding shadow. In addition, to ensure subjects could use the shadow-based 
analysis technique outlined in the introduction, we also made a number of other non-
target objects and their corresponding shadows visible in the scene. Recall that when a 
scene is illuminated by a single source all of the shadows in the scene must be consistent 
with that light; if any shadow is inconsistent with the light source, then the scene is 
physically impossible (Farid, 2016; Kee et al., 2013). We rendered6 each of the five 3-D 
scenes from Maya® to generate TIF image files with a resolution of 960 × 720 pixels. To 
ensure that the shadows in the 2-D images were physically accurate and therefore 
representative of the shadows that people experience in the real world we rendered the 
                                                          
6 Rendering is a computer process to automatically convert 3-D models into 2-D images 
84 
 
images with raytraced7 shadows. These five scenes comprised our original, consistent 
image set—each illuminated by a single source and thus containing only consistent 
shadows. 
To create the inconsistent shadow scenes we rendered each of the five scenes from 
Maya® (2016; Autodesk, Inc.) two more times: once with the light moved to the left of 
its original position (-800 m on the x-axis) and once with the light moved to the right of 
its original position (+800 m on the x-axis). The scene layout, for instance the position 
of the objects, remained identical across each version of the scene, yet the three different 
light positions—original, left and right—meant that each version had a different shadow 
configuration. For each of the five scenes, we selected a single lamppost and its 
corresponding shadow to manipulate. The manipulation process involved three stages, 
all carried out using GNU Image Manipulation Program® (GIMP, Version 2.8). First, we 
removed the target lamppost’s shadow in the original version of the scene. Second, we 
cut the shadow of that same target lamppost from the version of the scene with the light 
moved left of the original position. Third, we overlaid this shadow onto the original 
version of the scene. We then repeated stages two and three for the version of the scene 
with the light moved right of the original position (see Figure 4.2 for an example of the 
editing process). We exported the images as PNGs which is a lossless format. We 
repeated this manipulation process for the other four scenes. 
Overall, we had three versions of each of the five city scenes, a total of 15 images. 
The original version of each scene was used to create our consistent shadow image set. 
And the two manipulated versions of each scene were used to create our inconsistent 
shadow image set. Subjects saw two consistent and two inconsistent shadow images but 
always in a different city scene. The fifth city scene was used in the practice. 
                                                          
7 Raytracing is a type of shadow rendering that calculates the path of individual light rays from the light 
source to the camera—it produces physically accurate shadows that are like shadows in the real world 
(Autodesk, 2016) 
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Figure 4.2. Example of the image manipulation process: (a) original scene with 
consistent shadows; (b) original scene with the target lamppost shadow removed; (c) 
isolated shadows cut from the scenes with the light position moved left and right of the 
original light position; (d) original, left, and right light position shadows all shown in the 
scene; (e) left light position shadow added to the original scene, the shadow of the target 
lamppost is inconsistent with all of the other shadows in the scene; (f) right light position 
shadow added to the original scene, the shadow of the target lamppost is inconsistent 
with all of the other shadows in the scene. Each subject saw this city scene just once, 
they were randomly shown a, e, or f. 
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Procedure 
First, subjects received detailed instructions about the experiment. Importantly, we 
informed subjects they could assume that “…each of the scenes is illuminated by a 
single light source, such as the sun.” Before the experiment proper began, subjects were 
given a practice trial. To cue subjects’ attention to the target lamppost, they were first 
shown an almost entirely greyed out image with only the target lamppost fully visible 
and highlighted in a red ellipse. After four seconds, the full scene automatically became 
visible. We also added a small yellow dot on the base of the target lamppost to ensure 
subjects did not forget which lamppost to base their response on. Subjects were asked 
“Is the lamppost's shadow consistent or inconsistent with the shadows in the rest of the 
scene?” They were given unlimited time to select between two response options: (a) 
“Consistent”, (b) “Inconsistent.” They were then asked to rate their confidence in their 
decision using a 100-point Likert-type scale ranging from 0 (Not at all confident) to 100 
(Extremely confident). 
Then the experiment proper began. Subjects were presented with the four city 
scenes in a random order. Each subject saw two consistent shadow scenes and two 
inconsistent shadow scenes, however, they were unaware of this 50:50 ratio. For each 
scene, subjects completed exactly the same procedure as described for the practice trial. 
After completing the shadow task, subjects were asked a series of questions about their 
demographics, interest in photography, and video gaming experience. They were also 
asked whether they had experienced any technical difficulties while completing the 
experiment. Subjects received feedback on their performance at the end of the study. 
Results and Discussion 
An analysis of the response time data suggested that subjects were engaged with 
the task and spent a reasonable amount of time determining whether the shadows in the 
scenes were consistent or inconsistent with a single light source. The mean response 
time per image was 17.9 s (SD = 18.8 s) and the median response time 11.6 s 
(interquartile range: 7.3, 21.4 s). 
Overall accuracy on the shadow task 
We now turn to our primary research question: Can people identify whether scenes 
have consistent or inconsistent shadows? Overall, a mean 54% of the scenes were 
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correctly classified, 95% CI [48%, 60%]. Subjects' ability to distinguish between 
consistent (64% correct, 95% CI [56%, 73%]) and inconsistent (44% correct, 95% CI 
[36%, 53%]) shadow scenes was not reliably greater than zero, d' = 0.17, 95% CI [-0.06, 
0.39]. Furthermore, subjects showed a bias towards accepting the shadow scenes as 
consistent, c = 0.20, 95% CI [0.09, 0.30]. These results indicate that subjects’ ability to 
identify whether the shadows in a scene are consistent or inconsistent with a single light 
source was extremely limited. Given this result, it appears that subjects did not make use 
of the information available within the scene to objectively work out the answer. Instead, 
the results suggest that subjects relied on a subjective visual analysis of the scene and, as 
indicated by their bias, were often willing to accept that the shadows in the scenes were 
consistent. We next consider whether any individual factors or image metrics were 
associated with an improved ability to identify consistent and inconsistent shadow 
scenes. 
Individual factors and image metrics 
To determine whether individual factors play a role in identifying consistent and 
inconsistent shadows, we gathered subjects’ demographic data, as well as details about 
their interest in photography and video gaming experience. We also asked subjects to 
rate their confidence for each of their decisions and recorded their response time. In 
addition, we checked whether three properties of the image itself affected people’s 
accuracy on the task. One image property was simply whether the light position had 
moved left or right of the original light position. The second image property was the 
location of the light source: For each of the four scenes, we measured the distance from 
the centre of the scene to the light source. The third image property was a measurement 
of the rotation, in degrees, from the consistent shadow position to the inconsistent 
shadow position. 
To check how each factor influenced subjects’ performance, we conducted two 
generalized estimating equation (GEE) analyses—one for the inconsistent shadow 
scenes and one for the consistent shadow scenes. Specifically, we conducted a repeated 
measures logistic regression with GEE because our dependant variables were binary 
with both random and fixed effects (Liang & Zeger, 1986). The results of the GEE 
analyses are shown in Table 4.1. 
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The GEE analyses revealed that none of the variables had an effect on subjects’ 
ability to accurately identify inconsistent shadow scenes. Only one variable had an effect 
on subjects’ ability to accurately identify consistent shadow scenes, and that was 
subjects’ confidence in their decision. More confident responses were slightly more 
likely to be associated with accurate responses than less confident responses. 
 
Table 4.1 
Results of the GEE binary logistic regression models to determine variables that predict 
accuracy in the shadow task 
Predictor 
Inconsistent  Consistent 
B OR [95% CI] p  B OR [95% CI] p 
Confidence 0.00 1.00 [0.98, 1.01] .56  0.03 1.03 [1.01, 1.05] <.001 
Video gaming = Frequent 
(at least once a month) 
0.83 2.30 [0.64, 8.28] .20 
 
1.06 2.88 [0.72, 11.60] .14 
Response time 0.00 1.00 [0.98, 1.02] .87  -0.01 0.99 [0.97, 1.01] .23 
Gender = Female -0.12 0.89 [0.21, 3.66] .87  0.66 1.93 [0.46, 8.13] .37 
Interest in photography = 
Interested 
0.39 1.47 [0.76, 2.85] .25 
 
-0.29 0.74 [0.34, 1.65] .47 
Distance to light source 0.00 1.00 [0.98, 1.01] .38  0.01 1.01 [1.00, 1.02] .07 
Light position = Left 0.41 1.51 [0.69, 3.28] .30  - - - 
Angle difference -0.01 0.99 [0.97, 1.02] .56  - - - 
Note. CI = confidence interval. B and odds ratios (OR) estimate the degree of change in accuracy 
associated with one unit change in the independent variable. An odds ratio of 1 indicates no effect of 
the independent variable on accuracy, values of 1.5, 2.5, and 4.0 are generally considered to reflect 
small, medium, and large effect sizes, respectively (Rosenthal, 1996). The category order for factors 
was set to descending to make the reference level 0. The reference groups are: Video game playing = 
Infrequent (never/less than once a month), Gender = Male, Interest in photography = Not Interested, 
Light position = Right. Response time, confidence, distance of light source from the scene, and angle 
difference were added as continuous variables. All subjects were included in these analyses N = 69. 
The light position and angle difference predictor variables were not applicable in the consistent shadow 
scenes. 
 
Our results align with the growing body of literature suggesting that people are 
quite insensitive to lighting inconsistencies (e.g., Farid & Bravo, 2010; Ostrovsky et al., 
2005). Extending on previous research, we demonstrate that this insensitivity to lighting 
inconsistencies persists even when there is information available in the scene to 
objectively determine the correct answer. Further, our results do not provide any strong 
evidence to support an association between a range of individual factors and image 
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properties with an improved ability to identify consistent and inconsistent shadow 
scenes. One outstanding question is whether these findings generalise to a wider group 
of people. The subjects in Experiment 1a were first year Psychology students who 
participated for course credit, it is possible that we might find different results amongst 
individuals who choose to complete the task without an extrinsic incentive. One 
possibility is that individuals who choose to take part are interested in the task and 
perhaps are more motivated to perform well. We conducted Experiment 1b to examine 
whether these findings are tied to a specific sample. 
Experiment 1b 
Method 
Subjects and Design 
A total of 102 subjects (M = 25.5 years, SD = 9.0, range = 14-57; 60 men, 39 
women, and 3 chose not to disclose their gender) were recruited off campus and 
completed the task online. A further 4 subjects were excluded from the analyses, 3 who 
had missing response time data for at least one response on the task and 1 who 
experienced technical difficulties. There were no geographical restrictions and subjects 
did not receive payment for taking part, but they did receive feedback on their 
performance at the end of the task. Subject recruitment continued until we reached a 
minimum of 20 responses per image. The design was identical to that of Experiment 1a. 
Stimuli and Procedure 
The stimuli and procedure were unchanged from Experiment 1a. 
Results and Discussion 
An analysis of the response time data suggested that subjects were engaged with 
the task and spent a reasonable amount of time determining whether the shadows in the 
scenes were consistent or inconsistent with a single light source. The mean response 
time per image was 16.9 s (SD = 9.1 s) and the median response time was 14.1 s 
(interquartile range: 10.2, 23.1 s). 
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Overall accuracy on the shadow task 
Overall, subjects correctly classified a mean 61% of the shadows scenes (cf. Expt 
1a: 54%), 95% CI [56%, 65%]. Subjects had some ability to discriminate between 
consistent (75% correct, 95% CI [70%, 81%]) and inconsistent (46% correct, 95% CI 
[38%, 53%]) shadow scenes, d' = 0.41, 95% CI [0.22, 0.59]. These findings offer further 
empirical support for the idea that people are quite insensitive to lighting inconsistencies 
(e.g., Farid & Bravo, 2010; Ostrovsky et al., 2005). Although subjects’ ability to tell the 
difference between consistent and inconsistent shadow scenes was slightly better than in 
Experiment 1a (cf. Expt 1a: d' = 0.17), the difference did not reach significance t(163) = 
1.64, p = .10, d = 0.26. As in Experiment 1a, subjects showed a bias towards accepting 
the shadow scenes as consistent, c = 0.29, 95% CI [0.20, 0.38]. This bias tells us that 
subjects had a relatively conservative criterion for judging that shadows were 
inconsistent with the scene light source and typically accepted them as consistent. 
Individual factors and image metrics 
As in Experiment 1a, we conducted two GEE analyses—one for the inconsistent 
shadow scenes and one for the consistent shadow scenes. We included the same factors 
used in the GEE models in Experiment 1a. The results of the GEE analyses are shown in 
Table 4.2. This time we found that two of the variables had an effect on the likelihood of 
responding correctly: video gaming and angle difference. Those who play video games 
frequently were more likely to correctly identify inconsistent shadow scenes than those 
who do not play video games frequently. There was also a small effect of angle 
difference—inconsistent shadows positioned further from the correct position were more 
likely to be associated with accurate responses than inconsistent shadows positioned 
closer to the correct position. It seems, then, that there might be a discernible point at 
which the inconsistent shadow becomes different enough from its consistent position to 
make the inconsistency noticeable—lending support to the notion of a perceptual 
threshold for detecting lighting inconsistencies (Lopez-Moreno et al., 2010; Tan et al., 
2015). In other words, our subjects appeared to hold a basic understanding about where 
an object’s shadow must cast to be consistent with the light source. Yet this 
understanding was not very precise—subjects were willing to accept a shadow as 
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consistent when cast in a range of locations that were relatively near to its correct 
location. 
For the consistent shadow scenes, the results revealed that the distance of the light 
source from the scene had a small effect on likelihood to respond correctly. Specifically, 
scenes in which the light was closer to the scene were more likely to be identified as 
consistent compared with scenes in which the light was further from the scene. One 
possible reason for this effect is that subjects were better able to determine the accuracy 
of shadows in a scene when the light source was more readily available to use as a 
guide. Perhaps, then, our subjects were able to make use of the shadow-based analysis 
technique, but only when it was relatively easy to calculate the location of the light 
source. 
 
Table 4.2 
Results of the GEE binary logistic regression models to determine variables that predict 
accuracy in the shadow task 
Predictor 
Inconsistent  Consistent 
B OR [95% CI] p  B OR [95% CI] p 
Confidence -0.01 0.99 [0.98, 1.01] .44  0.01 1.01 [0.99, 1.03] .16 
Video gaming = Frequent 
(at least once a month) 
0.75 2.12 [1.05, 4.24] .03  0.15 1.16 [0.49, 2.75] .73 
Response time 0.00 1.00 [0.98, 1.02] .93  0.00 1.00 [0.98, 1.03] .76 
Gender = Female -0.04 0.96 [0.48, 1.91] .91  0.24 1.28 [0.54, 3.04] .58 
Interest in photography = 
Interested 
0.42 1.52 [0.76, 3.05] .24  0.33 1.39 [0.55, 3.55] .49 
Distance to light source 0.00 1.00 [0.99, 1.01] .78  -0.02 0.98 [0.97, 0.99] <.001 
Light position = Left 0.11 1.12 [0.65, 1.92] .68  - - - 
Angle difference 0.02 1.02 [1.00, 1.05] .03  - - - 
Note. CI = confidence interval. B and odds ratios (OR) estimate the degree of change in accuracy 
associated with one unit change in the independent variable. An odds ratio of 1 indicates no effect of 
the independent variable on accuracy, values of 1.5, 2.5, and 4.0 are generally considered to reflect 
small, medium, and large effect sizes, respectively (Rosenthal, 1996). The category order for factors 
was set to descending to make the reference level 0. The reference groups are: Video game playing = 
Infrequent (never/less than once a month), Gender = Male, Interest in photography = Not Interested, 
Light position = Right. Response time, confidence, distance of light source from the scene, and angle 
difference were added as continuous variables. The three subjects who chose not to disclose their 
gender were excluded from these analyses leaving a total sample of n = 99. The light position and angle 
difference predictor variables were not applicable in the consistent shadow scenes. 
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Recall that the stimuli used in Experiments 1a and 1b were identical. Why, then, 
did we find that two of the image properties—angle difference and distance of the 
light—had an impact on subjects’ performance in Experiment 1b but not 1a? One 
possibility is that the incentive to take part was an important factor: In Experiment 1a, 
subjects were incentivised with course credit; in Experiment 1b the only incentive was 
that subjects received their results at the end of the task. As such, we can speculate that 
the subjects in Experiment 1b might have been more interested in the task and more 
motivated to do well than the subjects in Experiment 1a. Offering some support for this 
suggestion, previous research has shown that using shadow information to determine the 
position of the light source in complex scenes is not an automatic process but instead 
requires effortful encoding (Langer & Zucker, 1997; Ostrovsky et al., 2005). It follows, 
then, that if people are more interested in the task, they might take a more considered 
and effortful approach and perhaps therefore give more attention to the image properties. 
As well as a small effect of the two image properties, video gaming influenced the 
likelihood of responding correctly: those who play video games frequently were more 
likely to correctly identify inconsistent shadow scenes than those who do not play video 
games frequently. This finding makes sense when considering the substantial body of 
evidence showing that video gamers outperform non-video gamers across a range of 
perceptual measures (e.g., Boot, Kramer, Simons, Fabiani, & Gratton, 2008; Feng, 
Spence, & Pratt, 2007; Green & Bavelier, 2003, 2006, 2007; for a review, see Green & 
Bavelier, 2012). For example, research has demonstrated that video gaming improves 
people’s selective attention, that is, their ability to choose which aspects of a stimulus 
are task-relevant and should receive additional processing, while filtering out task-
irrelevant items (e.g., Green & Bavelier, 2003, 2006, 2007). Given that detecting 
lighting inconsistencies is not an automatic process but instead requires a relatively slow 
scan of the scene to carefully process objects and their shadows in a serial manner 
(Langer & Zucker, 1997; Ostrovsky et al., 2005), it is likely that selective attention is 
important in the shadow task. Accordingly, our finding that video gamers were more 
likely to correctly identify inconsistent shadow scenes than non-gamers is concordant 
with the broader literature (e.g., Green & Bavelier, 2003, 2006, 2007; Ostrovsky et al., 
2005). 
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In Experiment 1b, subjects were slightly more likely to identify the inconsistent 
shadows when the angle difference from the correct shadow location was larger 
compared to when it was smaller. Yet the design of the experiment meant that there 
were only eight inconsistent shadow scenes and thus only eight angle differences to 
consider. In Experiment 2a, to more precisely estimate the perceptual threshold for 
identifying lighting inconsistencies, we asked subjects to move a target shadow to the 
exact position that they thought was consistent with the lighting of the scene. 
Experiment 2a 
Method 
Subjects and Design 
A total of 109 subjects (M = 25.1 years, SD = 9.7, range = 14-64; 41 women, 65 
men, and 3 chose not to disclose their gender) completed the task online. Two additional 
subjects were excluded from the analyses because they experienced technical 
difficulties. There were no geographical restrictions and subjects did not receive 
payment for taking part. Subject recruitment continued until we reached a minimum of 
100 responses per scene. In a within-subjects design, each subject viewed a series of 
four computer-generated images and, for each image, attempted to position a target 
shadow so that it was consistent with the scene light source. We measured subjects’ 
accuracy in determining the correct position for the target shadow. 
Stimuli 
We used the same five original city scenes as in Experiments 1a and 1b. In GNU 
Image Manipulation Program® (GIMP, Version 2.8), we removed the target lamppost’s 
shadow from each of the original scenes and saved the shadows as new PNG image 
files. We developed a program in HTML to display the original scene with the shadow 
image overlaid but rotated at a random angle between -45° and +45° of the correct 
shadow location. This time then, there was one version of each scene, but the initial 
position for the target shadow was randomised. 
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Procedure 
Subjects were first given detailed instructions about the experiment and informed 
that they could assume that “…each of the scenes is illuminated by a single light source, 
such as the sun.” Before the experiment proper began, subjects were given a practice 
trial. To cue subjects’ attention to the target lamppost (i.e., the lamppost they would base 
their response on), the scene first appeared with a red ellipse around the target lamppost 
then the ellipse disappeared automatically after 2 s. Subjects were asked to “Please use 
the left and right arrow keys to change the shadow rotation and then press enter when 
you think it is consistent with the other shadows in the scene.” Subjects were given 
unlimited time to rotate the target shadow and provide their answer. They were then 
asked to rate their confidence in their decision using a 100-point Likert-type scale 
ranging from 0 (Not at all confident) to 100 (Extremely confident). 
Next the experiment proper began. Subjects were presented with the four city 
scenes in a random order. For each scene, subjects completed exactly the same 
procedure as described for the practice trial. After completing the shadow task, subjects 
were asked whether they had experienced any technical difficulties while completing the 
experiment. 
Results and Discussion 
An analysis of the response time data suggested that subjects were engaged with 
the task and spent a reasonable amount of time positioning the target shadow in the 
scenes. The mean response time per image was 57.3 s (SD = 419.3 s) and the median 
response time was 23.9 s (interquartile range: 15.8, 39.7 s). 
Overall accuracy on the shadow task 
In the shadow task, subjects rotated the target shadow about its base to the position 
they judged to be consistent with the scene’s light source. The target shadow could be 
rotated 360°, with 0° representing the position in which the shadow was consistent with 
the scene’s light source. Clockwise rotation gave positive values from 0.1° to 179.9°, 
indicating that the shadow was placed left of its consistent position. Counter-clockwise 
rotation gave negative values from -0.1° to -179.9°, indicating that the shadow was 
placed right of its consistent position. This range of shadow positions makes it possible 
to consider accuracy on the task in various ways. First, taking an extremely conservative 
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approach and considering an accurate response to be between -1° and +1°, across the 
four scenes, subjects were accurate just 7% of the time, 95% CI [5%, 10%]. Taking a 
slightly more lenient approach, 51% of the shadows were positioned between -10° and 
+10°, 95% CI [46%, 56%]. And 95% of the shadows were positioned between -40° and 
+40° of the correct location, 95% CI [93%, 97%]. The remaining 5% of shadows were 
positioned as widely as -150° and +150° of the correct location. As in Experiment 1b, 
these results indicate that subjects had only a basic understanding about where an 
object’s shadow must cast to be consistent with the light source. Our results also offer 
empirical support for the notion of a perceptual threshold for noticing lighting 
inconsistencies in images (Lopez-Moreno et al., 2010; Tan et al., 2015). To more 
precisely estimate the perceptual system’s sensitivity to lighting inconsistencies than in 
previous research, we allowed subjects to rotate the target shadow through 360° at 0.1° 
increments. Despite this high level of control, subjects were still willing to rotate the 
target shadow to a relatively wide range of positions that were inconsistent with the 
scene lighting. Therefore, people’s perceptual threshold for accepting shadows as 
consistent with a single light source appears to be surprisingly wide. 
To further understand subjects’ perception of illumination inconsistencies we 
calculated accuracy by scene. Figure 4.3 displays the angle difference from the correct 
shadow position (0°) on the x-axis where smaller angle differences indicate that the 
shadow was positioned closer to its correct position than larger angle differences. The 
cumulative proportion of responses that were made by each angle difference level are 
presented on the y-axis. The light grey line with circle markers shows the overall 
proportion of responses made by each angle difference level and therefore includes both 
negative and positive values, for example 10° on the graph represents responses between 
-10° and +10°. We also calculated the number of positive and negative responses made 
by each angle difference level and displayed these as a proportion of the total responses. 
The black line with triangle markers shows the proportion of negative angle difference 
responses (shadow to the right of the consistent position). The dark grey line with square 
markers shows the proportion of positive angle difference responses (shadow to the left 
of the consistent position). This analysis revealed that subjects’ performance varied by 
scene. Specifically, subjects were most accurate in Scene 4 where the target shadow was 
positioned between -5° and +5° of the correct location by 50% of subjects, 95% CI 
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[41%, 60%]. On the other hand, subjects were least accurate in Scene 3, where the target 
shadow was positioned between -5° and +5° of the correct location by only 15% of 
subjects, 95% CI [8%, 21%]. In line with this finding, previous research has shown that 
the detection of illumination inconsistencies is affected by various factors, such as the 
scene content and layout (Tan et al., 2015; Xia et al., 2016). Specifically, if a scene 
contains a number of objects that are all orientated in the same direction, then lighting 
inconsistencies are typically easier to notice (Enns & Rensink, 1990). Therefore, our 
results offer support for the idea that the perception of shadow inconsistencies is 
influenced by the configuration of the scene (Ostrovsky et al., 2005; Tan et al., 2015; 
Xia et al., 2016). Next we consider whether subjects showed a preference to position the 
target shadow to the left or to the right of the consistent position. 
Preference for shadows to the left or right 
Across the four scenes, we classified each response according to whether subjects 
positioned the shadow to the left or right of the correct position. The results revealed that 
a mean 20% more of the shadows were positioned to the left of the correct location than 
to the right of the correct location, Mdiff 95% CI [12%, 28%]. Yet, as Figure 4.3 shows, 
this trend was not found across all four scenes. Subjects were more likely to rotate the 
shadow to the left (positive angle difference) of the correct position in Scenes 1 and 3 
(Scene 1: 84%, 95% CI [77%, 91%]; Scene 3: 75%, 95% CI [67%, 83%]). Conversely, 
in Scene 2, 73% of subjects rotated the shadow so that it appeared to the right (negative 
angle difference) of its correct position, 95% CI [65%, 82%]. And in Scene 4, a similar 
proportion of subjects positioned the shadow to the left of its correct location (54%) as 
to the right (46%). These findings contradict research suggesting a leftward bias for 
illumination position (Mamassian & Goutcher, 2001; Sun & Perona, 1998; Symons, 
Cuddy, & Humphrey, 2000). Yet the research showing that people hold a prior 
assumption that light comes from above-left has typically relied on simplistic stimuli, 
such as shaded disks. Thus it is possible that the leftward bias for light position might 
not apply to more complex stimuli. In fact, more recent studies have shown that prior 
assumptions about lighting direction are unimportant in everyday perception 
(Morgenstern, Geisler, & Murray, 2014; Morgenstern, Murray, & Harris, 2011). 
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Specifically, any prior assumptions people might hold are easily overridden by lighting 
direction cues such as shading and shadows—our findings support this account. 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Cumulative proportion of responses made by each angle difference level for 
(a) Scene 1 (b) Scene 2 (c) Scene 3 and (d) Scene 4. The light grey line with circle 
markers shows the overall proportion of responses made by each angle difference level 
and therefore includes both negative and positive values—for example, 10° on the graph 
represents responses between -10° and +10°. The black line with triangle markers shows 
the proportion of negative angle difference responses (shadow to the right of the 
consistent position). The dark grey line with square markers shows the proportion of 
positive angle difference responses (shadow to the left of the consistent position). Error 
bars represent standard error of the mean. 
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In sum, our results in Experiment 2a further support the idea that subjects typically 
make imprecise judgements about where shadows must be positioned to be consistent 
with a single light source. This result is somewhat surprising because there was 
sufficient information available in the scene to determine the location of the light and 
thus to allow an objective judgement. Given that only 51% of the shadows in 
Experiment 2a were positioned within +/- 10° of their correct location it suggests that 
subjects might not easily perceive this lighting information, thereby making it difficult to 
localise the light source. That said, because the target shadow used in Experiment 2a 
was taken from the consistent version of the scene it is possible that the shape of the 
target shadow provided subjects with a cue to its correct position. Therefore these results 
might actually overestimate people’s ability to position a target shadow so it is 
consistent with the scene light source. To check this possibility we ran Experiment 2b in 
which subjects were not only able to rotate the shadow but also change the scale of the 
shadow. 
Experiment 2b 
Method 
Subjects and Design 
A total of 102 subjects (M = 25.1 years, SD = 10.2, range = 14-59; 47 women, 50 
men, and 5 chose not to disclose their gender) completed the task online. Four additional 
subjects were removed because they experienced technical difficulties. There were no 
geographical restrictions and subjects did not receive payment for taking part. Subject 
recruitment continued until we reached a minimum of 100 responses per scene. The 
design was identical to that of Experiment 2a. 
Stimuli and Procedure 
We used the same stimuli and program as in Experiment 2a with one exception. 
We amended the program to allow subjects to adjust the scale of the shadow as well as 
the rotation. The scale was randomised so that the target shadow initially appeared 
between 0.5 and 1.5 of its correct scale. Subjects were instructed to “Please use the left 
and right arrow keys to change the shadow rotation and the up and down arrow keys to 
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change the shadow size, then press enter when you think it is consistent with the other 
shadows in the scene.” 
Results and Discussion 
An analysis of the response time data suggested that subjects were engaged with 
the task and spent a reasonable amount of time positioning the target shadow in the 
scenes. The mean response time per image was 34.7 s (SD = 27.3 s) and the median 
response time 28.6 s (interquartile range: 19.1, 42.5 s). 
Overall accuracy on the shadow task 
Replicating the result from Experiment 2a, across the four scenes, subjects placed 
the shadow between +/-1° of the correct shadow position just 7% of the time, 95% CI 
[4%, 9%]. With the more lenient classification for accuracy on the task, that is 
positioning the shadow between +/-10° of the correct position, 46% of shadows were 
positioned accurately (cf. Expt 2a: 51%), 95% CI [41%, 51%]. And 95% of the shadows 
were positioned between +/-40° of the correct location, 95% CI [93%, 97%]. Of the 
remaining shadows, 4.8% of shadows were positioned as widely as -124° and +124° of 
the correct location.8  Recall that the results from Experiment 2a showed that subjects’ 
accuracy on the shadow task varied by scene; as Figure 4.4 illustrates, we replicated this 
finding in Experiment 2b. Again, subjects were more accurate in positioning the shadow 
in Scene 4 than in the other three scenes. In Scene 4, 50% of shadows were positioned 
between +/-6.7° of the correct location, 95% CI [40%, 60%]. Also replicating the results 
from Experiment 2a, subjects were least accurate in Scenes 1 and 3, where the target 
shadow was positioned between +/-6.7° of the correct location by only 25% and 26% of 
subjects, respectively (Scene 1: 95% CI [17%, 34%]; Scene 3: 95% CI [18%, 35%]). As 
in Experiment 2a, and in line with previous studies, these results suggest a context 
effect—the orientation of the objects and resulting configuration of the shadow cues in 
the scene influenced performance on the task (Tan et al., 2015; Xia et al., 2016). Next, 
we considered the likelihood that subjects positioned the target shadow to the left or to 
the right of the consistent position. 
                                                          
8 One outstanding shadow was positioned at -170° 
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Preference for shadows to the left or right 
Replicating our finding from Experiment 2a, collapsed across the four scenes, 
subjects positioned 16% more of the shadows to the left of the correct position than to 
the right, Mdiff 95% CI [7%, 25%]. Further, we also replicated our finding that this 
directional preference was context dependent—that is, it varied by scene. As illustrated 
in Figure 4.4, subjects were more likely to move the shadow to the left of the correct 
position in Scenes 1 and 3, but more likely to move the shadow to the right of the correct 
position in Scene 2. In Scene 4, subjects were equally likely to have positioned the 
shadow to the left or right of its correct location. By replicating our results in 
Experiment 2a, we offer further support for the view that lighting direction cues in the 
scene can override any prior assumptions about lighting (Morgenstern et al., 2011, 
2014). 
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Figure 4.4. Cumulative proportion of responses made by each angle difference level for 
(a) Scene 1 (b) Scene 2 (c) Scene 3 and (d) Scene 4. The light grey line with circle 
markers shows the overall proportion of responses made by each angle difference level 
and therefore includes both negative and positive values—for example, 10° on the graph 
represents responses between -10° and +10°. The black line with triangle markers shows 
the proportion of negative angle difference responses (shadow to the right of the 
consistent position). The dark grey line with square markers shows the proportion of 
positive angle difference responses (shadow to the left of the consistent position). Error 
bars represent standard error of the mean. 
 
In sum, allowing subjects to adjust the size of the target shadow in Experiment 2b 
made virtually no difference to the pattern of results. Therefore, it is possible that being 
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able to change the scale of the target shadow did not prevent subjects using the shape of 
the shadow as a cue. If so, our results might still overestimate people’s ability on the 
task. To check, we ran a fifth experiment in which we generated different versions of the 
target shadow that were inconsistent in both position and shape. 
Experiment 3 
Method 
Subjects and Design 
A total of 114 subjects (M = 25.6 years, SD = 9.0, range = 14-52; 48 women, 62 
men, and 4 chose not to disclose their gender) completed the task online. Five additional 
subjects were removed because they experienced technical difficulties. There were no 
geographical restrictions and subjects did not receive payment for taking part. Subject 
recruitment continued until we reached a minimum of 100 responses per scene. We used 
a within-subjects design. Each person viewed a series of four computer-generated 
images, for each image, subjects used the left and right arrow keys to scroll through 11 
possible shadow options for a single lamppost. We measured subjects’ accuracy in 
selecting the shadow that was consistent with the scene light source. 
Stimuli 
We used the same five original city scenes as in the previous four experiments. 
This time, however, we created 21 versions of each scene in Maya® (2016; Autodesk, 
Inc.), each version with the objects in an identical position, but with 21 different light 
positions. In the consistent version, the target lamppost’s shadow was created by the 
same light source as the rest of the scene. In the other 20 versions of the scene—the 
inconsistent versions—we created a second light source that only created a shadow for 
the target lamppost, nothing else in the scene. By changing the position of only the 
second light source we created 20 versions of the scene in which the shadow for the 
target lamppost was inconsistent with the shadow configuration for the rest of that scene. 
Furthermore, these shadows were inconsistent in terms of both position and shape. For 
10 of the inconsistent versions of the scene we moved the second light source in 10 
equal increments of 200 m to the left of the original light position. For the other 10, we 
moved the second light source in 10 equal increments of 200 m to the right of the 
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original light position. As a result, we created 21 versions of each of the five scenes: one 
with consistent lighting for all objects in the scene—including the target lamppost—and 
20 with consistent lighting for all objects except the target lamppost. The versions of the 
scene were numbered from 1 to 21, with the consistent version of the scene always 
number 11. Versions 10 to 1 were inconsistent, with the target shadow moving 
incrementally further to the left of the consistent version, while 12 to 21 were the 
inconsistent versions, with the target shadow moving incrementally further to the right 
of the consistent version (see Figure 4.5 for a sample of the versions of a scene). 
We developed a program in HTML to randomly select one of the 21 versions of 
the scene to display. As well as this randomly selected version, subjects were able to 
scroll through a sequence of another 10 consecutive versions of that same scene—
crucially, the sequence always included the consistent version. To illustrate, consider, 
for example, that the program randomly selects version 1, the subject would be able to 
scroll through versions 1 to 11 of the scene. Or, to consider another example, if the 
program randomly selects version 15, then the subject will be able to scroll through 
versions 5 to 15 of the scene. Having generated the sequence, the program randomised 
which of the 11 versions to display first, thus ensuring that subjects did not always start 
at the extreme end of a sequence. We programmed the left and right arrow keys on the 
keyboard to allow subjects to scroll through the 11 versions of the scene. 
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Figure 4.5. Example versions of Scene 3. (a) version 4, inconsistent; (b) version 11, 
consistent; (c) version 14, inconsistent. 
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Procedure 
The procedure was the same as Experiment 2b, with one exception: subjects 
scrolled through the 11 versions of each scene rather than moving the shadow at will. 
We asked subjects to select the version of the scene in which the shadow of the target 
lamppost was consistent with the other shadows in the scene. 
Results and Discussion 
An analysis of the response time data suggested that subjects were engaged with 
the task and spent a reasonable amount of time determining which version of the scene 
was consistent with a single light source. The mean response time per image was 26.3 s 
(SD = 50.2 s) and the median response time 19.4 s (interquartile range: 12.3, 29.6 s). 
Overall accuracy on the shadow task 
In the shadow task, subjects scrolled through 11 versions of the scene, each of 
which showed a different shadow configuration for the target lamppost, and selected the 
one they judged to be consistent with the scene’s lighting. Therefore, as in Experiments 
2a and 2b, it was possible to classify subjects’ performance on the shadow task in a 
number of different ways. First, taking a conservative approach we defined an accurate 
response to be only when subjects selected the consistent version of the scene. Collapsed 
across the four scenes, the consistent version was selected a mean 25% of the time, 95% 
CI [21%, 29%]. Second, taking a slightly more lenient approach and defining an 
accurate response by including one version either side of the consistent shadow 
position—that is, when versions 10, 11, or 12 were selected—a mean 55% of shadows 
were positioned correctly, 95% CI [50%, 59%]. Replicating the findings from 
Experiments 2a and 2b, Figure 4.6 shows that subjects were least accurate in Scene 3, 
with a mean 40% selecting version 10, 11, or 12 of the scene, 95% CI [31%, 49%]. In 
contrast to the previous experiments, however, subjects were most accurate in Scene 1, a 
mean 65% selecting version 10, 11, or 12 of the scene, 95% CI [56%, 74%]. There is not 
an immediately obvious reason as to why subjects did relatively well on Scene 1 in 
Experiment 3. Speculatively, it is possible that the shape of the target shadow in 
Experiments 2a and 2b actually made the inconsistent positions seem more plausible 
rather than less plausible in Scene 1. 
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Preference for shadows to the left or right 
Across the four scenes, we classified each response according to whether subjects 
positioned the shadow to the left (versions 10 to 1) or right (versions 12 to 21) of the 
correct position. In contrast to the results of Experiments 2a and 2b, collapsing across all 
four scenes, the shadows were equally likely to be positioned to the left or to the right of 
the correct location, Mdiff = 0%, 95% CI [-8%, 7%]. Yet as illustrated in Figure 4.6, there 
was still variation by scene. In line with our previous experiments, subjects were more 
likely to position the target shadow left of the correct position in Scene 3. And again, in 
Scene 2, subjects were more likely to position the target shadow right of the correct 
position. This time, in both Scenes 1 and 4, a similar proportion of subjects selected a 
target shadow to the left of its correct location as to the right. Again, these findings 
support the notion that lighting direction cues can override any prior assumptions about 
lighting (Morgenstern et al., 2011, 2014). 
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Figure 4.6. Cumulative proportion of responses made by each version of the scene for 
(a) Scene 1 (b) Scene 2 (c) Scene 3 and (d) Scene 4. The light grey line with circle 
markers shows the overall proportion of responses made by each inconsistent version of 
the scene—these are cumulative and therefore a difference of 1 includes subjects 
selecting versions 10, 11, or 12 of the scene. The black line with triangle markers shows 
the cumulative proportion of subjects selecting each version of the scene to the right of 
the consistent shadow position responses. The dark grey line with square markers shows 
the cumulative proportion of subjects selecting each version of the scene to the left of 
the consistent shadow position responses Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
 
Conclusion 
Overall the pattern of results across our five shadow experiments was largely 
consistent. First and foremost, these experiments suggest that people have a limited 
ability to identify consistent and inconsistent shadows. This finding is surprising 
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considering that subjects viewed scenes in which there was sufficient information to 
determine the answer objectively. Furthermore, unlike in a real-world scenario, subjects’ 
attention was cued to the target object and its shadow in the scene which meant that 
subjects only had to check the consistency of this one shadow with the lighting of the 
scene. When viewing images in real-life, people are unlikely to gain this advantage, 
rather their task is more difficult than in our experimental scenario because they need to 
be sceptical of all shadows. There is, however, an important point to consider when 
interpreting the results of the shadow experiments; although there was information in the 
scenes that allowed subjects to use the shadow-based analysis technique, it remains 
possible that they were not aware of this technique. In fact, even with awareness, people 
might still find it difficult to apply the shadow-based analysis—this would be interesting 
to explore in future research. 
It is possible, then, that a lack of awareness prevented people from using the 
objective shadow-based analysis. Consider, however, that even without using this 
objective technique, it should still be possible to identify whether the target shadow is 
consistent or inconsistent with the other shadows based on a subjective visual inspection 
of the scene. Put simply, a visual comparison of the position and shape of the target 
shadow with the other shadows in the scene should help people to make an accurate 
decision about the consistency or inconsistency of the shadows. In fact, because the 
human visual system evolved under natural lighting conditions there is good reason to 
think that people would be sensitive to the appearance of shadows. Yet, our results 
suggest the opposite: that people are reasonably insensitive to shadow information. To 
help understand this finding we can look to theoretical accounts of how people process 
shadow information. 
Commonly, researchers have adopted the visual search paradigm to gain insight 
about how people process shadow information (e.g., Elder, Trithart, Pintilie, & 
MacLean, 2004; Khuu, Honson, & Challinor, 2016; Lovell, Gilchrist, Tolhurst, & 
Troscianko, 2009; Porter, Tales, & Leonards, 2010; Rensink & Cavanagh, 2004). In one 
study, subjects searched for a target item that had a different orientation to the distractor 
items in the display (Rensink & Cavanagh, 2004). The items in the display were 
vertically orientated grey rectangle posts with an attached darker grey quadrilateral 
shape at one end of the post. Based on the implicit light from above assumption—that is, 
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shadows should be below objects (e.g., Adams, 2007; Mamassian & Goutcher, 2001)—
when the displays were upright the attached darker region is interpreted as a shadow cast 
by the post; but when the displays were inverted, the attached darker region is no longer 
interpreted as a shadow, instead it is simply another part of the object. As such, in the 
upright trials subjects were searching for an odd shadow amongst other shadows, while 
in the inverted trials subjects were searching for an odd object amongst other objects. 
Interestingly, people were slower to detect an odd shadow in a display than an 
equivalent odd object. Based on these findings, researchers proposed that there is an 
early stage in visual processing that rapidly identifies and then discounts shadow regions 
in a scene (Rensink & Cavanagh, 2004). 
Indeed this insensitivity to shadows can account for our finding that people 
struggled to make a subjective judgement about whether or not a target shadow was 
consistent or inconsistent with the other shadows in the scene. Specifically, if people 
discard shadow information at an early stage of visual processing, then it follows that 
they will not have an opportunity to learn about how shadows should appear. Thus, 
although we directed subjects to use the shadow information in the scenes it is unlikely 
to have been much help if people do not hold a basic knowledge about how shadows 
should look. Yet, it is difficult to reconcile some of our other results with the early 
discounting theory; for example the theory cannot account for our finding that people 
were more likely to detect inconsistent shadows that were positioned further from the 
correct position than inconsistent shadows that were positioned closer to the correct 
position. According to the early discounting theory, all shadows are rapidly identified 
and discounted; this means that people should be equally likely to incorrectly accept an 
inconsistent shadow as correct, regardless of the extent of discrepancy with the other 
shadows in the scene. Therefore, our results suggest that the early discounting theory 
might not fully account for how people process shadow information. 
Other studies showing that shadows can have a profound effect on scene 
perception also indicate that people do not just ignore shadow information (e.g., Allen, 
1999; Castiello, 2001; Kersten, et al., 1996). Such findings have led some researchers to 
suggest that the notion of an early level mechanism that discounts shadows is too 
simplistic (Elder et al., 2004; Khuu et al., 2016; Lovell et al., 2009; Porter et al., 2010). 
An alternative theoretical account of shadow processing is that the visual system adopts 
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a coarse scale analysis of shadow information (Khuu et al., 2016; Lovell et al., 2009; 
Mamassian, 2004). According to this hypothesis, shadow regions are rapidly identified 
but not discounted; instead the identified shadows are processed in a coarse manner 
(Lovell et al., 2009; Mamassian, 2004). Offering support for this coarse scale 
hypothesis, researchers demonstrated a boundary condition for Rensink and Cavanagh’s 
(2004) finding that people were slower to detect an odd shadow than an equivalent odd 
object (Lovell et al., 2009). In the original study, the attached darker region of the target 
item in the display was orientated at a 30° difference to the attached darker region of the 
distractor items in the display. When this angle difference increased, for example from 
30 to 90°, people were as fast to detect the odd shadow as they were to detect the odd 
object (Lovell et al., 2009). This boundary of the effect illustrates that people can readily 
detect shadow discrepancies when they are relatively large but not when they are subtle 
(Lovell et al., 2009; Mamassian, 2004; but see Porter et al., 2010). For subtle shadow 
discrepancies, an effortful higher-level visual mechanism is invoked to re-evaluate the 
information, this time taking into account finer details (Lovell et al., 2009). 
The coarse scale hypothesis can account for some of our results; namely that 
people were more likely to detect inconsistent shadows that were positioned further from 
the correct position than inconsistent shadows that were positioned closer to the correct 
position. Accordingly, using the coarse scale hypothesis to interpret our results also fits 
with the notion of a perceptual threshold for detecting lighting inconsistencies (Lopez-
Moreno et al., 2010; Tan et al., 2015). That is, there might be a discernible point at 
which inconsistent shadows are different enough from the consistent position that the 
inconsistency becomes noticeable—at this point a coarse scale mechanism is effective. 
For inconsistent shadows that do not reach this threshold a different strategy, perhaps an 
effortful higher-level mechanism, is used. Although our results neither support nor 
oppose the existence of a separate higher-level mechanism for processing subtle shadow 
inconsistencies, our data do indicate that, if such a mechanism does exist, it might not be 
particularly effective. Indeed, subjects often failed to notice shadow inconsistencies, 
especially the subtle ones. Furthermore, our finding that subjects were biased to accept 
the shadow scenes as consistent in Experiments 1a and 1b raises the possibility that 
people might infrequently employ a more effortful strategy and instead tend to rely on 
intuitive feelings about shadows. 
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Unfortunately, these findings do not have overly positive consequences for using 
shadow information to identify image forgeries in the real world. The results suggest 
that when an image manipulation creates a relatively large inconsistency in the shadows 
of the scene, people are likely to notice it and might be able to detect the image as a 
fake. If the shadow inconsistency is relatively subtle, however, then people are more 
likely to be fooled by the fake image. What is more, this interpretation might be 
optimistic; in our experiments, we asked people to check the consistency of the shadows 
in the scenes—evidence suggests that people give less attention to shadows in more 
natural viewing conditions (Ehinger et al., 2016; Ostrovsky et al., 2005; Wright, 2005). 
An interesting follow-up study would be to explore to what extent people can detect 
shadow inconsistencies when their attention is not directed to the shadows in the scene. 
Encouragingly, though, researchers have shown that performance on many types 
of perceptual tasks can improve as a result of training (e.g., Ellison & Walsh, 1998; 
Porter et al., 2010; Sireteanu & Rettenbach, 1995, 2000). For example, using the same 
visual search task as in Rensink and Cavanagh’s (2004) study, researchers found that 
following a training period subjects were as fast to detect an odd shadow in a display as 
an equivalent odd object (Porter et al., 2010). Moreover, this learning process transferred 
to other forms of shadow stimuli. Therefore, an interesting avenue for future research 
would be to examine the influence of training on people’s performance on the shadow 
task. This training could include both showing people how to make use of the objective 
shadow-based analysis technique as well as perceptual-based learning—for example 
giving people a number of practice trials before completing the shadow task.  
In sum, our findings suggest that people have a limited ability to identify 
consistent and inconsistent shadows. Yet, the extent of the inconsistency influenced 
performance: people were more likely to detect inconsistent shadows that were 
positioned further from the correct position than inconsistent shadows that were 
positioned closer to the correct position. This result fits with the coarse scale hypothesis 
of shadow processing—that the visual system typically relies on a coarse representation 
of shadow information. In real-world situations, then, it is possible that people might be 
able to use shadow information to help detect fake images if the forger leaves a 
relatively large shadow inconsistency but not if the inconsistency is only subtle. 
Seemingly, if the Rathods had chosen to manipulate their fake summit photos to show a 
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timestamp within an hour or so of midday—rather than 6.25am—they might still hold 
the title of first Indian couple to climb Mount Everest. 
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Chapter 5 : 
Can people identify geometric inconsistencies in reflections? 
 
“…there's the room you can see through the glass—that's just the same as our drawing 
room, only the things go the other way.” 
Lewis Carroll (1871) 
Introduction 
Shortly after the November 2015 Paris terrorist attacks, a doctored photo depicting 
an innocent man as one of the attackers circulated online and in newspapers (Rawlinson, 
2015). The authentic version of the photo featured Veerender Jubbal standing in a 
bathroom in front of a mirror taking a selfie with his iPad. In the manipulated version of 
the image, Jubbal is shown wearing a suicide vest and his iPad has been replaced by 
what appears to be a Qur’an. Although many major news outlets were fooled by the 
image, the manipulation left several prominent clues that the image was a fake (Butterly, 
2015; Rawlinson, 2015). Crucially, when Jubbal photographed his reflection he was 
standing straight-on to the mirror which means that the camera used to capture the photo 
must also be visible in the reflection. In the authentic version of the photo, the iPad used 
to capture the photo can be seen clearly in the reflection. Yet in the manipulated version 
of the image, the forgers replaced the iPad with a Qur’an thus making it a geometrical 
impossibility for the image to have been captured. Detecting this basic inconsistency in 
the geometry of the reflection could have prevented an innocent man becoming a suspect 
in the attacks. To what extent, then, can people use reflections to help to identify 
whether photos are authentic or manipulated? In this chapter, we explored this question 
by examining people’s ability to identify whether a target reflection was consistent or 
inconsistent with the other reflections in the same scene. 
Reflections are common in our everyday environment yet only a relatively small 
number of studies have tested what people understand about mirror reflections9 
(Bertamini, Spooner, & Hecht, 2003; Bianchi & Savardi, 2012; Croucher, Bertamini, & 
Hecht, 2002; Hecht, Bertamini, & Gamer, 2005; Lawson, 2010; Lawson & Bertamini, 
                                                          
9 Although there are two types of reflection, in this chapter we focus on specular reflection—the reflection 
of light from a smooth surface, such as a flat mirror or window. 
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2006; Muelenz, Hecht, & Gamer, 2010). In one study using a bird’s-eye view diagram 
of a room, subjects predicted when a target would first become visible in a mirror 
(Croucher et al., 2002). In one scenario, for example, subjects indicated the point at 
which a character who walks across the room on a path parallel to the surface of a mirror 
on the opposite wall would first see their reflection in that mirror. Across a range of 
these scenarios, subjects made consistent early errors. Put simply, they predicted that 
the character would be able to see their reflection before reaching the edge of the mirror, 
which is physically impossible. These findings suggest that people’s understanding of 
reflection is limited and biased. 
The bird’s-eye view diagrams did not allow people to see the reflections in the 
mirror which meant that they had to rely on their memory or abstract knowledge about 
mirror reflections when making their predictions. As such, other research has explored 
how people perceive reflections, such as subjects’ ability to distinguish between correct 
and incorrect mirror reflections when the reflections are visible in the scene (Bertamini 
et al., 2003; Farid & Bravo, 2010). In one study, subjects judged whether the reflections 
in a series of computer-generated scenes of household rooms were correct or incorrect 
(Bertamini et al., 2003). Some of the scenes contained authentic reflections and others 
had been manipulated to show an incorrect reflection, for example, a left-right reversal 
of the mirror image. Even when making these perceptual judgements about mirror 
images, subjects were surprisingly unlikely to notice distortions. A similar pattern of 
results was found in a more recent study (Farid & Bravo, 2010). The researchers created 
a series of computer-generated scenes containing only a red cone and a mirror. In half of 
the scenes, the cone’s reflection was inconsistent with the scene geometry such that the 
reflection was manipulated to be physically impossible given the position of the cone 
and the mirror in the scene. In the other half, the cone’s reflection was consistent with 
the scene geometry. Overall, subjects performed only slightly better than chance, 
correctly identifying just 55.7% of the scenes. In these perceptual tasks, people were 
surprisingly poor at detecting simple inconsistencies in reflections. 
A number of possible explanations have been proposed to account for people’s 
poor performance across these reflection tasks (Croucher et al., 2002). The one that 
appears to be able to account for the majority of the findings, including the early error, is 
the virtual world rotation hypothesis (Hecht et al., 2005; Muelenz et al., 2010). This 
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hypothesis proposes that people hold a perceptual outward bias that causes them to 
mentally rotate the mirror reflection of the world to make it more orthogonal (at a right-
angle) with respect to their line of sight. As a result, the mirror reflection appears further 
away from the observer than it would in reality. To illustrate, imagine an observer is 
viewing a mirror from the right side, owing to their bias the reflected world in the mirror 
is perceived as if it has been rotated counter-clockwise causing it to shift left, and away 
from the observer. 
It follows, then, that people would expect to see reflections before it is physically 
possible to do so. In a test of this hypothesis, subjects completed a real-world 
localisation task; first subjects viewed an object’s reflection in a mirror, then, once the 
mirror had been concealed and the object removed from the room, they attempted to 
indicate where the real object had been positioned in the room (Muelenz et al., 2010). 
Unbeknownst to the subjects, the rotation of the mirror was manipulated across trials: In 
half of the trials the mirror was positioned with no rotation, in the other half the mirror 
was rotated 2° away from the subjects’ point of view. If subjects have a perceptual 
outward bias then when the actual mirror is rotated away from their point of view this 
rotation will compensate for their bias and result in higher accuracy in the rotation than 
the non-rotation condition. Alternatively, if subjects do not have this bias, then they will 
more accurately locate the real object in the room when the mirror is not rotated. In 
support of the virtual world rotation hypothesis, the mean error for localising the 
position of the real object was smaller in the rotation than in the non-rotation condition. 
Although the virtual world rotation hypothesis can account for many of the 
previous findings, it does not explain all of them (Bianchi, Bertamini, & Savardi, 2015). 
Furthermore this hypothesis struggles to explain why people make effective use of 
mirrors in everyday life, for instance when driving or checking their appearance. One 
possibility is that the virtual world rotation hypothesis is only part of the explanation. 
Indeed, there is an important difference between using mirrors in the real world and 
making predictions or judgements about the location of reflections in experimental 
settings: When people use mirrors in real life the reflections are visible and people can 
use this perceptual information to help them to successfully use the mirror. Typically, 
such information is not available in experimental reflection tasks (Bertamini et al., 2003; 
Croucher et al., 2002). If experimental settings more closely mimicked real-life 
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scenarios, would people be better able to predict when their reflection would appear in 
the mirror? Research suggests the answer is yes. Using a real-life setting where subjects 
could see the reflections in a real mirror—as opposed to the mirror being covered—
subjects made accurate predictions about when their reflection would become visible 
(Lawson & Bertamini, 2006). Perhaps, then, the errors people make and the outward 
bias are artefacts of the experimental conditions but when using real mirrors the 
availability of perceptual information allows people to use them effectively. Even if that 
is the case, the results of these studies are still theoretically important because they 
suggest that people do not store readily accessible information from past experiences 
with mirrors. Instead, people need the information available each time they use a mirror. 
It seems likely that the same rationale would hold for people’s ability to predict or 
recognise the correct pattern of reflection in images. That is, to make accurate 
judgements people need perceptual information to be available in the image to guide 
them. One such piece of information that might prove useful is the reflection vanishing 
point (Montague, 2010). It has been known for centuries that reflections adhere to a 
basic law of optical physics: a smooth surface will reflect the light at the same angle that 
it hits the surface (Hecht & Zajac, 1974; Ronchi, 1970). As shown in Figure 5.1a, a 
result of this optical constraint means that, from a bird’s-eye view, imaginary parallel 
lines connect points on the real object in front of the mirror with the same points on the 
object’s reflection behind the mirror (Farid, 2016; O’Brien & Farid, 2012). Owing to 
perspective projection, when viewing that same scene but from the viewpoint shown in 
Figure 5.1b, the lines that connect object points and their corresponding points in the 
reflection will converge to a single point—the reflection vanishing point. Consequently, 
a geometric-based analysis can be used to objectively verify where the reflection of an 
object in the world should appear in a mirror. Furthermore, adding fake reflections into a 
photo, or manipulating a photo that contains reflections, can create inconsistencies that 
can be identified using the geometric-based analysis. If a line connecting a point on an 
object and its corresponding point in the reflection does not intersect the reflection 
vanishing point it highlights an inconsistency (O’Brien & Farid, 2012). As shown in 
Figure 5.1c, the geometric analysis reveals that the bus stop’s reflection is inconsistent 
with the reflection vanishing point that is consistent with the rest of the scene, indicating 
that some manipulation has occurred. 
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This reasonably simple analysis based on the geometric relationship between 
objects and their reflections is used in digital image forensics to help identify fakes. 
What is still unknown, however, is whether people also make use of the reflection 
vanishing point. To our knowledge, none of the reflection studies to date have used 
stimuli that would allow people to apply this geometric analysis—studies have used 
either bird’s eye view diagrams or scenes that do not contain enough corresponding 
object and reflection points to compute the reflection vanishing point. Therefore, 
previous research might have underestimated people’s understanding of mirror 
reflections. Accordingly, in this chapter we explored people’s ability to identify scenes 
that contained consistent and inconsistent reflections when it was possible to make use 
of the reflection vanishing point. 
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Figure 5.1. Example of the geometrical information available in images: (a) The scene is 
shown from a bird’s-eye view. The geometric relationship between objects and 
reflections of those objects is constrained by optical law of reflection. As a result, the 
black lines drawn connecting the objects with their reflections are parallel to one other 
and perpendicular to the mirror surface. (b) The same scene is shown from a different 
perspective; here, owing to perspective projection, the black lines are no longer parallel 
but instead converge to a single vanishing point. (c) Again the same scene is shown but 
the bus stop on the left and its reflection have been added. The red line connecting the 
bus stop with its reflection does not intersect the scene’s reflection vanishing point and 
highlights an inconsistency. 
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Experiment 1 
Method 
Subjects and Design 
A total of 79 subjects (M = 26.6 years, SD = 10.8, range = 13-68; 39 men, 38 
women, and 2 chose not to disclose their gender) completed the study online. Five 
additional subjects were removed, 4 who experienced technical difficulties, and 1 who 
had missing response time data for at least one response on the task. There were no 
geographical restrictions and subjects did not receive payment for taking part, but they 
did receive feedback on their performance at the end of the task. Subject recruitment 
continued until we reached a minimum of 20 responses per image (the stimulus set 
consisted of four consistent reflection images and eight inconsistent reflection images, 
further details of the images are provided in the following Stimuli section). We used a 
within-subjects design. Each person viewed a series of four computer-generated images, 
half of which had consistent reflections, and half of which were manipulated to show 
inconsistent reflections. We measured people’s accuracy in determining whether an 
image had consistent or inconsistent reflections. 
Stimuli 
Using Maya® (2016; Autodesk, Inc.), a 3-D animation software, we created five 
different outdoor city scenes from the same 3-D cityscape model that was used to create 
the shadow scenes in Chapter 4. All scenes were rendered as TIF files at a resolution of 
960 × 720 pixels. Each of the five scenes included a flat, smooth reflective surface. In 
each scene, the target object was a street sign placed adjacent to the reflective surface so 
that the sign and its reflection were both visible. In addition, to ensure subjects could use 
the geometric analysis to locate the reflection vanishing point we made a number of 
other non-target objects and their corresponding reflections visible in the scene. The 
scenes were rendered without shadows to ensure that we did not provide subjects with 
any additional cues that would influence their ability on the reflection task. These five 
scenes were the originals with consistent reflections. 
To create our inconsistent reflection scenes we began by rendering each scene two 
more times; once with the street sign moved forward relative to the original street sign 
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position (+7 m on the z-axis) and once with the street sign moved backward relative to 
the original street sign position (-7 m on the z-axis). We then manipulated the images 
using GNU Image Manipulation Program® (GIMP, Version 2.8). First, we removed the 
street sign’s reflection in the original scene, importantly, the original street sign itself 
remained in the scene. Second, we cut the reflection of the street sign from one of the 
other scenes with the street sign moved forwards or backwards. We then overlaid this 
reflection onto the original scene (see Figure 5.2 for an example of the consistent and 
inconsistent versions of a scene). We exported the images as PNGs, a lossless format. 
Overall, we had three versions of each of the five city scenes, a total of 15 images. 
The original, non-manipulated version of each of these scenes was used to create our 
consistent reflection image set. The two manipulated versions of each scene were used 
to create our inconsistent reflection image set. Subjects saw two consistent reflection and 
two inconsistent reflection images but always in a different city scene. The fifth city 
scene was used as a practice. 
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Figure 5.2. Example of the consistent and two inconsistent versions of a scene: (a) 
original image with consistent reflections, (b) forward inconsistent reflection image with 
the target street sign reflection moved forward of the consistent position, (c) backward 
inconsistent reflection image with the target street sign reflection moved backward of 
the consistent position. Each subject saw this city scene just once, they were randomly 
shown a, b, or c. In the example images the target street sign is shown in a red circle. 
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Procedure 
We used the same procedure as Experiments 1a and 1b in Chapter 4, with the 
following two adjustments: We cued subjects’ attention to the target street sign on which 
they need to base their response, and we asked “Is the street sign's reflection consistent 
or inconsistent with the other reflections in the scene?” 
Results and Discussion 
An analysis of the response time data suggested that subjects were engaged with 
the task and spent a reasonable amount of time determining whether the reflections in 
the scenes were consistent or inconsistent. The mean response time per image was 23.9 s 
(SD = 24.8 s) and the median response time 17.4 s (interquartile range: 9.9, 25.5 s). 
Overall accuracy on the reflection task 
We now turn to our primary research question: Can people identify whether scenes 
contain consistent or inconsistent reflections? Overall, a mean 50% of the scenes were 
correctly classified, 95% CI [44%, 55%]. Subjects' ability to distinguish between 
consistent (42% correct, 95% CI [34%, 50%]) and inconsistent (58% correct, 95% CI 
[50%, 65%]) reflections was not reliably greater than zero, d' = -0.01, 95% CI [-0.23, 
0.21]. Furthermore, subjects showed a bias towards saying that reflections were 
inconsistent, c = -0.15, 95% CI [-0.25, -0.06]. These results indicate that subjects found 
it extremely difficult to determine whether the reflection of the target object was 
consistent or inconsistent with the other reflections in the scene. Furthermore, the results 
suggest that subjects did not make use of the geometrical information in the scene to 
compute the reflection vanishing point and objectively determine the answer. Instead, in 
line with previous research, it seems more likely that subjects had incorrect beliefs about 
reflections and relied on these to make a subjective judgement about the consistency or 
inconsistency of the reflections in the scene (e.g., Bertamini et al., 2003; Croucher et al., 
2002). We next consider whether any individual factors or image metrics are associated 
with improved ability to identify consistent and inconsistent reflection scenes. 
Individual factors and image metrics 
To determine whether individual factors play a role in identifying consistent and 
inconsistent reflections, we gathered subjects’ demographic data, as well as details about 
123 
 
their interest in photography, and video gaming experience. We also asked subjects to 
rate their confidence for each of their decisions and recorded their response time. In 
addition to these individual factors, we checked whether three properties of the image 
itself affected people’s accuracy on the task. One image property was simply whether 
the reflection had moved forwards or backwards relative to the consistent reflection 
position. Figure 5.2 shows examples of how the reflection was moved in the forward and 
backward inconsistent scenes. The second image property was the distance from the 
centre of the image to the reflection vanishing point. The third image property was an 
angle measurement. Specifically, we measured the rotation, in degrees, from the scene’s 
reflection vanishing point to the reflection vanishing point for the target object and its 
inconsistent reflection. 
To check how each factor influenced subjects’ performance, we conducted two 
generalized estimating equation (GEE) analyses—one for the inconsistent reflection 
scenes and one for the consistent reflection scenes. Specifically, we conducted a 
repeated measures logistic regression with GEE because our dependant variables were 
binary with both random and fixed effects (Liang & Zeger, 1986). The results of the 
GEE analyses are shown in Table 5.1. 
The GEE analysis revealed that three of the variables had an effect on subjects’ 
ability to accurately identify inconsistent reflection scenes: reflection position, 
confidence, and gender. Scenes in which the reflection was moved forward of its 
consistent position were more likely to be identified as inconsistent compared with 
scenes in which the reflection was moved backwards of its consistent position. This 
result fits with the virtual world rotation hypothesis and supports the notion of a 
perceptual outward bias. Indeed, the inconsistent reflections that appeared further away 
rather than closer to the observers’ viewpoint were more likely to be incorrectly 
accepted as consistent (Muelenz et al., 2010). On the other hand, it is possible that this 
result is simply an effect of perspective projection transformation from the 3-D world to 
the 2-D image. Although the street sign was moved equally in the forward and backward 
conditions in the 3-D environment, owing to perspective projection the same change in 
the 3-D environment produces a larger change in the foreground than background of the 
2-D image. Thus it follows that people will be more sensitive to changes in the 
foreground than in the background.  
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We also found a small effect of confidence, such that more confident responses 
were slightly more likely to be associated with accurate responses than were less 
confident responses. Finally, females were slightly more likely to correctly identify 
inconsistent reflection scenes than males. The results of the GEE analyses for the 
consistent scenes revealed that none of the variables had an effect on subjects’ ability to 
accurately identify consistent reflection scenes. 
 
Table 5.1 
Results of the GEE binary logistic models to determine variables that predict accuracy 
in the reflection task 
Predictor 
Inconsistent  Consistent 
B OR [95% CI] p  B OR [95% CI] p 
Reflection position = 
Forward 
0.82 2.26 [1.08, 4.74] .03 
 
- - - 
Confidence 0.01 1.02 [1.00, 1.03] .04  -0.01 0.99 [0.98, 1.01] .24 
Gender = Female 0.71 2.04 [1.01, 4.10] .05  -0.10 0.91 [0.46, 1.78] .78 
Vanishing point distance -0.05 0.95 [0.89, 1.01] .12  0.03 1.03 [0.97, 1.11] .34 
Interest in photography = 
Interested 
-0.61 0.54 [0.25, 1.16] .12  -0.21 0.81 [0.41, 1.59] .54 
Video gaming = Frequent 
(at least twice a month) 
0.47 1.59 [0.80, 3.18] .19  0.40 1.49 [0.79, 2.83] .22 
Angle difference -2.22 0.11 [0.00, 3.96] .23  - - - 
Response time 0.00 1.00 [1.00, 1.01] .41  0.00 1.00 [0.99, 1.01] .79 
Note. CI = confidence interval. B and odds ratios (OR) estimate the degree of change in accuracy 
associated with one unit change in the independent variable. An odds ratio of 1 indicates no effect of 
the independent variable on accuracy, values of 1.5, 2.5, and 4.0 are generally considered to reflect 
small, medium, and large effect sizes, respectively (Rosenthal, 1996). The category order for factors 
was set to descending to make the reference level 0. The reference groups are: Reflection position = 
back, Video game playing = Infrequent (never/less than once a month/about once a month), Gender = 
Male, Interest in photography = Not Interested. Response time, confidence, reflection vanishing point 
distance, and angle difference were added as continuous variables. The two subjects who chose not to 
disclose their gender were excluded from these analyses leaving a total sample of n = 77. The 
reflection position and angle difference predictor variables were not applicable in the consistent 
reflection scenes. 
 
In Experiment 1, subjects correctly classified a mean 50% of the scenes indicating 
their performance on the reflection task was no better than would be expected by chance 
alone. These results suggest that people have an extremely limited ability to identify 
when the reflections within a scene are consistent and when they are inconsistent: this is 
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somewhat surprising because each scene contained sufficient information to objectively 
determine the answer. That is, by calculating the location of the scene’s reflection 
vanishing point, the consistency of the target object’s reflection with that vanishing point 
can be objectively verified. There is, however, a possibility that it might have been too 
difficult to make use of the reflection vanishing points in the four scenes used in 
Experiment 1. There are two reasons for this possibility. One reason is that the scenes’ 
reflection vanishing point was located a mean 48.9 cm from the image centre, a distance 
which might have been large enough to make it difficult to use this information. A 
second reason is that in the inconsistent scenes, the mean angle difference between the 
target object’s reflection vanishing point and the reflection vanishing point for the rest of 
the scene was just 1°. Perhaps these two factors made it too difficult for subjects to use 
the geometrical information and locate the reflection vanishing point. For these reasons, 
and because relatively little research has examined people’s perception of reflections, we 
ran a second experiment with new stimuli. For this new stimuli we decreased the 
distance of reflection vanishing point from the centre of the image, and increased the 
angle difference from the scene reflection vanishing point to the vanishing point for the 
target object and its inconsistent reflection. In Experiment 2, we checked whether 
changing these image properties influences performance on the task. 
Experiment 2 
Method 
Subjects and Design 
A total of 97 subjects (M = 25.5 years, SD = 9.0, range = 15-57; 58 men, 36 
women, and 3 chose not to disclose their gender) completed the study online. Eight 
additional subjects were removed, 5 who experienced technical difficulties and 3 who 
failed to understand instructions. There were no geographical restrictions and subjects 
did not receive payment for taking part, but they did receive feedback on their 
performance at the end of the task. Subject recruitment continued until we reached a 
minimum of 20 responses per image. The design was identical to that of Experiment 1. 
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Stimuli 
We created our stimuli following the procedure as in Experiment 1, with two 
exceptions. First, we changed viewing perspective to bring the reflection vanishing point 
closer to the centre of the image—the mean distance was 29.8 cm (cf. Expt 1: 48.9 cm). 
Second, to increase the angle difference between the original, consistent reflection and 
the manipulated, inconsistent reflection we moved the street sign further from its 
original position. In Experiment 1, we moved the street sign 7 m on the z-axis relative to 
the original street sign position, this time we moved it by 10 m. The resulting mean 
angle difference between the reflection vanishing point for the inconsistent reflections 
and the reflection vanishing point for the rest of the scene was 3.5° (cf. Expt 1: 1°). 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to that used in Experiment 1. 
Results and Discussion 
An analysis of the response time data indicated that subjects spent a reasonable 
amount of time determining whether the reflections in the scenes were consistent or 
inconsistent. The mean response time per image was 23.6 s (SD = 17.4 s) and the median 
response time 18.7 s (interquartile range: 13.4, 29.6 s). 
Overall accuracy on the reflection task 
Overall subjects correctly classified a mean 73% of the reflection scenes (cf. Expt 
1: 50%), 95% CI [68%, 78%]. Subjects showed a reasonably good ability to discriminate 
between consistent (72% correct, 95% CI [65%, 80%]) and inconsistent (75% correct, 
95% CI [68%, 81%]) reflection scenes, d' = 0.91, 95% CI [0.72, 1.10]. Unlike in 
Experiment 1, these results suggest that subjects have some ability to identify consistent 
and inconsistent reflections. Perhaps, then, subjects can make use of the reflection 
vanishing point to objectively judge the consistency of the reflections in a scene, but 
only in instances where the vanishing point is relatively easy to determine. In addition, 
in contrast to Experiment 1, subjects did not show a bias towards saying that reflections 
were inconsistent, c = -0.03, 95% CI [-0.12, 0.07]. This finding offers some support for 
our suggestion that people might only rely on perceptual biases to make judgements 
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about reflections when there is a lack of information available to make a more informed 
decision. 
Individual factors and image metrics 
As in Experiment 1, we conducted two GEE analyses—one for the inconsistent 
reflection scenes and one for the consistent reflection scenes. Preliminary analyses 
revealed a variance inflation factor of 11.8 for the angle difference variable, suggesting 
that this variable was correlated with one or more of the other predictor variables, 
therefore we removed the angle difference variable from the analyses. Other than 
removing the angle difference variable, we included the same factors used in the GEE 
models in Experiment 1. The results of the GEE analyses are shown in Table 5.2. Two 
of the variables had an effect on subjects’ ability to accurately identify inconsistent 
reflection scenes. Replicating our finding in Experiment 1, more confident responses 
were slightly more likely to be associated with accurate responses than less confident 
responses. There was also an effect of distance from the centre of the image to the 
reflection vanishing point: scenes in which the reflection vanishing point was closer to 
the image were more likely to be identified as inconsistent compared with scenes in 
which the reflection vanishing point was further from the image. This time, however, we 
did not find an effect of reflection position or gender. 
Next, considering the consistent reflection scenes, the GEE analysis revealed that 
only one variable had an effect on subjects’ ability to accurately identify consistent 
reflection scenes—the distance of the reflection vanishing point. As with the 
inconsistent scenes, when the reflection vanishing point was closer to the centre of the 
image the scenes were more likely to be identified as consistent compared with when the 
reflection vanishing point was further from the centre of the scene. It appears, then, that 
people might be able to make use of the geometrical information provided in the scenes 
to objectively judge the validity of the reflections when the reflection vanishing point is 
closer to the centre of the image. 
That said, our results warrant a second interpretation that is not based on subjects 
making use of the reflection vanishing point. Another possibility is that moving the 
inconsistent reflections further from the consistent position in Experiment 2 than in 
Experiment 1 made it more visually apparent when the reflections were consistent 
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versus inconsistent. If so, perhaps even based on a visual inspection of the scene, the 
correspondence between the object and its reflection did not match subjects’ subjective 
expectation of how it should look—including for the backward inconsistent reflections. 
 
Table 5.2 
Results of the GEE binary logistic models to determine variables that predict accuracy 
in the reflection task 
 Inconsistent  Consistent 
Predictor B OR [95% CI] p  B OR [95% CI] p 
Reflection position = 
Forward 
0.04 1.05 [0.53, 2.08] .90 
 
- - - 
Confidence 0.02 1.02 [1.01, 1.04] .002  -0.01 0.99 [0.97, 1.01] .38 
Gender = Female -0.40 0.67 [0.29, 1.57] .36  -0.42 0.66 [0.28, 1.55] .34 
Vanishing point distance -0.17 0.84 [0.71, 1.00] .04  -0.20 0.82 [0.72, 0.93] .002 
Interest in photography = 
Interested 
0.08 1.08 [0.47, 2.48] .85  -0.12 0.89 [0.42, 1.91] .77 
Video gaming = Frequent 
(at least twice a month) 
-0.35 0.70 [0.30, 1.64] .42 
 
0.77 2.16 [0.98, 4.75] .06 
Response time 0.00 1.00 [0.98, 1.02] .88  0.00 1.00 [0.99, 1.01] .89 
Note. CI = confidence interval. B and odds ratios (OR) estimate the degree of change in accuracy 
associated with one unit change in the independent variable. An odds ratio of 1 indicates no effect of 
the independent variable on accuracy, values of 1.5, 2.5, and 4.0 are generally considered to reflect 
small, medium, and large effect sizes, respectively (Rosenthal, 1996). The category order for factors 
was set to descending to make the reference level 0. The reference groups are: Reflection position = 
back, Video game playing = Infrequent (never/less than once a month/about once a month), Gender = 
Male, Interest in photography = Not Interested. Response time, confidence, and reflection vanishing 
point distance were added as continuous variables. The three subjects who chose not to disclose their 
gender were excluded from these analyses leaving a total sample of n = 94. The reflection position 
predictor variables was not applicable in the consistent reflection scenes. 
 
So why did subjects perform better on the reflection task in Experiment 2 than in 
Experiment 1? Given that we made two changes to the stimuli between Experiments 1 
and 2 there are two possible reasons. One possibility is that creating scenes with the 
reflection vanishing point closer to the centre of the image made it easier for people to 
use the geometric analysis to work out the answer. A second possibility is that the bigger 
physical distance between the consistent and inconsistent reflection position made it 
easier to make a subjective judgement about the consistency or inconsistency of the 
reflections in the scene. To check which of these possible explanations best accounts for 
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people’s better performance in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1 we ran a third 
experiment in which we changed only one variable. In Experiment 3, the scene 
reflection vanishing point remained the same as in Experiment 2, but we decreased the 
distance between the inconsistent and the consistent reflection position to match the 
distance in Experiment 1. 
Experiment 3 
Method 
Subjects and Design 
A total of 120 subjects (M = 30.9 years, SD = 13.7, range = 14-77; 53 men, 62 
women, and 5 chose not to disclose their gender) completed the study online. A further 
10 subjects were excluded from the analyses because they experienced technical 
difficulties. There were no geographical restrictions and subjects did not receive 
payment for taking part, but they did receive feedback on their performance at the end of 
the task. Subject recruitment continued until we reached a minimum of 20 responses per 
image. The design was identical to that of Experiments 1 and 2. 
Stimuli 
The stimuli remained the same as in Experiment 2 with just one exception: we 
decreased the distance that we moved the street sign reflection from its consistent 
position when creating the inconsistent scenes. In Experiment 2, we moved the street 
sign 10 m on the z-axis relative to the original street sign position, this time we moved it 
the same distance as in Experiment 1—7 m. The resulting mean angle difference 
between the reflection vanishing point for the inconsistent reflections and the reflection 
vanishing point for the rest of the scene was 2.4° (cf. Expt 2: 3.5°). 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to that used in Experiments 1 and 2. 
Results and Discussion 
An analysis of the response time data indicated that subjects spent a reasonable 
amount of time determining whether the reflections in the scenes were consistent or 
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inconsistent. The mean response time per image was 45.0 s (SD = 144.1 s) and the 
median response time 26.2 s (interquartile range: 18.8, 38.6 s). 
Overall accuracy on the reflection task 
Overall subjects correctly classified a mean 62% of the reflection scenes (cf. Expt 
1: 50%; Expt 2: 73%), 95% CI [57%, 67%]. Subjects had some ability to discriminate 
between consistent (68% correct, 95% CI [62%, 75%]) and inconsistent (55% correct, 
95% CI [49%, 62%]) reflection scenes, d' = 0.46, 95% CI [0.27, 0.65]. Our results show 
that subjects in Experiment 3 correctly classified a mean 12% more of the reflection 
scenes as consistent or inconsistent than subjects in Experiment 1, 95% CI [5%, 20%]. 
This difference in performance suggests that the position of the reflection vanishing 
point might influence people’s ability to distinguish between consistent and inconsistent 
reflection scenes. On the other hand, subjects in Experiment 3 correctly classified a 
mean 11% fewer of the scenes as consistent or inconsistent than subjects in Experiment 
2, 95% CI [5%, 19%], indicating that the extent of the inconsistency might also have an 
effect on people’s performance on the task. In line with this suggestion, in Experiment 2 
the inconsistent reflections were positioned further from the consistent position than in 
Experiment 3 and we did not find evidence of a response bias. Yet in Experiment 3, 
subjects showed a bias towards accepting the reflection scenes as consistent, c = 0.12, 
95% CI [0.04, 0.21]. Taken together, these results suggest that people might have a 
relatively conservative criterion for judging that the reflections in a scene are 
inconsistent. As such, it is possible that people have a perceptual threshold for detecting 
reflection inconsistencies—that is, there is a point at which the inconsistent reflections 
are close enough to the consistent position that people will find it extremely difficult to 
detect the inconsistency; instead, they simply accept the reflection as consistent. 
Individual factors and image metrics 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, we conducted two GEE analyses—one for the 
inconsistent reflection scenes and one for the consistent reflection scenes. We included 
the same factors used in the GEE models in Experiment 2. The results of the GEE 
analyses are shown in Table 5.3. The GEE analyses revealed that none of the variables 
had an effect on subjects’ ability to accurately identify consistent reflection scenes. Only 
one variable had an effect on subjects’ ability to accurately identify inconsistent 
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reflection scenes: replicating our finding in Experiment 1, we found an effect of 
reflection position. Scenes in which the reflection was moved forward of its consistent 
position were more likely to be identified as inconsistent compared with scenes in which 
the reflection was moved backwards of its consistent position. As mentioned when 
discussing the finding in Experiment 1, there are two ways to account for this effect of 
reflection position. On the one hand, this result fits with the virtual world rotation 
hypothesis and supports the notion of a perceptual outward bias (Muelenz et al., 2010). 
On the other hand, this result might simply be an effect of perspective projection: the 
same change in the 3-D environment produces a larger change in the foreground than 
background of the 2-D image and thus people are more sensitive to changes in the 
foreground than background of the 2-D scene. Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to 
determine which of these explanations best accounts for our finding that reflection 
position has an influence on subjects’ ability to correctly identify inconsistent 
reflections. 
Interestingly, however, our finding that there was an influence of reflection 
position in Experiments 1 and 3, but not Experiment 2, offers support to the notion of a 
perceptual threshold for detecting when reflections in a scene are inconsistent. Put 
simply, in Experiment 2 when the inconsistent reflections were moved 10 m from the 
consistent position we did not find a reliable effect of reflection position on subjects’ 
ability to identify the inconsistent scenes. Yet in Experiments 1 and 3 when the 
inconsistent reflections were moved a smaller distance (7 m) from the consistent 
position, we did find a reliable effect of reflection position on performance. These 
findings suggest that there might be a point at which the inconsistent reflection becomes 
different enough from its consistent position to make the inconsistency noticeable. That 
said, it is important to note that adjusting the distance of the inconsistent reflections from 
the original position also changes the angle difference between the scene reflection 
vanishing point and the reflection vanishing point for the inconsistent reflection—as the 
distance increases, so does the angle difference. Thus we are not able to isolate the two 
factors and test them individually. Although our results appear to support the notion of a 
perceptual threshold in people’s ability to subjectively determine the validity of the 
reflections based on a visual inspection of the scene, we cannot rule out an alternative 
explanation. Instead, it remains possible that changes to the angle difference between the 
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scene reflection vanishing point and the reflection vanishing point for the inconsistent 
reflection affects people’s ability to use the geometric information in the scene. 
 
Table 5.3 
Results of the GEE binary logistic models to determine variables that predict accuracy 
in the reflection task 
 Inconsistent  Consistent 
Predictor B OR [95% CI] p  B OR [95% CI] p 
Reflection position = 
Forward 
1.13 3.10 [1.84, 5.23] <.001 
 
- - - 
Confidence 0.01 1.01 [0.99, 1.02] .42  0.01 1.01 [1.00, 1.03] .12 
Gender = Female 0.21 1.23 [0.65, 2.31] .52  -0.34 0.71 [0.32, 1.57] .40 
Vanishing point distance -0.10 0.91 [0.80, 1.03] .13  -0.08 0.93 [0.80, 1.07] .29 
Interest in photography = 
Interested 
-0.03 0.97 [0.52, 1.79] .92  0.46 1.59 [0.82, 3.10] .17 
Video gaming = Frequent 
(at least twice a month) 
0.36 1.43 [0.75, 2.73] .28 
 
0.39 1.47 [0.71, 3.06] .30 
Response time 0.00 1.00 [0.99, 1.01] .59  -0.01 0.99 [0.98, 1.00] .15 
Note. CI = confidence interval. B and odds ratios (OR) estimate the degree of change in accuracy 
associated with one unit change in the independent variable. An odds ratio of 1 indicates no effect of 
the independent variable on accuracy, values of 1.5, 2.5, and 4.0 are generally considered to reflect 
small, medium, and large effect sizes, respectively (Rosenthal, 1996). The category order for factors 
was set to descending to make the reference level 0. The reference groups are: Reflection position = 
back, Video game playing = Infrequent (never/less than once a month/about once a month), Gender = 
Male, Interest in photography = Not Interested. Response time, confidence, and reflection vanishing 
point distance were added as continuous variables. The five subjects who chose not to disclose their 
gender were excluded from these analyses leaving a total sample of n = 115. The reflection position 
predictor variables was not applicable in the consistent reflection scenes. 
 
Conclusion 
In three experiments we examined people’s ability to identify whether scenes 
contained consistent or inconsistent reflections. The results of Experiment 1 suggest that 
people have an extremely limited ability to identify when reflections in a scene are 
consistent or inconsistent. Yet, in Experiment 2, when we brought the reflection 
vanishing point closer to the centre of the image and also moved the inconsistent 
reflections further from the consistent position, subjects’ performance on the task 
improved. Moreover, in a third experiment we kept the vanishing point position the 
same as in Experiment 2 but decreased the distance between the inconsistent and the 
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consistent reflection position to match the distance in Experiment 1. Subjects in 
Experiment 3 correctly classified fewer of the consistent and inconsistent scenes than in 
Experiment 2 but more than in Experiment 1. Thus, it seems people’s understanding of 
how reflections should appear in images is not straightforward, but rather might depend 
on various factors, including the location of the reflection vanishing point and extent of 
the inconsistency. 
The results in Experiment 1 further support the notion that people have a limited 
and biased understanding of reflections (e.g., Bertamini et al., 2003; Croucher et al., 
2002; Farid & Bravo, 2010; Muelenz et al., 2010). In line with the virtual world rotation 
hypothesis, we found an effect of reflection position—subjects accurately identified 
more of the forward than backward inconsistent reflections which supports the notion of 
a perceptual outward bias (Muelenz et al., 2010). Conversely, this finding might be more 
simply accounted for by perspective projection (Farid, 2016; Hartley & Zisserman, 
2004). To illustrate, consider the image in Figure 5.3 that shows train tracks receding 
into the distance. Although in reality there is, of course, a fixed distance between the 
tracks, the properties of perspective projection mean that the tracks appear closer 
together in the background than in the foreground. The same principle applies to our 
scenes: we moved the forward and backward inconsistent reflections the same distance 
in the 3-D world and accordingly, in the 2-D image, the difference appeared larger in the 
foreground than in the background. Therefore, people might have more easily noticed 
the forward than backward inconsistent reflections in the scenes. Overall, the findings in 
Experiment 1 suggest that people did not take advantage of the geometrical information 
provided in the scenes to make an objective judgement about the reflections. Instead, our 
results indicate that people relied on a subjective assessment and in line with previous 
findings, it seems this assessment was based on incorrect beliefs about reflections (e.g., 
Bertamini et al., 2003; Croucher et al., 2002). It remains possible, however, that subjects 
found it too difficult make use of the geometrical information to locate the reflection 
vanishing point in the scenes used in Experiment 1. 
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Figure 5.3. Train tracks receding into the distance. Creative Commons license CC0 1.0 / 
Public Domain. 
 
Indeed, in Experiment 2 when we made it easier for subjects to locate the 
reflection vanishing point they showed a reasonably good ability to identify whether 
scenes contained consistent or inconsistent reflections. Furthermore, the results of the 
GEE analyses revealed that accuracy on the task was associated with distance of the 
reflection vanishing point from the centre of the image—accuracy was higher when the 
reflection vanishing point was closer compared with further from the centre of the scene. 
Seemingly, when the geometrical information in the scene is relatively easy to use, 
people might rely on it to objectively judge the validity of reflections in a scene. If so, it 
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raises the possibility that people might be able to use this information to help detect 
manipulated images in the real world. And although our results suggest the ability to 
make use of this information is limited to situations in which it is easy to apply the 
geometric analysis, it is possible that with training and practice people’s ability will 
improve. 
Yet, we cannot rule out another explanation for subjects’ better ability in 
Experiment 2: moving the inconsistent reflections further from the consistent position in 
Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1 might simply have made it more visually apparent 
that the reflections were inconsistent. In fact, the finding that reflection position—
forward or backward—had an effect on subjects’ accuracy in Experiment 1 but not 
Experiment 2 offers some support for this explanation. We proposed that this effect of 
reflection position might be owing to the principles of perspective projection. That is, to 
give the impression of depth in a 2-D image objects appear smaller and closer together 
in the background than in the foreground of a scene. Thus it is possible that perspective 
makes it more difficult for people to make accurate judgements about objects and their 
reflections when they appear further away than when they are closer. We did not, 
however, replicate the effect of reflection position in Experiment 2—subjects were as 
accurate on the backward inconsistent reflections as they were on the forward 
inconsistent reflections. Perhaps, then, there is a point at which the influence of 
perspective becomes less important than sensitivity to the absolute distance between the 
object and its reflection. That is, the results raise the possibility that people have a 
perceptual threshold for detecting inconsistencies in reflections. 
To further test this possibility of a perceptual threshold for detecting 
inconsistencies in reflections we conducted a third experiment. In this third experiment, 
the scene reflection vanishing point remained the same as in Experiment 2, but we 
decreased the distance between the inconsistent reflections and the consistent position to 
match the distance in Experiment 1. In Experiment 3, subjects correctly classified a 
mean 11% fewer of the scenes than in Experiment 2. Furthermore, unlike in Experiment 
2, subjects showed a bias to accept the reflection scenes as consistent. Also, we found an 
effect of reflection position—subjects correctly identified more of the forward 
inconsistent reflections than the backward inconsistent reflections. Together, these 
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findings offer some support to the notion of a perceptual threshold for noticing when the 
reflections in a scene are inconsistent. 
Specifically, decreasing the distance between the inconsistent reflection and the 
consistent position might simply have made it more difficult to determine whether or not 
the reflections were inconsistent based on a visual inspection of the scene. It is important 
to note, however, that adjusting the distance of the inconsistent reflections from the 
original position also changes the angle difference between the scene reflection 
vanishing point and the reflection vanishing point for the inconsistent reflection. As 
such, it remains possible that there is another explanation for these findings—that it is 
the change in the angle difference that affects people’s ability to use the geometric 
information in the scene. Our results also offer some support for this idea that subjects 
are using the geometric information to help them to identify the consistent and 
inconsistent reflections. In particular, in Experiment 3, a mean 12% more of the 
reflection scenes were correctly classified than in Experiment 1. In both experiments, the 
distance between the inconsistent reflection position and the consistent position was the 
same, but the scene vanishing point was closer to the centre of the image in Experiment 
3 than in Experiment 1. Therefore, making it easier to use the geometric information in 
the scene might also influence people’s ability to determine when reflections are 
consistent and when they are inconsistent. 
Future research might examine which of these explanations—geometric analysis 
or a perceptual threshold—best accounts for our findings. Unfortunately, however, it is 
difficult to isolate the variables of interest: as noted above, adjusting the distance of the 
inconsistent reflections from the original position also changes the angle difference 
between the scene reflection vanishing point and the reflection vanishing point for the 
inconsistent reflection. As such, determining the general strategy subjects rely on to 
make judgments in the reflection task is not straightforward. Perhaps one fruitful 
approach would be to examine whether training people to use the geometric analysis 
would influence performance on the task. 
Irrespective of the explanation, our results reveal that people have only a limited 
ability to detect reflection inconsistencies. Moreover, this ability appears to be 
dependent upon a number of factors, including the location of the reflection vanishing 
point and the extent of the inconsistency. Essentially, then, people might have a basic 
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understanding of mirror reflections, but this understanding does not appear to be 
particularly precise. And, perhaps most importantly, our results imply that in the real 
world, where people are not prompted to check the geometry of reflections, simple 
inconsistencies will go undetected. Such was the case when major news outlets were 
fooled by the fake image that depicted the innocent Veerender Jubbal as a terrorist. 
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Part Two 
Chapter 6 : 
Introduction to photos and memory 
 
“Today everything exists to end in a photograph.” 
Susan Sontag (1977) 
Introduction 
Snap-happy photographers are used to the quip that they are “taking pictures rather 
than living in the moment” (Jefferies, 2013). Indeed, some critics suggest that taking 
photos detracts from an experience and impairs people’s ability to engage with the real 
world (Mols et al., 2015). Nonetheless, people take photos because they believe it helps 
them to remember (Chalfen, 1998; Harrison, 2002). But there is good reason to think 
that photography could have the opposite effect. To what extent does taking photos 
actually hurt our ability to recall or recognise those photographed objects later? That is 
the question we are interested in here. 
It is also the question that Henkel (2014) set out to answer. To examine the effects 
of taking photos on memory, Henkel took a group of adults on a museum tour. She 
asked them to photograph some objects, but to simply view others. The next day, 
everyone took two kinds of memory tests—free-recall and recognition—to determine if 
their memories were enhanced or impaired by the act of taking a photo. Although 
subjects performed similarly well on the free-recall test regardless of whether they had 
photographed that object or not, the recognition test told a different story: Subjects 
recognised fewer of the objects they had photographed—and fewer details about those 
objects—relative to objects they merely viewed. Table 6.1 summarises Henkel’s results. 
Taking photos might hurt memory 
These results suggest that photographing objects might hurt memory—findings 
that make sense in light of the wider research on attention and memory. We know, for 
example, that attention is key to remembering (Chun & Turk-Browne, 2007; James, 
1890), yet, attentional resources are thought to be finite; a bottleneck restricts the 
amount of information we process at any one time (Levy, Pashler, & Boer, 2006; for a 
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review, see Pashler, 1994). Multitasking divides these finite resources across two or 
more tasks, impairing people’s performance on the primary task (e.g., Broadbent, 1958). 
In experiments using driving simulators, talking on the phone or texting while driving, 
for example, impairs people’s driving ability (Drews, Yazdani, Godfrey, Cooper, & 
Strayer, 2009; Strayer & Johnston, 2001). In addition, outside of the laboratory and the 
driving simulator, we see the same problem in real-world multitasking scenarios (e.g., 
Hyman, Boss, Wise, McKenzie, & Caggiano, 2010). If taking photos is a similar act of 
multitasking, then it is reasonable to expect that photographing objects might impair 
people’s ability to attend to, encode, and later remember those objects. Such a process 
could help us to understand why Henkel (2014) found that when people took photos, it 
impaired their ability to recognise objects later. 
Henkel (2014) proposed a plausible alternative account of her findings: People pay 
less attention to experiences they capture on camera because, after all, the camera will 
“remember” for them. The idea that we offload our memories to external storage 
systems is not new. Couples in long-term relationships often form a shared “transactive” 
memory system, dividing their knowledge, and accessing that knowledge from each 
other when necessary (Hewitt & Roberts, 2015; Wegner, 1986). People use digital 
technology, including computers and smartphones, similarly—to extend their own 
limited cognition (Sparrow, Liu, & Wegner, 2011; Storm & Stone, 2015). It seems 
reasonable, then, to surmise that when Henkel’s subjects photographed objects in a 
museum, it encouraged them to offload their memories onto the camera. 
Taking photos might not hurt memory 
But as much as Henkel’s (2014) findings fit with research in the attention and 
memory literatures, the findings were puzzling in light of other literatures. For instance, 
the evidence on dual-task interference is inconsistent: multitasking does not always hurt. 
Numerous studies have shown that in some circumstances people can perform two tasks 
concurrently at a level comparable to single-task performance (e.g., Humphreys, 
Watson, & Jolicœur, 2002; Schumacher et al., 2001). So, how can we reconcile these 
findings with the studies that have found clear evidence of a dual-task cost? Crucially, 
the answer to that question might depend on various task-related conditions. For 
example, dual-task performance is highly sensitive to task instructions. In many dual-
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task studies, subjects are instructed to prioritise one task over the other and the impaired 
performance is observed for the non-prioritised task (Meyer & Kieras, 1997; Meyer et 
al., 1995). In one study in which the performance on two simultaneously conducted 
tasks were given equal emphasis, and subjects were given extensive practice, dual-task 
costs were found to be minimal (Schumacher et al., 2001). 
What do these findings suggest for the effect of taking photos on memory? 
Consider that when people take a photo, they make a series of subjective decisions 
(Estrin, 2013; Kurtz, 2015). People ask themselves “Where should I stand?” and “How 
should I frame this photo?” In doing so, they evaluate the environment to determine 
what should appear in the photo and what should not. This considered approach should 
help to prioritise processing of the visual scene and minimise whatever distraction the 
act of photographing might cause. 
The “enactment effect” also makes Henkel’s (2014) findings surprising. Taking 
photos should make an experience more distinctive; after all, the enactment effect shows 
that learning-by-doing enhances memory more than learning-by-observing (for a review, 
see Roediger & Zaromb, 2010). Performing an action draws people’s attention to the 
specific details of objects, thereby providing a richer encoding that results in a more 
distinctive memory trace (Engelkamp & Zimmer, 1997; Engelkamp, Seiler, & Zimmer, 
2004). Taking photos of an object, then, as opposed to simply viewing it, might also 
draw people’s attention to details, creating a stronger, more detailed memory trace and 
ultimately improving memory for that object. 
Considered together, the literature supports two predictions: that taking photos will 
hurt memory, and that taking photos will help memory. Henkel’s (2014) findings offer 
limited support for the idea that taking photos can hurt memory, however, the size of the 
effects was rather small. In Henkel’s Experiment 1, subjects recalled only 1.0% more, 
and recognised only 2.8% more, of the objects they viewed than the objects they 
photographed. In Experiment 2, there was no free-recall test but subjects recognised just 
4.6% more of the objects they viewed than the objects they photographed. Furthermore, 
Henkel’s results showed that taking photos does not always hurt memory; zooming in to 
photograph a part of the object had only a trivial effect on memory—subjects recognised 
just 1.2% more of the objects they simply viewed than the objects they photographed 
partly. Therefore, Henkel’s findings do not offer good support for one prediction or the 
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other. These findings, when considered against a backdrop of research supporting 
opposite predictions, prompted us to learn more about the nature of the photo-taking 
impairment effect in general. Our first experiment, a close replication of Henkel’s 
original study yielded findings in line with the idea that there was plausibly no effect of 
photo-taking on memory. We conducted the next four experiments to further examine 
the influence of photo-taking on memory: To improve experimental control, we 
developed a computer-based analogue of Henkel’s procedure. This highly controlled 
paradigm allowed us to carefully test for a photo-taking memory decrement across a 
wider range of conditions than has previously been tested. Expanding the “test-space” in 
turn increased the possibility of detecting any effects of photo-taking on memory as well 
as allowing us to examine the generalisability of any such effects. 
 
Table 6.1 
Mean Difference Scores [95% confidence intervals] from Henkel’s (2014) Experiments. 
 
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
Test 
View vs. Photo-
whole 
View vs. Photo-whole View vs. Photo-part 
    
Free-recall 1.0% [-5.8%, 7.8%] - - 
Name- and photo-
recognition 
2.8% [-0.1%, 5.7%] 4.6% [0.6%, 8.6%] 1.2% [-1.5%, 3.9%] 
Source accuracy 5.3% [-1.5%, 12.2%] -1.3% [-10%, 7.5%] -5.4% [-13.4%, 2.7%] 
Visual details 9.9% [3.7%, 16.0%] 5.9% [0.5%, 11.3%] -2.2% [-8.0%, 3.6%] 
Location - 6.8% [1.7%, 11.8%] 29.2% [21.8%, 36.7%] 
Note. The 95% confidence intervals are calculated from the planned contrasts of the sample means. In 
Experiment 1, subjects either viewed (view) or photographed objects as a whole (photo-whole). In 
Experiment 2, as well as the view and photo-whole conditions, there was a third condition in which subjects 
photographed a specific part of the object (photo-part). Henkel (2014) used five types of memory test: (a) 
free-recall—subjects wrote down the names of the objects, (b) name- and photo-recognition—subjects 
distinguished between objects from the museum and objects they had not seen before, first on a memory 
test where the name of each object were cues, and then on a test where the name plus a photo of each object 
served as cues, (c) source accuracy—subjects recalled their action (observe or photograph) for each 
remembered object, (d) visual details—subjects answered multiple choice questions about visual details of 
the objects, (e) location-recognition—subjects indicated the location of the objects in the museum. Cells 
with a dash indicate that data for the test were not collected. A positive mean difference indicates a better 
performance in the view than photo-whole or photo-part condition. A negative mean difference indicates a 
better performance in the photo-whole or photo-part than view condition. 
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Chapter 7 : 
To what extent does taking photos affect what people remember? 
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, we aimed to replicate the basic patterns in Henkel’s (2014) 
Experiment 1. 
Method 
Subjects 
A total of 42 subjects (M = 23 years, SD = 4.5, range = 18–35; 26 women) from 
Otago University completed the experiment individually and received NZD30. All 
subjects confirmed that they had not visited the Otago Museum in at least the past year. 
One additional subject failed to complete the experiment. We aimed to recruit as many 
people as possible given budgetary constraints. 
Design 
We used a single-factor (Action: view, photograph) within-subjects design.  
Procedure 
We followed Henkel’s (2014, Experiment 1) procedure, with seven exceptions that 
served to improve experimental rigor and generalisability; details of these exceptions 
appear in Appendix B (Table B.1). 
Subjects arrived at the museum and received detailed instructions about the 
experiment. They practiced using the camera function on an iPod Touch (32GB), 
learning how to zoom and focus correctly. We told them to frame each photo carefully 
so that the camera captured the whole object. We also asked subjects to pay attention to 
each of the objects because they would be asked about them the following day. Subjects 
were told, falsely, that their photos would be available during the second session. We 
gave subjects this false information to make the process more similar to everyday life—
after all, if people really do rely on cameras to remember for them, it is likely that they 
do so believing they will have access to their photos later. 
We selected 30 objects for the tour, including sculptures, pottery, models, tools, 
and clothing. The objects were distributed across four rooms, and the tour was structured 
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so that subjects passed each object only once. Half the subjects took the tour starting 
from one point in the museum (A) and ending at another point (B), and the other half 
took the tour in the reverse order. Subjects viewed half of the objects but did not 
photograph them; for the remaining objects, they photographed the whole object. We 
randomly determined the order in which objects were viewed or photographed, and then 
counterbalanced across this viewed/photographed dimension as well as the direction of 
the tour (AB or BA). This counterbalancing resulted in four versions of the museum 
tour, and subjects were randomly assigned to one of these versions. 
To begin the tour, subjects read aloud the name of the first object and the 
researcher led them to that object. After 25 s observing the object, subjects were either 
told to turn away from the object (for “view” objects), or to photograph the object in its 
entirety (for “photo” objects). Regardless of the instruction, subjects had 25 s to view the 
objects; when they took a photo, they received additional time to do so. Subjects then 
completed a brief distractor (backward counting) task for 10 s before reading aloud the 
name of the next object. We repeated this procedure for the remaining 29 objects. 
The following day, subjects came into the lab, where we tested their memories for 
the 30 objects using four tests. Test 1 was a free-recall test. Subjects wrote the names of 
all of the objects they remembered, regardless of whether they had photographed or only 
viewed them. Test 2 was a name-recognition test in which subjects distinguished among 
names of objects from the tour and names of objects they had not seen. Subjects were 
randomly presented with the names of the 30 old objects and 10 new objects, one name 
at a time. For each object, subjects indicated whether they took a photo of it, observed it, 
or believed that the object was not part of the tour. Subjects had unlimited time to 
respond, and the name of each object remained on the computer screen until subjects 
made a response. Test 3 was a photo-recognition test. This test was similar to the name-
recognition test, but subjects viewed photos rather than names of the objects. The final 
test was a location-recognition test in which subjects examined printed photos of the 30 
objects and used a floor plan of the museum to indicate which of the four rooms each 
object was located. 
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Results  
For all experiments, we followed Cumming’s (2012) recommendations and 
calculated a precise estimate of the actual size of the effects. We also analysed our data 
using conventional null hypothesis significance testing; those results appear in the 
Appendix C. The data is also available online: https://osf.io/54pxy/ 
Free-recall 
To determine the effect of photographing objects on subjects’ ability to recall 
them, we calculated the mean accuracy for each subject, and then classified those means 
according to whether subjects had viewed or photographed each object. Recall that 
Henkel’s (2014) subjects recalled a mean 1.0% more of the objects they viewed than the 
objects they photographed. We found a different pattern of results: Taking photos led 
subjects to recall a mean 7.8% more objects than simply viewing (54.1% vs 46.4%), 
although the confidence interval around the mean difference indicates that there is 
plausibly only a small benefit of photographing, Mdiff 95% CI
10 [2.1%, 13.4%]. 
Recognition 
In the name- and photo-recognition tests, we considered “Observed” or 
“Photographed” responses to be correct for objects that were part of the museum tour. 
We considered “Not seen before” responses as correct for new objects that were not part 
of the museum tour. We used signal detection analysis (Green & Swets, 1966; Stanislaw 
& Todorov, 1999) to calculate the percentage of correctly identified objects from the 
museum tour (hits) and the percentage of new objects that were incorrectly identified as 
objects from the museum tour (false alarms). Because both response bias (c) and 
sensitivity (d') can each illuminate the pattern of responses, we calculated both, and 
report the results in Table 7.1. As the top row of the table shows, subjects were biased 
towards saying they had seen objects on the tour, but the confidence interval indicates 
that this bias was plausibly small. Further, we found that the plausible value range for d' 
was greater than zero, indicating that subjects were able to discriminate new from old 
objects. 
 
 
                                                          
10 The 95% confidence intervals are calculated from the planned contrasts of the sample means. 
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Table 7.1 
Response Bias (c) and Sensitivity (d') in the Name- and Photo-Recognition Tests 
Experiment  c  d' 
  M 95% CI  M 95% CI 
1  -0.23 [-0.37, -.09]  2.88 [2.63, 3.13] 
2  0.09 [0.00, 0.17]  2.12 [1.89, 2.35] 
3  0.19 [0.08, 0.31]  1.40 [1.17, 1.61] 
4  0.08 [-0.04, 0.21]  1.35 [1.09, 1.61] 
5  0.07 [-0.04, 0.19]  1.43 [1.13, 1.73] 
Note. In Experiments 4 and 5, c and d' are calculated based on the photo-recognition test data only. 
The square brackets show the 95% confidence interval for the sample mean. For response bias (c), 
negative values signify a bias to say that objects were seen on the tour, positive values signify a 
bias to say that objects were not seen on the tour, zero indicates no bias. For d', higher values 
indicate better discrimination ability, zero signifies no ability. 
 
We now consider the extent to which taking photos affected subjects’ ability to 
recognise which objects were on the museum tour. In Henkel’s (2014) Experiment 1, 
collapsed across the name- and photo-recognition tests, subjects recognised a mean 2.8% 
more of the objects they viewed than the objects they photographed. By contrast, we 
found that subjects’ ability to recognise objects was the same regardless of the action 
they took—they correctly recognised 94.3% of objects in the photograph condition and 
94.0% of objects in the view condition, Mdiff = 0.3%, 95% CI [-1.8%, 2.4%]. 
We also considered subjects’ ability to report whether they photographed or 
simply viewed each object on the tour. To calculate source accuracy, we again used the 
data from the name- and photo-recognition tests, but classified responses in a different 
way. For viewed objects we considered an “Observed” response as correct; for 
photographed objects we considered a “Photographed” response as correct. Henkel 
(2014) found a small photo-taking impairment effect such that subjects correctly recalled 
their action (photographing vs. viewing the object) a mean 5.3% more for viewed 
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objects than for photographed objects. We found a slightly larger impairment effect: 
Subjects correctly recalled their action a mean 22.2% more for viewed than for 
photographed objects (70.7% vs. 48.5%), Mdiff 95% CI [13.5%, 31.0%]. Finally, we 
found that photographing an object had a trivial effect—and plausibly no effect—on 
subjects’ memory for the location of that object: Subjects recognised location at a 
similar rate for viewed objects and photographed objects (81.3% vs. 80.3%), Mdiff 95% 
CI [-3.2%, 5.1%]. 
The only finding consistent with the idea that taking photos hurts memory was that 
subjects were markedly more accurate in recalling the action they had performed for the 
viewed objects than for the photographed objects. But we found no good support for the 
idea that taking photos of an object does much to one’s memory for that object. In 
Experiment 2, we developed a computer-based analogue for the museum tour so that we 
could begin to investigate under which conditions (if any), and to what extent, taking 
photos might hurt our ability to recall or recognise those photographed objects later. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, we followed Henkel’s (2014, Experiment 2) method. 
Accordingly, there were three action conditions: (a) “view”, as in Experiment 1; (b) 
“photo-whole”, as in Experiment 1; and (c) a “photo-part” condition, in which subjects 
photographed a specific part of the object. Using a computer-based analogue for the 
museum tour afforded more control over the procedure and materials. 
Method 
Subjects 
We recruited 42 subjects (M = 23 years, SD = 3.7, range = 17–35; 20 women) 
from Warwick University who each received £4. We aimed to recruit as many subjects 
as possible given financial constraints. 
Design 
We used a single-factor (Action: view, photo-whole, photo-part) within-subjects 
design. 
147 
 
Procedure 
To increase experimental rigor and/or generalisability, we made five amendments 
to Henkel’s (2014) Experiment 2 methodology, details of which appear in Appendix B 
(Table B.2). Subjects arrived at the lab and received detailed instructions about the 
experiment. Before the experiment proper began, subjects practiced navigating through a 
virtual tour of an exhibition at London’s Tate Britain. They also practiced each of the 
three actions—view, photo-whole, photo-part—that they would perform during the 
experiment. 
We used BlitzMax IDE (Version 1.26; Blitz Research Ltd), a videogame 
programming language, to control all details for each of the stops, including instructions 
to subjects, and how long they had to view or photograph objects. To take photos, 
subjects used a virtual camera that appeared on-screen and mimicked a real camera in 
several ways: Subjects “lined up” their photo by moving the mouse; they could also 
zoom in on the object by using the “up” and “down” arrow keys on the keyboard. 
Subjects took the “photo” by clicking a mouse button. Each time subjects took a photo, 
the program paused for 2 s while displaying the image captured by the camera. Subjects 
were told to make sure they framed each photo carefully and to take the best shot 
possible. 
Then the experiment proper began. This tour was based on another exhibition at 
London’s Tate Britain, and included stops at 15 objects, five for each of the three action 
conditions. Figure 7.1a shows some sample objects. The video recording of the museum 
tour was captured at a resolution of 1920 × 1080 on an Olympus Stylus SH-50 and was 5 
min 27 s long. The objects were located in a single room, and the tour was structured so 
that subjects passed each object only once. We randomly presented the order that the 
objects appeared in the view, photo-whole and photo-part action conditions and then 
counterbalanced the objects across the three conditions. For photo-part objects, we 
selected two parts of each object that subjects could zoom in on to photograph, and the 
specified part was also counterbalanced. Our counterbalancing resulted in six versions of 
the museum tour, and subjects were randomly assigned to one of these versions. 
At each of the 15 stops, subjects saw the object name on-screen for 1.5 s and then, 
regardless of condition, had 5 s to view the object. For “viewed” objects, subjects did 
not perform any further action, and the museum tour continued. For the photo-whole and 
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photo-part objects, after the 5 s view time a message appeared at the bottom of the 
screen instructing subjects which action to take: to photograph the whole object or to 
zoom in and photograph the part of the object as specified in the message. Figure 7.1b 
shows an example of the virtual camera being used in the photo-whole condition. In both 
photo conditions, subjects were given an additional 10 s to take the photo. Subjects’ 
photos were saved so that we could verify that they had followed the instructions. 
After the tour phase, subjects worked on a 20-min filler task—a crossword 
puzzle—before completing four memory tests. First, as in Experiment 1, subjects 
completed the free-recall test. Second, subjects completed the name-recognition test, in 
which they were required to distinguish between the 15 objects from the tour and five 
objects they had never seen. Third, subjects completed the visual details test: For each 
object recognised as old in the name-recognition test, subjects answered two multiple-
choice questions about visual details of that object. Finally, subjects completed the 
photo-recognition test. 
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Figure 7.1. Examples of the objects (a) and virtual camera (b) used in Experiments 2 and 
3. 
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Results 
We examined subjects’ photos to verify that they photographed the whole of the 
object or the specified part of the object when instructed. All subjects followed 
instructions. 
Free-recall 
In line with the pattern of results from Experiment 1, subjects recalled a mean 
6.7% more photo-whole objects than view objects (31.0% vs 24.3%), Mdiff 95% CI [-
1.3%, 14.7%]. Further, subjects recalled a mean 4.3% more of the photo-part than view 
objects (28.6% vs 24.3%), Mdiff 95% CI [-3.6%, 12.1%]. Yet the confidence intervals 
around both of these mean differences shows that there was plausibly no benefit of 
taking a photo on recall. 
Recognition 
In contrast to Henkel (2014), our subjects recognised a mean 4.0% more photo-
whole objects than view objects (84.0% vs. 80.0%), Mdiff 95% CI [-1.2%, 9.3%]. 
Further, subjects recognised a mean 5.0% more photo-part objects than view objects 
(85.0% vs. 80.0%), Mdiff 95% CI [0.3%, 9.7%]. It is important to note that the confidence 
intervals for both of these differences include zero; it is therefore plausible that 
photographing did nothing at all to subjects’ ability to recognise the objects they 
encountered during the tour. 
Recall that subjects also answered two multiple-choice questions about the visual 
details of objects that they recognised as old in the name-recognition test. Our results 
suggest that photographing had plausibly no effect on subjects’ memory of the objects: 
Subjects correctly answered a mean 4.8% more of the visual detail questions for photo-
whole than view objects (35.0% vs. 30.2%), Mdiff 95% CI [-1.4%, 11.0%], and 3.8% 
more for photo-part than view objects (34.0% vs. 30.2%), Mdiff = 3.8%, 95% CI [-1.8%, 
9.4%]. 
Next we examined subjects’ ability to report the specific action they performed for 
each of the objects on the tour. In our first experiment, subjects recalled their action a 
mean 22.2% more often for viewed than for photographed objects. This time, similar to 
Henkel’s (2014) findings, source accuracy for the view and photo-whole objects was 
plausibly no different, Mdiff = 1.9%, 95% CI [-9.2%, 13.0%]. Furthermore, subjects were 
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more likely to remember the action they performed for photo-part objects than for view 
objects (61.0% vs. 46.9%), Mdiff = 14.0%, 95% CI [6.7%, 21.4%]. 
In sum, our first experiment using the computer-based analogue of the museum 
tour did not offer any good evidence to suggest that taking photos hurts memory. 
Nonetheless, it is possible that such memory effects only occur (or occur more strongly) 
sometime after a photo is taken. To examine this possibility, in Experiment 3 we 
included a 48-hour delay between the tour phase and the test phase. 
Experiment 3 
Method 
Subjects 
We initially recruited 42 subjects but replaced 13 who completed the tour phase of 
the experiment but not the online test emailed to them 48 hours later. Our final sample 
included 42 subjects (M = 32 years, SD = 14.9, range = 16–56; 11 men, 24 women, 7 
declined to respond) who participated at Warwick University in exchange for £4 or 
volunteered to participate without payment. 
Design 
We used a single-factor (Action: view, photo-whole, photo-part) within-subjects 
design. 
Procedure 
The procedure was similar to Experiment 2, but we increased the delay between 
the museum tour and memory test from 20 min to at least 48 hours. We emailed subjects 
a link so that they could complete the memory test online. The mean delay between the 
museum tour and memory test was 64 hours (range = 48–148). We also excluded the 
free-recall test, based on subjects’ poor performance in Experiment 2. 
Results  
Recognition 
As in Experiment 2, we found that photographing objects had plausibly no effect 
on subjects’ ability to recognise which objects were on the museum tour. Subjects 
recognised a mean 2.1% more photo-whole than view objects (69.0% vs. 66.9%), 95% 
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CI [-4.8%, 9.0%]. Further, subjects recognised 3.1% more photo-part than view objects 
(70.0% vs. 66.9%), 95% CI [-2.5%, 8.7%]. 
For the visual details test, our findings were similar to those in Experiment 2: 
There was plausibly no difference in the mean proportion of correctly answered 
questions for view and photo-whole objects (24.3% vs. 25.2%; Mdiff = 1.1%, 95% CI [-
5.3%, 7.3%]), or view and photo-part objects (24.3% vs. 23.3%; Mdiff = 1.0%, 95% CI [-
5.5%, 7.4%]). 
Finally, we considered source accuracy. Subjects’ ability to recall whether they 
viewed or photographed an object did not differ between the view and photo-whole 
conditions—a mean 35.0% for source accuracy in the view condition and 34.8% in the 
photo-whole condition, Mdiff = 0.2%, 95% CI [-6.7%, 7.2%]. Recall that in Experiment 
2, subjects remembered the action performed for 14.0% more photo-part than view 
objects. This time, we found plausibly no difference, as subjects recalled their action a 
mean 4.3% more often for photo-part than for view objects (39.3% vs. 35.0%), Mdiff = 
4.3%, 95% CI [-3.6%, 12.2%]. 
To summarise, in Experiment 3 when we extended the retention interval between 
the tour phase and the test phase we still found there was plausibly no effect of taking 
photos on memory. Nonetheless, a critic might counter that although the computer-based 
paradigm gave us much more control than walking people around a real museum, a 
video recording of a museum tour still left us with several factors that we could not 
control. Using the video recording we could not, for example, manipulate the attributes 
of the target and distractor objects or the size and layout of the museum. To address this 
criticism, we created a method with even more experimental control, and to minimise 
the influence of noise from these other factors, we developed a virtual museum. 
Experiment 4 
Method 
Subjects 
We recruited 42 subjects (M = 30 years, SD = 15.6, range = 16–67; 27 women) 
from Warwick University who volunteered to participate without payment. 
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Design 
We used a single-factor (Action: view, photo-whole, photo-part) within-subjects 
design. 
Procedure 
The procedure was similar to Experiment 3, with eight exceptions that added 
experimental rigor and/or generalisability; details of these exceptions appear in 
Appendix B (see Table B.3). Subjects arrived at the lab and received detailed 
instructions about the experiment. This time, rather than watching the video of the 
museum tour at the Tate Britain, subjects were navigated through a virtual museum 
created using 3D World Studio (Version 5.6; Leadwerks). To simulate a real museum, 
we included both paintings and sculptures. For the paintings, we downloaded images, 
permitted for non-commercial re-use with modification, via Google Image search. For 
the sculptures, we obtained 3-D models from turbosquid.com. Figure 7.2a shows some 
sample objects. As in Experiments 2 and 3, we used BlitzMax IDE (Version 1.26; Blitz 
Research Ltd) to control all details for each of the 15 stops on the tour and to create the 
virtual camera. Figure 7.2b shows an example of the virtual camera being used in the 
photo-whole condition. Following the tour phase, subjects were given a 2-min filler task 
before completing the photo-recognition test. In the photo-recognition test, the 15 
objects from the museum tour were randomly intermixed with 15 new objects. We 
piloted the new materials and found that, even with a 2-min delay, subjects’ recognition 
performance was at a level similar to that observed in Experiment 3. 
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Figure 7.2. Examples of the objects (a) and virtual camera (b) used in Experiments 4 and 
5. 
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Results 
Recognition 
Once again, we found that taking photos had plausibly no effect on subjects’ 
ability to recognise which objects were on the museum tour. Subjects recognised a mean 
5.7% more view than photo-whole objects (70.5% vs. 64.8%), Mdiff 95% CI [-3.0%, 
14.5%]. In addition, subjects recognised 7.1% more photo-part than view objects (77.6% 
vs. 70.5%), Mdiff 95% CI [-0.9%, 15.1%]. The one notable finding was that the way in 
which subjects took photos might have had a small effect on their ability to recognise 
objects: Subjects recognised a mean 12.9% more photo-part than photo-whole objects 
(77.6% vs. 64.8%), Mdiff 95% CI [3.6%, 22.1%]. 
There are two possible reasons why subjects might be more likely to remember 
objects they partially—as opposed to wholly—photographed. One reason is that subjects 
pay more attention to the object when they are asked to locate and then zoom in to 
photograph a certain portion of it, thereby making it more memorable. A second reason 
is that by instructing subjects to photograph a specific part of the object we provide an 
additional memory cue—a verbal description of part of the object. Which of these 
reasons, then, accounts for subjects' remembering partially photographed objects better 
than wholly photographed objects? Is it the action of zooming, or is it the verbal 
description of the object in the instruction that makes these partially photographed 
objects more memorable? To determine which of these explanations best accounts for 
subjects’ better memory of the objects they photographed partly, in Experiment 5 we 
changed the wording of the “photo-part” instruction to allow subjects to choose which 
part of the object to photograph. 
Experiment 5 
Method 
Subjects 
We recruited 42 subjects and replaced 2 subjects who failed to follow instructions. 
The final sample consisted of 42 subjects (M = 21.4 years, SD = 5.7, range = 17-52; 26 
women) from Warwick University who received £2 for participating. 
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Design 
We used a single-factor (Action: view, photo-whole, photo-part) within-subjects 
design. 
Procedure 
The procedure was similar to Experiment 4. For the photo-part objects, however, 
rather than informing subjects specifically which part of the object to photograph, 
subjects were simply asked to “Please take a photograph of a part of the painting.” 
Results  
Recognition 
In line with the findings in Experiments 1 to 4, our results revealed plausibly no 
effect of photographing on recognition memory. Subjects recognised 6.7% more of the 
view than photo-whole objects (72.4% vs. 65.7%), Mdiff 95% CI [-0.2%, 13.5%]. In 
addition, subjects recognised 7.6% more of the photo-part than view objects (80.0% vs. 
72.4%), Mdiff 95% CI [-0.9%, 16.1%]. Despite our change to the instruction for how to 
photograph the photo-part objects, subjects still recognised 14.3% more of the photo-
part than photo-whole objects (80.0% vs. 65.7%), Mdiff 95% CI [6.1%, 22.5%]. This 
finding does not fit with the account that the verbal description of part of the object 
provided an additional cue that enhanced memory. Rather, it suggests that subjects’ 
better memory for photo-part objects could be due to the additional attention required to 
locate and zoom in on a certain portion of the object. 
Recall that we developed the computer-based museum tour procedure to examine 
the influence of taking photos on memory under highly controlled conditions. We used 
this procedure in Experiments 2-5 to explore a range of factors that might influence 
whether or not photo-taking impairs memory. In each of our four computer-based 
experiments and also in Experiment 1—a close replication of Henkel’s (2014) study—
we found there was plausibly no effect of taking photos on memory. To obtain a more 
precise estimate of the extent to which taking photos influences memory, we conducted 
a "mini meta-analysis" including the data from our experiments and Henkel’s original 
experiments (see Cumming, 2012, 2013). 
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Mini meta-analysis of the effect of photo-taking on memory 
Here, we examined the data from the photo-recognition tests, the only test used in 
all five of our experiments and in Henkel's (2014) two experiments. For each 
experiment, we calculated the mean difference in the proportion of objects that subjects 
correctly recognised as old when they merely viewed the object (view condition) 
compared to when they photographed the object as a whole (photo-whole condition). We 
used ESCI (Cumming, 2013) to conduct the analysis and to generate a random effects 
model meta-analysis on the mean difference data. As Figure 7.3 shows, the result of the 
meta-analysis is an estimated raw effect size of 0.02, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.05], z = .99, p = 
.32. This estimate represents a 2% advantage for viewing over photographing objects, 
but includes a range of values that plausibly include photo-taking impairment, photo-
taking improvement, or no effect of photographing. 
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Figure 7.3. Forest plot of effect sizes, including 95% confidence intervals. The location 
of each circle on the horizontal axis represents the raw effect size—the mean difference 
in subjects’ ability to recognise objects they merely viewed compared to objects they 
photographed as a whole (calculated using the photo-recognition test data). The size of 
the circle represents the weighting given to each experiment in the meta-analysis, and is 
based on sample size and standard deviation. The diamond shape shows the result of the 
meta-analysis, the estimated effect size. Shapes to the left of zero indicate a photo-taking 
improvement effect (subjects recognised more objects they photographed as a whole 
than objects they merely viewed) and shapes to the right of zero indicate a photo-taking 
impairment effect (subjects recognised more objects they merely viewed than objects 
they photographed as a whole). 
 
Finally, we calculated the mean difference in the proportion of objects that 
subjects correctly recognised as old when they merely viewed the object (view 
condition) compared to when they photographed part of the object (photo-part 
condition). We calculated these mean differences for each of the five experiments that 
included the photo-part condition: Henkel’s (2014) Experiment 2 and our Experiments 2 
Expt 1
Expt 2
Expt 3
Expt 4
Expt 5
Henkel, 2014 Expt 1
Henkel, 2014 Expt 2
Result of meta-
analysis
-0.35 -0.3 -0.25 -0.2 -0.15 -0.1 -0.05 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
Mean difference between view and photo-whole on the photo-
recognition test. Scores left of zero indicate a better performance for 
photo-whole objects. Scores right of zero indicate a better 
performance for view objects
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to 5. We subjected these data to a random effects model meta-analysis. As Figure 7.4 
shows, the result of the meta-analysis is an estimated raw effect size of -0.07, 95% CI [-
0.13, -0.01], z = -2.14, p = .03. This estimate represents a 7% advantage for 
photographing partly over merely viewing the object, but includes a range of values that 
indicate there is plausibly only a small benefit. 
 
 
Figure 7.4. Forest plot of effect sizes, including 95% confidence intervals. The location 
of each circle on the horizontal axis represents the raw effect size—the mean difference 
in subjects’ ability to recognise objects they merely viewed compared to objects they 
photographed partly (calculated using the photo-recognition test data). The size of the 
circle represents the weighting given to each experiment in the meta-analysis, and is 
based on sample size and standard deviation. The diamond shape shows the result of the 
meta-analysis, the estimated effect size. Shapes to the left of zero indicate a photo-taking 
improvement effect (subjects recognised more objects they photographed partly than 
objects they merely viewed) and shapes to the right of zero indicate a photo-taking 
impairment effect (subjects recognised more objects they merely viewed than objects 
they photographed partly). 
Expt 2
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Expt 4
Expt 5
Henkel, 2014 Expt 2
Result of meta-
analysis
-0.35 -0.3 -0.25 -0.2 -0.15 -0.1 -0.05 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
Mean difference between view and photo-part on the photo-
recognition test. Scores left of zero indicate a better performance for 
photo-part objects. Scores right of zero indicate a better 
performance for view objects
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Conclusion 
Across five experiments and a mini meta-analysis, we found limited support for 
the proposal that taking photos impairs people's memories. More specifically, the mini 
meta-analysis estimated the size of the effect was 2%—but plausibly zero (Cumming, 
2012). 
How do we reconcile these findings with the extended-cognition literature, which 
shows that people frequently offload their memories onto external devices, such as 
smartphones and search engines, instead of committing the information to memory—and 
that doing so impairs their memory for that information later on (Sparrow et al., 2011; 
Storm & Stone, 2015)? It seems reasonable to see the act of photographing objects as 
parallel: Why, then, did we find so little support for this notion that taking photos 
impairs memory? 
One answer might hinge on the type of memories that people offload. People 
might be willing to offload trivia questions and wordlists, but be more reluctant to 
offload autobiographical information. After all, autobiographical memories matter: they 
shape our identity, guide our decisions, and help us to form social relationships (Bluck, 
Alea, Habermas, & Rubin, 2005). If people are more reluctant to trust their personal 
memories to external storage, the act of taking photos would not harm memory 
performance. Future studies might explore this possibility by manipulating the type of 
information that people are asked to remember to determine the extent to which people 
are willing to offload semantic rather than personal information. 
It is also worth considering the size of the cognitive offloading effect. In light of 
our findings, we examined Storm and Stone’s (2015) recent study which showed that 
saving previously studied information onto the computer can improve memory for new 
information. In this study, subjects learned two word lists—A and B. After studying List 
A, subjects either saved it onto the computer or deleted it, they then studied List B. 
Finally, after a short delay, subjects were asked to recall the words in List B. Subjects 
recalled more of the words when they had saved List A than when they had deleted it—
seemingly, offloading information onto the computer enhanced subjects’ ability to learn 
and remember new information. The researchers conducted two further experiments to 
replicate and extend their results. We used the reported data from these three 
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experiments and Cumming’s (2013) mini meta-analysis procedure to calculate a more 
precise estimate of the cognitive offloading effect. The result, an estimated raw effect 
size of 11%, 95% CI [8%, 15%], suggests a slightly larger effect for offloading (and 
subsequently failing to report) words than photos. Yet, we cannot know whether this 
difference is attributable to the medium (words or photos) or the memory (word lists or 
autobiographical memories) and how that factor affects memory storage. 
There are important differences in both Henkel’s (2014) original procedure and 
ours when compared with how real-world people take real-world photos. Even so, these 
differences might actually mean photos enhance, rather than impair, memory. For 
example, people usually choose to photograph objects in which they are interested, and 
therefore might encode these objects better than objects that they are directed to 
photograph. That interest in turn might well override whatever degree of impairment 
could be associated with taking a photo. In line with this suggestion, when we asked 
subjects to choose which aspect of the object to photograph (Experiment 5), they 
remembered a mean 14.3% (95% CI [6.1%, 22.5%]) more of the objects they 
photographed partly than the objects they photographed wholly. Given that people’s 
tendency to take so many photos is a relatively new development (Heyman, 2015) there 
are many outstanding empirical questions to explore, including how taking photos 
influences our real-world memories. 
But considered as a whole, our data support the conclusion that taking photos of an 
object has little effect on one’s memory for that object—and plausibly no effect at all. 
Our findings also raise new questions about extended cognition in general. With 
estimates suggesting people will take a record 1.3 trillion photos in 2017 (Heyman, 
2015), the possibility that taking photos might have little effect on memory is good 
news—particularly for the snap-happy among us. 
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Chapter 8 : 
General Discussion 
 
The aims of this thesis were twofold. The aim in Part One was to gain an 
understanding of people’s ability to discriminate between authentic and manipulated 
images of real-world scenes and to begin to look for ways that might improve this 
ability. The aim in Part Two was to investigate how taking photos affects people’s 
memory of the events that are photographed. Before discussing the implications of the 
results, the key findings in each chapter are summarised. 
Summary 
In Chapter 3, two experiments examined people’s ability to detect and locate 
manipulations within images. The results revealed that people have an extremely limited 
ability to distinguish between original and manipulated images of real-world scenes. 
Furthermore, even when subjects correctly detected that an image had been manipulated, 
they were often unable to locate the manipulation. That said, in Experiment 2, when 
comparing people’s performance on the detection and location tasks with what they 
should achieve by chance on those tasks, it was surprising to find that people performed 
better on the location than on the detection task. The results in Experiment 1 offered 
some support for the prediction that people are better able to identify physically 
implausible changes than physically plausible ones. This finding, however, was not 
replicated in Experiment 2, where the results indicated that the amount of change might 
be more important than the plausibility of the change. 
In Chapters 4 and 5 we explored two possible ways that might help people to 
better identify when images have been manipulated. In Chapter 4, we looked at people’s 
ability to determine the physical consistency of shadow information within a scene 
illuminated by a single light source. Across five experiments the results showed that 
people were insensitive to lighting inconsistencies. The results also revealed that the 
extent of the inconsistency influenced people’s ability to detect inconsistent shadows. 
That is, inconsistent shadows positioned further from the correct position were more 
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likely to be associated with accurate responses than inconsistent shadows positioned 
closer to the correct position.  
In Chapter 5 we explored people’s ability to make use of reflection information in 
scenes. Overall, the results suggested that people had a reasonably limited ability to 
determine whether the reflections in a scene were consistent or inconsistent. Similar to 
the results of the shadow experiments, the extent of the inconsistency influenced 
people’s ability to detect manipulations. Specifically, in Experiment 2, when the 
inconsistent reflections were further from the correct position than in Experiments 1 and 
3, people correctly detected more of the inconsistent reflection scenes. 
In Chapters 6 and 7, we aimed to learn more about the nature of the photo-taking 
impairment effect in general. Specifically, we examined the extent that taking photos of 
objects influenced people’s ability to remember those objects later. Across five 
experiments, taking photos had a small, or plausibly no, effect on memory. Furthermore, 
the result of a mini meta-analysis including the data from our experiments and Henkel’s 
(2014) original experiments estimated the size of the photo-taking impairment effect to 
be a trivial 2%. 
Theoretical implications 
Detecting and locating image manipulations 
The research presented in Chapters 3 to 5 has important implications for our 
understanding of how the visual system processes information. The human visual system 
is remarkable in many ways. Central to this premise is that people are able to process 
visual information in a rapid and effortless manner—just a glance at an image is often 
enough to glean the basic meaning (Potter, 1975; Thorpe et al., 1996). The ease of 
processing visual information can help to explain why photos have become so popular; 
for many people, it is easier and quicker to take a message from an image than from a 
sequence of text. But if people are able to process images so readily, why do they find it 
difficult to identify manipulations in images? It seems likely that we can account for this 
finding by considering that there is a limit to the amount of information the visual 
system can process at any one time. Indeed, continually representing highly detailed 
information from the visual world in the brain would be cognitively expensive and 
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would overwhelm the system (Liverence & Franconeri, 2015; Tsotsos, 1990). The extent 
to which the visual detail in the world is represented in visual memory remains a topic 
for debate. 
A number of theories of visual perception exist. The main point that these theories 
diverge on concerns the amount of information from the visual world that is represented 
in visual memory. At one extreme is the suggestion that very little of the visual world is 
processed and that internal representations are sparse, while at the other extreme is the 
idea that people create a rich and detailed internal representation of the visual world. To 
better understand these theories it is useful to consider three possible levels of 
processing within visual perception, as shown in Figure 8.1. The first level involves 
early and automatic processing of the visual scene, resulting in a low-level 
representation that is not consciously accessible. At the second level, this low-level 
representation is coded coarsely; again this happens automatically but the information is 
now accessible for quick and approximate decisions. The third level involves a separate 
effortful process that requires focused attention to produce a highly detailed and 
consciously accessible internal representation of the attended aspect of the scene. 
 
 
Figure 8.1. Levels of processing approach to visual perception. A number of theories 
suggest that visual perception involves Levels 1 and 3. Our results in Chapters 4 and 5 
indicate that another level—Level 2—might be used when processing shadows and 
reflections. 
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The sparse representation theory proposes that the visual world is represented 
only sparsely in the mind; people might take the gist from a scene but the details are not 
represented at all, instead the world itself acts as an “external memory” (Dennett, 1991; 
O’Regan, 1992; Stroud, 1955). Thus, rather than using limited perceptual resources to 
encode the visual details, this information is accessed directly from the world as and 
when it is needed. A slightly less extreme version of this sparse representation theory is 
that visual memory is limited to the currently attended aspect of a scene (e.g., O’Regan, 
Rensink, & Clark, 1999; Simons & Levin, 1997, 1998). Support for the general notion of 
incomplete representation of the visual world in the brain comes from change blindness 
studies in which people are slow to detect even large changes that occur during a real or 
simulated eye blink. Therefore, although people tend to efficiently encode the aspects of 
the scene that are important for understanding the gist meaning (Potter, 1975; Schyns & 
Oliva, 1994), to encode the finer visual details in the scene requires the serial focus of 
attention on objects through movements of the eyes (Hollingworth & Henderson, 2002; 
Nelson & Loftus, 1980; O’Regan et al., 1999; Simons & Levin, 1997, 1998). That is, to 
process finer visual details, and not only the gist of the scene, effortful attention is likely 
to be required. As such, the incomplete representation theory suggests that visual 
perception involves a combination of the first and third levels of processing. 
The results in Chapter 3 offer some support to this theory. In Experiment 2, 
subjects performed better in the location task than in the detection task (relative to 
chance performance for each task). In line with the theories of incomplete visual 
representation (e.g., O’Regan, 1992; Simons & Levin, 1997), it is possible that the 
detection task encouraged a more general search of the scene whereby observers 
encoded the gist but largely ignored the finer visual details. The location task, however, 
might have encouraged observers to expend greater effort in attending to, and as such 
encoding, the visual details. Thus the difference in performance on the detection and 
location tasks might have been a result of people’s tendency to use different strategies in 
each: The location task might have encouraged an effortful strategy to encode more of 
the finer visual details in the scene compared to the detection task. Generally then, 
encoding only the most important aspects of the scene—the gist meaning—is an 
adaptive strategy that allows the visual and perceptual systems to cope with the 
continually changing visual input that they receive from the world. Yet neglect of the 
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finer visual details might explain why people often fail to notice when images have been 
manipulated. Future research might examine whether manipulations that affect the gist 
meaning of a scene are detected more readily than manipulations that affect the 
geometric plausibility of the scene. 
Moreover, even when people take an effortful approach to attend to the details of a 
scene, aspects such as shadows and reflections rarely receive attention (Ehinger et al., 
2016; Rensink & Cavanagh, 2004; Sareen, Ehinger, & Wolfe, 2015). It is possible 
therefore that people have little opportunity to learn about how shadows and reflections 
should look. In fact, we explored specifically whether people could identify if the 
shadows (Chapter 4) and reflections (Chapter 5) in a scene were consistent or 
inconsistent and found that, overall, people’s ability to do so was extremely limited. This 
finding supports the idea that these details might not be included in people’s internal 
representation of the visual world and that they infrequently receive effortful attention 
(Ehinger et al., 2016; O’Regan, 1992; Rensink & Cavanagh, 2004; Sareen et al., 2015). 
Yet when we looked more closely at the results of our shadow and reflection 
experiments, we found that the extent of the inconsistency influenced people’s 
performance on the shadow and reflection tasks. Specifically, people were more likely to 
detect inconsistent shadows and reflections positioned further from the correct position 
than inconsistent shadows and reflections positioned closer to the correct position. 
According to the incomplete representation and early discounting theories (e.g., Rensink 
& Cavanagh, 2004; Simons & Levin, 1997, 1998) such visual details are not usually 
attended and therefore not “seen”—which means that people should be equally likely to 
accept an inconsistent shadow or reflection as inconsistent regardless of the extent of the 
discrepancy. 
 The difference in people’s ability to identify inconsistent shadows and reflections 
depending on the extent of the inconsistency offers support to the theory that the visual 
system adopts a coarse scale analysis of fine visual details (Khuu et al., 2016; Lovell et 
al., 2009; Mamassian, 2004). The coarse scale hypothesis proposes that shadow regions 
are rapidly identified but not discounted—instead they are represented coarsely. As 
described above and shown in Figure 8.1, at the second level of visual processing low-
level representations are coded coarsely and can be accessed for quick and approximate 
decisions. This coarse scale analysis means that relatively large shadow discrepancies 
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are fairly easily noticed, but more subtle ones are missed. One possibility is that to detect 
the more subtle inconsistencies a more effortful higher-level mechanism is required to 
evaluate the shadow information in the scene (Lovell et al., 2009). Therefore it might be 
possible that the visual details are encoded by the perceptual system even in the absence 
of attention. Relatedly, studies in the area of inattentional blindness have revealed that 
background objects can influence people’s judgements even when people claim to be 
unaware of the objects (C. M. Moore & Egeth, 1997). Yet for visual details to reach an 
explicit level of internal representation, effortful attention is required. 
As well as supporting a coarse scale analysis of shadow information, our results 
also fit with the notion of a perceptual threshold for detecting lighting inconsistencies 
(Lopez-Moreno et al., 2010; Tan et al., 2015). It seems possible then, that there is a 
discernible point at which the inconsistent shadows are different enough from the 
consistent position for the inconsistency to become noticeable and the coarse scale 
mechanism to detect it. But for shadow inconsistencies that do not pass this perceptual 
threshold, a more effortful strategy is required for people to detect the inconsistency. 
Indeed, our results from the three reflection experiments in Chapter 5 revealed a similar 
possibility—that people might have a perceptual threshold for noticing inconsistencies 
in the reflections in a scene. People’s ability to identify inconsistent reflections appeared 
to be dependent upon a number of factors, such as the extent of the inconsistency. In 
particular, in Experiment 2, when the inconsistent reflections were moved further from 
the consistent position than in Experiments 1 or 3, people detected the inconsistencies 
75% of the time (cf. 58% in Experiment 1 and 55% in Experiment 3). Taken together, 
our subjects’ ability to detect relatively large discrepancies in shadows (Chapter 4) and 
reflections (Chapter 5) does not have particularly positive consequences for using these 
visual details to identify image forgeries in the real world. Essentially, the results 
suggest that when image manipulations create relatively large inconsistencies in the 
shadows or reflections of the scene, people might be able to detect the image as a fake. 
Yet, when the inconsistencies are relatively subtle, then people are more likely to be 
fooled by the fake image. 
The findings in Part One of this thesis add to our theoretical understanding of the 
perception of visual details in scenes. Notably, our results broadly support the notion 
that people’s internal representation of the visual world is incomplete (e.g., Dennett, 
168 
 
1991; O’Regan, 1992; Simons & Levin, 1997, 1998; Stroud, 1955). That said, our 
findings are difficult to reconcile with the idea that visual details are not perceived at all; 
instead it is possible that these details might be encoded, even if only coarsely. 
The influence of taking photos on memory 
The research presented in Chapters 6 and 7 has important implications for our 
understanding of the workings of human memory. Limits in the visual system mean that 
people have adapted to encode only the gist of a scene and rely on the world as an 
external memory source that holds more detailed visual information that can be accessed 
as and when it is required (O’Regan, 1992; O’Regan & Noë, 2001). In general, the idea 
behind this theory relates to our research in Chapter 7. In a recent study, Henkel (2014) 
showed that taking photos of objects on a museum tour influenced people’s ability to 
remember those objects later. Specifically, people recognised fewer of the objects they 
had photographed—and fewer details about those objects—relative to objects they 
merely viewed. One explanation for these findings is that people expect the camera to 
remember for them and therefore pay less attention to content that is captured in photos. 
Put another way, people might offload their memories onto the camera which acts as an 
external storage system. The idea that people offload memories onto digital devices is 
theoretically interesting and could potentially further knowledge about the workings of 
human memory. For this reason, in Chapter 7 we further explored the impact of taking 
photos on memory. 
Somewhat surprisingly, across five experiments we found little evidence to 
suggest that people offload their memories onto digital cameras. In fact, when we 
conducted a mini meta-analysis (see Cumming, 2012, 2013) including the data from our 
five experiments and Henkel’s (2014) original experiments, the estimated size of the 
photo-taking impairment effect was a trivial 2%—but taking photos could plausibly 
have no effect at all on memory. Although our results suggest that people might not use 
digital devices to extend their cognitive capacity, other research in the area of extended-
cognition is not concordant with our finding. Specifically, a number of studies have 
found evidence to suggest that people frequently offload the task of remembering onto 
external devices, such as smartphones and search engines, instead of committing the 
information to their own memory. We know that offloading memories can impair 
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people’s ability to remember that information later on (Sparrow et al., 2011; Storm & 
Stone, 2015). At first glance the results of our studies seem difficult to reconcile with the 
extended-cognition literature in general. Indeed, it seems reasonable to consider that 
taking photos offers an opportunity to offload memories onto the camera, so why didn’t 
we find any strong evidence to suggest that taking photos impaired memory? Although 
we are unable to fully answer this question, we can outline two possible explanations. 
Before considering the two explanations, however, it is important to note a key 
difference between our research and other extended-cognition experiments: the nature of 
the to-be-remembered information. The original photo-taking impairment research 
(Henkel, 2014) and our five follow-up experiments are the first to look at people’s 
tendency to offload content captured in photos. To our knowledge, all of the other 
extended-cognition experiments have used generic trivia statements or word lists (e.g., 
Sparrow et al., 2011; Storm & Stone, 2015). It is possible that the medium (words or 
photos) or the memory (word lists / trivia statements or autobiographical memories) 
influence whether or not information will be offloaded. 
First, we can draw on research in the area of visual perception to offer one possible 
explanation for our findings. Because cognitive resources are limited, the perceptual 
system typically encodes the gist meaning from a scene quickly and effortlessly, but to 
encode the details requires effortful attention. Put simply, with only a glance at an 
image, people can glean its basic meaning (Potter, 1975; Thorpe et al., 1996). Therefore, 
if people find it easier to process visual information than text-based information perhaps 
in turn this also makes it easier to later recognise visual as opposed to text-based 
information. If so, it follows that there might be a stronger cognitive offloading effect, 
and consequently memory impairment, for words than for photos. 
Second, our findings might be explained by the difference in the type of memory 
rather than the medium of the information. Considering that people take photos of their 
own experiences, it is likely that these photos often contain meaningful autobiographical 
information. And because autobiographical memories are important—they shape our 
identity, guide our decisions, and help us to form social relationships (Bluck et al., 
2005)—it is possible that people are reluctant to trust these memories to external 
devices. Yet generic word lists and trivia statements that are not personally relevant 
provide people with little meaningful information and accordingly people might be more 
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likely to trust that information to an external device. Therefore, prioritising the encoding 
of personally meaningful experiences might help to explain why research findings 
suggest less of a cognitive offloading effect for autobiographical memories than word 
lists and trivia statements. In future research, it would be interesting to test the idea that 
information type influences people’s likelihood to offload, and thus impair memory for, 
that information. One approach might be to compare the extent to which memory is 
impaired for autobiographical information in photos versus text. 
To summarise, the findings in Part Two of this thesis offer insight into how people 
perceive and remember their experiences in the world. In general, limits in human 
cognition mean that people offload information onto external digital devices, but our 
findings highlight that this might not always be the case. It remains possible that there is 
something special about the way people process information in photos or 
autobiographical memories that makes this information less likely to be offloaded—and 
as a result less likely to impair memory for that information later on. As such, our 
findings raise new questions about the potential differences in the way that information 
is offloaded onto external devices. Specifically, it seems possible that the medium or the 
type of memory that the information relates to influences the likelihood that it is 
offloaded. 
Practical implications 
Taken together, the studies presented in this thesis provide the first empirical tests 
of people’s ability to detect image manipulations in real-world scenes and also explore 
ways that might help people to improve this ability. Accordingly, the results of this 
research have practical implications for a number of areas where image manipulation 
could pose problems. 
Image manipulation and legal processes 
The findings from Part One of this thesis have practical implications for people 
working within criminal justice settings. It has become commonplace for digital photos 
to be used as evidence in the criminal justice system, however the rules and guidelines 
for the admission of photographic evidence in legal cases has not been adequately 
updated to reflect the unique challenges of the digital age (Johnson, 2012). Instead, 
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digital photos are admissible as evidence based on largely the same grounds as analogue 
photos, which means that photographic evidence is often admitted based on a witness 
testimony that the image is authentic and an accurate representation of events (Facciola 
& Barrett, 2016; Federal Rules of Evidence, 1975; Galves, 2000; Parry, 2009). The 
findings in Chapter 3 highlight potential pitfalls of such a strategy. Namely, people find 
it incredibly difficult to determine when an image of a real-world scene is the original, 
unaltered photo, or when it has been manipulated. Furthermore, even when people are 
able to detect that an image has been altered, our findings suggest they often fail to 
locate precisely what has changed. 
So what can be done to improve the current situation where digitally altered 
photos might too easily be admitted into evidence in legal cases? One possibility is to 
conduct research to better understand why people find it difficult to identify when 
images have been manipulated and to then use this information to help people to 
improve at this task. In Chapters 4 and 5, we looked at the extent that people could 
identify inconsistencies in shadows and reflections. In particular, we explored people’s 
ability to identify inconsistencies when there was enough information in the scene to use 
two types of geometric analysis based on shadow (Chapter 4) and reflection (Chapter 5) 
information. These types of analyses form the basis of some of the digital image forensic 
computer programs that can help to verify the authenticity of images (e.g., Kee et al., 
2013; O’Brien & Farid, 2012). Unfortunately, however, our results suggest that people 
are reasonably insensitive to inconsistencies in shadows and reflections which indicates 
that they might struggle to use these geometric-based strategies to help them to judge the 
authenticity of images. Yet it remains possible that, through training, people could learn 
to use these techniques. In addition, future research could examine whether raising 
awareness of the extent and possibilities of image manipulation, and whether various 
types of training, can improve people’s ability to distinguish fake images from real ones. 
Consequently, then, our findings suggest that relying on people to testify about the 
authenticity of images in legal settings is potentially problematic. Therefore it is 
reasonable to suggest that the current rules and guidelines that govern the admissibility 
of photographic evidence in legal cases should be updated to better account for the ease 
of digitally altering photos and people’s limited ability to detect such alterations. Given 
that our research is the first to show that people have a limited ability to identify 
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manipulations in real-world scenes, we unfortunately do not yet know enough to make 
strong recommendations about how to amend the rules and guidelines. At this stage our 
findings suggest that something needs to change, but to give sound advice on how best 
to update the policies more research is required. Ideally, psychological scientists, digital 
forensic experts, legal scholars, and policy makers might work together to conduct 
further research and develop research-led policies. 
In the meantime, one sensible strategy might be to place more reliance on digital 
image forensics to verify images that are used in legal cases—current guidelines do not 
request this, thus highlighting a potential area for change. Following the controversy in 
the 2015 World Press Photo competition, the organisers decided to introduce new 
safeguards for detecting manipulated photos, including a computerised photo-
verification test (World Press Photo, n.d.). A similar safeguarding strategy in the legal 
arena might be sensible. As it stands, digital image forensic experts are typically 
approached independently by the defence or prosecution to verify or discredit photo 
evidence. The lack of an official procedure for using digital forensic tools to verify the 
authenticity of images means that those who are not aware of the problems associated 
with digital photography, or of the field of digital image forensics, do not access such 
tools. Furthermore, independently calling on digital image experts can be expensive. 
Thus, the most powerful and promising digital forensic tools are often reserved for a 
small number of cases. 
Yet it is important to note that digital image forensics are not infallible. Many 
researchers have warned that forgers might work out ways to get around the digital 
image forensic software and beat the system (Böhme & Kirchner, 2012; Gloe, Kirchner, 
Winkler, & Böhme, 2007). Furthermore, digital image forensics are not at the stage 
where users can simply upload an image and at the click of a button get back an 
unequivocal answer as to whether it is authentic or not (Wen, 2017). Although 
developing such technology is the aim of one of the research projects being conducted 
by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in the US, in the current 
situation using the suite of forensic tools to analyse images requires expertise and time. 
Therefore a promising research investment is to continue to explore ways to improve 
people’s ability to detect when photos have been altered. As shown in Chapters 4 and 5 
of this thesis, we can borrow techniques from the field of digital image forensics to 
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discover ways to better equip people to authenticate images on their own (Horaczek, 
2017). Of course, by teaching people ways to better detect manipulations we might also 
inadvertently help forgers to create even more convincing fake images—a paradox that 
is difficult to avoid. On a positive note, even though serious image forgers might make 
the effort to correct all potential tell-tale signs that their edits could create in the image, 
many laypeople are unlikely to make such a concerted effort. Thus, providing tips for 
detecting fake images should at least make it harder for many people to fool others with 
manipulated images. 
Image manipulation and well-being 
Another practical implication of the studies described in Chapter 3 concerns the 
media’s use of digital-editing software to alter a person’s appearance. It has become 
standard for advertisers and magazine editors to present retouched images of celebrities 
and models that align with societal views of ideal beauty (e.g., Grabe et al., 2008; 
Groesz et al., 2002; Kee & Farid, 2011; Sheehan, 2014). The portrayal of such difficult-
to-achieve, if not impossible, standards for beauty and thinness is worrying because 
research shows that continual exposure to these beauty “ideals” can lead to 
psychological problems as well as put people at risk of engaging in dangerous eating and 
exercise behaviour (e.g., Fallon, 1990; Heinberg, 1996; Morry & Staska, 2001; Owen & 
Spencer, 2013; Thompson & Stice, 2001). Chapter 3 shows that one reason manipulated 
images can have such a negative effect is because people frequently fail to realise that 
these images have been manipulated—indeed, only 40% of the airbrushing 
manipulations in Experiment 2 were detected (10% below chance performance). If 
people think that these images are the truth and that people really do look the way they 
are portrayed in the media then it might seem more reasonable for them to aspire to 
these unrealistic beauty standards. 
The negative impact of ubiquitous idealised and unrealistic representations of 
physical beauty is being recognised and several countries have implemented formal 
legislation in an attempt to challenge the permeation of these unrealistic beauty 
standards (Gladstone, 2016; Wallwork, 2015). Unfortunately, however, the strategies 
being implemented are not based on a solid body of scientific evidence about what 
works best. One strategy, for instance, is to add disclaimer labels to images that indicate 
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to viewers that the photos have been retouched. Yet research shows that such disclaimer 
labels are not a sufficient solution; labels not only fail to offer protective effects against 
exposure to unrealistic standards of physical beauty (e.g., Tiggemann et al., 2013) but 
can even have a harmful impact by increasing accessibility to negative thoughts 
(Selimbegović & Chatard, 2015). Essentially, adding disclaimer labels to retouched 
images might only prove useful if people are able to work out specifically what has been 
airbrushed in the image. Recall, our findings suggest that people are rarely able to do so. 
In Experiment 2, just 13% of people accurately detected the airbrushing manipulations 
and also then went on to locate the change in the image. To put this result into 
perspective, consider that more than three times as many people (44%) failed to detect or 
locate the airbrushing manipulations. And twice as many people (27%) managed to 
detect that something in the airbrushed image had been altered but failed to correctly 
select the specific area that had changed. Thus, even when people thought that 
something had been altered, they often could not tell precisely what had changed. Our 
results add to the literature suggesting that current “solutions” for the negative impact of 
idealised and unrealistic representations of physical beauty might not suffice. 
An interesting finding is that people’s perception of how much an image has been 
retouched correlates with a quantitative measure of the amount of physical change that 
has been made to the image (Kee & Farid, 2011). In Chapter 3, we considered how the 
amount of change made to an image influenced people’s ability to detect and locate that 
change. In particular, Experiment 2 revealed a positive correlation between the amount 
of change and people’s ability to both detect and locate manipulations. On average, 
however, the airbrushing manipulations created a smaller amount of change to the 
manipulated images than the other manipulation types—that is, the airbrushing 
manipulations in our research were relatively subtle. Future research might explore a 
wider range of airbrushing manipulations—from subtle to extreme—to determine 
whether the relationship between the extent of the change and people’s ability to detect 
and locate that change persists. Indeed, using an objective measure to inform people how 
much an image has been retouched could be a more helpful approach than simply adding 
a disclaimer label. Perhaps providing more information about the extent of retouching in 
images could serve to better protect people from the negative consequences of exposure 
to unrealistic representations of physical beauty. In addition, development of such an 
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objective measure could serve as a useful tool for the industry as a whole; organisations 
and professional photo editors could use this as a guide to minimise or prevent extreme 
retouching to images (Kee & Farid, 2011). 
Future research 
The research presented in Part One of this thesis represents the first empirical test 
of people’s ability to identify when images of real-world scenes have been manipulated 
and explores ways to help people to better detect photo forgeries. The findings have 
important theoretical and practical implications but given the newness of this research 
area there are numerous outstanding questions for future research. In fact, as digital 
technology continues to advance at an incredible speed, the frequency and sophistication 
of image forgeries is growing. Thus it is important that the relatively neglected area of 
exploring people’s ability to detect photo forgeries continues to receive research interest. 
In future research it would be interesting to examine whether raising awareness of 
image manipulation and whether various types of training can improve people’s ability 
to distinguish fake images from real ones. At first glance, it might seem obvious—better 
awareness and appreciation of image manipulation will help people to detect when 
images have been altered. It is possible, however, that people will not apply awareness 
or knowledge gained from a training scenario to images that they see in the real world. 
In addition, there is a potential cost associated with raising awareness or training people 
to look for manipulations: that they lose trust in authentic images. Therefore, any 
research that looks at the effectiveness of awareness and training should not only 
consider people’s ability to detect when a photo has been altered, but also their ability to 
correctly identify when a photo has not been altered. Signal detection theory offers the 
necessary measures to do so; to consider any awareness or training strategy truly 
beneficial then it is important to see an improvement in d' for the experimental group 
compared with the control group—as opposed to only considering the effect of that 
strategy on the overall percentage of manipulated photos that are correctly detected. The 
results in Chapter 3 demonstrate how easy it might be to sway people’s tendency to 
simply say images are manipulated. In Experiment 1 we asked subjects to attempt to 
locate the manipulation only in photos that they had previously identified as 
manipulated. We made a small change to the method in Experiment 2 so that subjects 
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were asked to make a guess about the manipulated region regardless of their answer in 
the detection task. In Experiment 1 people showed a bias to accept the images we 
showed them as real but we did not find this bias in Experiment 2. Put simply then, a 
small change to the method between Experiments 1 and 2 appeared to influence people’s 
bias to accept the images we showed them as real. 
Another avenue for future research would be to see whether it is possible to train 
people to more effectively use the shadow and reflection information in scenes. 
Encouragingly, researchers have shown that performance on many types of perceptual 
tasks can improve as a result of training (e.g., Ellison & Walsh, 1998; Porter et al., 2010; 
Sireteanu & Rettenbach, 1995, 2000). Furthermore, it would be interesting to compare 
how effective a range of different training methods are in improving people’s ability to 
identify consistent and inconsistent shadows and reflections. One method might involve 
training people to make use of the objective shadow- and reflection-based geometric 
analysis techniques. Another method might be to use perceptual-based learning—for 
example giving people a number of practice trials before completing the shadow or 
reflection task. As well as testing the influence of such training methods on immediate 
performance on the tasks, if training does improve people’s ability to identify consistent 
and inconsistent scenes, it is important to check whether the improvement persists over 
time. 
The research presented in Part Two of this thesis extends the relatively limited 
body of research looking at the effect of photography on memory. The results from the 
five experiments in Chapter 7 not only suggest that the influence of taking photos on 
memory might not be particularly robust, but also raise new questions about people’s 
willingness to offload cognitive tasks, like remembering, onto external devices. Future 
research could examine whether people might be more reluctant to offload 
autobiographical memories than word lists and trivia statements, or alternatively whether 
the medium of the information influences the likelihood that information will be 
offloaded. 
In addition, to further explore the effect of taking photos on memory it would be 
interesting to run a series of experiments that consider how people take real-world 
photos. Based on Henkel’s (2014) original procedure, in our five replication experiments 
we instructed subjects to photograph particular objects on the museum tour. Instructing 
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subjects about what to photograph marks an important difference to how photos are 
taken in the real world—people typically choose what to photograph and often they 
photograph things that they are interested in. Furthermore, in the real world, people are 
not usually given a time limit to capture a photo, and they often have the opportunity to 
review the photos they take. Therefore, it would be interesting to conduct further 
research that looks at the impact of taking photos on people’s memory for the 
photographed content under conditions that are more similar to people’s experiences in 
the real world (Barasch, Diehl, Silverman, & Zauberman, 2017). Aligning the 
experimental conditions more closely with real-life experiences might actually mean that 
taking photos enhances, rather than impairs, memory. 
Concluding remarks 
The aims in Part One of this thesis were to gain an understanding of people’s 
ability to discriminate between authentic and manipulated images of real-world scenes 
and to begin to look for ways that might improve this ability. The aim in Part Two was 
to investigate how taking photos affects people’s memory of the photographed content. 
The findings in Part One suggest that people have an extremely limited ability to 
identify manipulations in images of real-world scenes. One possible reason for people’s 
limited ability to detect manipulations is that when people process images, they typically 
encode the gist meaning but not necessarily the details. Accordingly, people might 
frequently neglect information that could help them to accurately determine whether 
images are real or fake. It is clear that image manipulation is not going away; as digital 
technology improves forgeries are only going to become more visually compelling and 
thus more difficult to detect. The challenge now is to try to find ways to prevent people 
being fooled by manipulated photos. The findings in Part Two suggest that taking photos 
might have only a small effect on people’s memories. With projections indicating that 
the number of photos captured each year will continue to grow exponentially (Heyman, 
2015; Lee 2016), perhaps the finding that taking photos plausibly has little effect on 
memory is good news. That said, our research raises new questions for the area of 
extended-cognition in general. Further exploring the possible nuances concerning the 
effects of taking photos on memory will prove useful for furthering theoretical 
understanding of the workings of human memory. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Saliency Analyses in Chapter 3 
 
Saliency analyses 
The extent to which certain parts of a scene stand out relative to other parts (object 
or region saliency) can affect the distribution of visual attention. We ran two saliency 
analyses to check whether our manipulations influenced the salience of the region where 
the manipulation had been made. 
We chose two of the various models available to compute bottom-up predictions 
of visual salience; the classic Itti-Koch model (Itti & Koch, 2000; Itti, Koch, & Niebur, 
1998) and the Graph-Based Visual Saliency (GBVS) model (Harel, Koch, & Perona, 
2006). For simplicity, we will refer to these models as IK and GBVS. 
Experiment 1 
IK 
Using Matlab, we ran the IK model on the six original images and the 30 
manipulated versions of these images. For each image, the model created a saliency map 
with a saliency value for each individual pixel. Recall that in the location task of 
Experiment 1, subjects saw the image with a 3 × 3 grid overlaid and were asked to select 
the region that they believed had been manipulated. Therefore, to quantify the saliency 
values we calculated the mean saliency for each of the nine regions for each the 36 
images. We then checked whether our manipulations of the images had affected the 
saliency of the manipulated region compared with the same region in the original image. 
That is, did our manipulations make the regions any more or less salient than they were 
in the original image? Figure A.1 shows the mean saliency of the manipulated region 
alongside the mean saliency of that same region in the original image. As shown, our 
manipulations had no systematic effect. 
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Figure A.1. Mean saliency of the manipulated region in the manipulated image and 
mean saliency of the same region in the original image, where higher values indicate a 
more salient region. Data is shown for each of the 6 images, a-f, and for all five 
manipulation types, computed using the IK model. 
 
GBVS 
Next, in Matlab we ran the same analysis using the GBVS model to determine 
whether our manipulations had influenced region salience. Replicating the results from 
the IK model, Figure A.2 shows that our manipulations made little difference to the 
salience of the image regions. 
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Figure A.2. Mean saliency of the manipulated region in the manipulated image and 
mean saliency of the same region in the original image, where higher values indicate a 
more salient region. Data is shown for each of the 6 images, a-f, and for all five 
manipulation types, computed using the GBVS model. 
 
Experiment 2 
IK 
We ran the IK model on the six original images and the 30 manipulated versions 
of these images. For each image, the model created a saliency map with the saliency 
value for each individual pixel. Recall that in Experiment 2 the location task used a 4 × 3 
overlaid grid. Therefore, to quantify the saliency values, we calculated the mean saliency 
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for each of the 12 regions. We calculated these mean values for each region in each of 
the 36 images.  
As in Experiment 1, we considered whether our manipulations of the images had 
made any difference to the saliency of the manipulated region compared with that same 
region in the original image. Figure A.3 shows a similar pattern of results to those 
observed in Experiment 1—our manipulations had little or no systematic effect on 
region salience. 
 
 
Figure A.3. Mean saliency of the manipulated region in the manipulated image and 
mean saliency of the same region in the original image, where higher values indicate a 
more salient region. Data is shown for each of the 6 images, a-f, and for all five 
manipulation types, computed using the IK model. 
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GBVS 
Next we ran the GBVS model on all six original and the 30 manipulated images. 
Again, we considered whether our manipulations made the regions any more or less 
salient than they were in the original image. Replicating our previous results, Figure A.4 
shows that our manipulations made little difference to the salience of the images. In 
sum, as in Experiment 1, our saliency analyses indicate that we did not influence 
people’s accuracy on the detection and location tasks by inadvertently changing the 
salience of the manipulated regions. 
 
 
Figure A.4. Mean saliency of the manipulated region in the manipulated image and 
mean saliency of the same region in the original image, where higher values indicate a 
more salient region. Data is shown for each of the 6 images, a-f, and for all five 
manipulation types, computed using the GBVS model.  
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Appendix B: Exceptions to procedure in Chapter 7 
All exceptions were made to add experimental rigor and/or generalisability.  
Experiment 1 
Table B.1 provides details of the exceptions. 
 
Table B.1 
Exceptions to Henkel’s (2014, Experiment 1) procedure 
Exception Details and Rationale 
Museum location The experiment took place at a different museum: The Otago 
Museum in New Zealand. 
Camera type Henkel’s subjects used a digital camera to take photos but we 
used an iPod touch because subjects routinely use similar devices 
to take photos. 
Photo review Henkel did not explicitly tell subjects that they would get an 
opportunity to see the photos the next day, but we did. We gave 
subjects this false information to make the process more similar 
to everyday life—after all, if people really do rely on cameras to 
remember for them, it is likely that they do so believing they will 
have access to their photos later. 
Tour direction Henkel used only one direction of the tour (AB), we also 
included the reverse (BA) to account for the order in which 
subjects encountered objects. 
Timing for viewing 
and photographing 
objects 
In Henkel’s Experiment 1, subjects had 30 s with each object, 
regardless of whether they were only viewing or photographing 
the objects. For the view objects, subjects had the full 30 s to 
simply view the object.  For the photograph objects, however, 
subjects only had 20 s uninterrupted to view the object and then 
the remaining 10 s were used to take the photo. Henkel noted the 
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time difference as a limitation and changed the timings for 
Experiment 2; we used her Experiment 2 timings. 
Distractor task The distractor task was included as a mask to stop immediate 
rehearsal of the objects. 
Test phase We included the location-recognition test from Henkel’s 
Experiment 2. But we did not ask subjects to answer questions 
about details of the objects. In Henkel’s experiments, the visual 
details test involved subjects answering questions about details of 
only the objects that were recognised as old in the name-
recognition test. It is possible that the additional information 
provided in the visual detail questions might affect subjects’ 
responses in the photo-recognition test. 
For the location-recognition test, subjects indicated the location of 
all 30 objects. In Henkel’s Experiment 2, subjects only indicated 
the location of the objects they recognised as old in the photo-
recognition test. 
 
Experiment 2 
Table B.2 provides details of the exceptions. 
 
Table B.2 
Exceptions to Henkel’s (2014, Experiment 2) procedure 
Exception Details and Rationale 
Museum tour To convert the experiment to a lab-based procedure, subjects 
watched a recording of a museum tour on a computer instead of 
actively walking around a museum. 
Number of objects Henkel’s museum tour included stops at 27 objects, ours included 
stops at 15 objects. 
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Camera type Henkel’s subjects used a digital camera to take photos but we 
used a virtual camera. The virtual camera appeared on-screen 
when subjects were instructed to photograph an object. If subjects 
were still unsure about how to use the virtual camera after 
completing the practice, they were allowed to do the practice 
again (only one subject asked to do the practice a second time). 
Timing for viewing 
and photographing 
objects 
One reason for developing the lab-based analogue for the 
museum tour procedure was to remove the external distractions 
from the museum environment. Using the same timing restraints 
as in Henkel’s Experiment 2, but without external distractions in 
the museum environment, would likely improve subjects’ overall 
performance on the memory tests, potentially leading to a ceiling 
effect. For this reason, we conducted several pilot tests with 
different manipulations of the timing restraints for viewing and 
photographing the objects in the museum. Subjects’ overall 
performance on the name- and photo-recognition tests was similar 
to Henkel’s Experiment 2 with a 5 s view time and additional 10 s 
to take a photo. 
Test phase Henkel removed the free-recall test in her Experiment 2, but we 
included it to see whether we could replicate our finding from our 
Experiment 1. We did not include the location-recognition test 
because our subjects did not actively walk around the museum 
and because the objects were located in a single room. 
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Experiment 4 
Table B.3 provides details of the exceptions to our Experiment 3 procedure. 
 
Table B.3 
Exceptions to the Experiment 3 procedure 
Exception Details and Rationale 
Museum tour To gain more experimental control, subjects were navigated 
through a virtual museum instead of watching a video recording 
of a museum tour. 
Target objects One reason for moving to use a virtual museum was to have more 
control over the stimuli. As such, we selected objects with similar 
attributes which allowed us to create less variation across the 
objects. We carried out pilot tests to check that each of the 15 
objects we selected for our stimulus set were recognised at a 
similar level in the memory test phase. Subjects’ performance on 
two of the objects was perfect across all three action conditions so 
we replaced these objects as it seemed likely that they were more 
salient than the other 13 objects included in the tour. 
Distractor objects We placed three distractor objects near each of the target objects. 
Therefore, when subjects stopped at each of the 15 target objects 
in the museum they would see the target object and three 
distractor objects. 
Museum layout We spaced the objects across four different rooms in the virtual 
museum. Although this marks a change from our Experiments 2 
and 3, it is more similar to the museum layouts used in Henkel’s 
(2014) experiments and our Experiment 1. 
Virtual camera We made a change to the virtual camera to further ensure that 
subjects were aware their photos were being stored. Each time 
subjects took a photo, in addition to displaying the shot they had 
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captured on the screen of the virtual camera for 2 seconds, we 
included a message at the top of the screen that read “saving.” 
Timing for viewing 
and photographing 
objects 
We conducted several pilot tests with different manipulations of 
the timing restraints for viewing and photographing the objects in 
the museum. Subjects’ overall performance on the photo-
recognition test was similar to Henkel’s (2014, Experiment 2) 
with a 10 s view time and additional 10 s to take a photo. 
Length of time for 
filler task 
We also used the pilot tests to determine the length of time for the 
filler task—we reduced the duration of the filler task to 2 min. 
Test phase We excluded the name-recognition and visual details tests. 
Whether subjects viewed or photographed objects made a trivial 
difference to performance on either of these tests, therefore we 
included only the photo-recognition test. 
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Appendix C: Null Hypothesis Significance Testing Approach for the results 
in Chapter 7 
 We also ran our analyses in null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) terms. 
Experiment 1 
Free recall 
A paired-samples t test revealed that subjects were more likely to recall the 
photographed objects than the merely viewed objects: Mview 46%; Mphotograph = 54%; 
t(41) = 2.78, p = .01, d = 0.44. 
Recognition 
 A 2 (Action: view, photograph) × 2 (Retrieval Cue: name-cue, photo-cue) 
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) on subjects’ correct old recognition 
showed no effect of action, F(1, 41) = 0.07, p = .79, ηp2 = .002, no effect for the retrieval 
cue, F(1, 41) = 1.22, p = .28, ηp2 = .03, and no interaction between action and retrieval 
cue, F(1, 41) = 0.09, p = .77, ηp2 = .002. The results show that there was no difference in 
subjects’ ability to recognise objects as old in the two action conditions and that their 
recognition performance did not vary as a function of the type of retrieval cue.  
 For source accuracy, we conducted an Action (view, photograph) × Retrieval Cue 
(name-cue, photo-cue) repeated measures ANOVA and found a main effect of action, 
F(1, 41) = 25.94, p < .001, ηp2 = .39. Subjects attributed more of the objects they viewed 
to the accurate source than objects they photographed, Mview 71%; Mphotograph = 49%. 
There was also an effect of retrieval cue, F(1, 41) = 14.18, p = .001, ηp2 = .26, in which 
subjects attributed more objects to the correct source when their memories were cued by 
photos than by names, Mname-cue = 56%; Mphoto-cue = 63%. There was no interaction. 
 For location accuracy, a paired-samples t test revealed that there was no effect of 
action on the proportion of objects recognised in the correct location, Mview 81%; 
Mphotograph = 80%; t(41) = 0.47, p = .64, d = 0.07. 
Experiment 2 
Free recall 
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA revealed no effect of action on the 
proportion of objects correctly recalled, F(2, 82) = 1.28, p = .28, ηp2 = .03. 
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Recognition 
In NHST terms, for the recognition tests, a 3 (Action: view, photo-whole, photo-
part) × 2 (Retrieval Cue: name-cue, photo-cue) repeated measures ANOVA on subjects’ 
correct old recognition revealed no effect of action, F(2, 82) = 2.48, p = .09, ηp2 = .06. 
There was an effect of retrieval cue, F(1, 41) = 64.98, p < .001, ηp2 = .61—subjects 
correctly recognised markedly more objects as old in the photo-recognition test than in 
the name-recognition test, Mphoto-cue = 93%, Mname-cue = 73%. There was no interaction 
between action and retrieval cue, F(2, 82) = 1.65, p = .20, ηp2 = .04. 
For accuracy on the visual details test, a one-way repeated measures ANOVA 
revealed no effect of action, F(2, 82) = 1.63, p = .20, ηp2 = .04. Finally, to explore source 
accuracy, we conducted an Action (view, photo-whole, photo-part) × Retrieval Cue 
(name-cue, photo-cue) repeated measures ANOVA and found a main effect of action, 
F(2, 82) = 6.61, p = .002, ηp2 = .14; a main effect of retrieval cue, F(1, 41) = 54.29, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .57; and an interaction between action and retrieval cue, F(2, 82) = 5.64, p = 
.01, ηp2 = .12. This interaction indicates that the type of retrieval cue had a different 
effect, depending on the action subjects took. To explore this interaction further, we first 
looked at the effect of action on source accuracy in the name-recognition test. A one-
way repeated measures ANOVA revealed no effect of action, F(2, 82) = 2.1, p = .14, ηp2 
= .05 indicating  that subjects were equally likely to attribute view, photo-whole and 
photo-part objects to the accurate source when their memories were cued by names. 
Next we ran a one-way repeated measures ANOVA to look at the effect of action on 
source accuracy in the photo-recognition test and found a main effect, F(2, 82) = 9.53, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .19. Post hoc Bonferroni-corrected comparisons showed that subjects were 
more accurate in recognising which action they had performed for photo-part (74%) than 
photo-whole objects (47%) or view objects (57%): photo-part and photo-whole, t(41) = 
3.96, p < .001, d = 1.07; photo-part and view, t(41) = 3.77, p = .001, d = 0.59. 
Experiment 3 
Recognition 
For the name- and photo-recognition tests, a 3 (Action: view, photo-whole, photo-
part) × 2 (Retrieval Cue: name-cue, photo-cue) repeated measures ANOVA on subjects’ 
correct old recognition showed no effect of action, F(2, 82) = 0.50, p = .61, ηp2 = .01. 
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There was an effect for the retrieval cue, F(1, 41) = 80.36, p < .001, ηp2 = .66, and an 
interaction between action and retrieval cue, F(2, 82) = 7.86, p = .001, ηp2 = .16. To 
explore the interaction further, we ran a one-way repeated measures ANOVA for the 
name-recognition test and for the photo-recognition test. There was no main effect of 
action on the name-recognition test, F(2, 82) = 1.28, p = .28, ηp2 = .03—subjects 
correctly recognised a similar proportion of view, photo-whole and photo-part objects. 
In contrast, there was a main effect of action on the photo-recognition test, F(2, 82) = 
6.60, p = .002, ηp2 = .14. But the pattern of results does not fit with photo-taking 
impairment effect. Post hoc Bonferroni-corrected comparisons revealed that when 
subjects’ memories were cued with photos, they correctly recognised more of the photo-
part than view objects: Mphoto-part = 87%, Mview = 74%, t(41) = 3.95, p < .001, d = 0.58. 
Subjects recognised a similar proportion of the view and photo-whole objects. 
Next, we considered the effect of photographing on subjects’ memory for the 
visual details of the objects. We replicated our finding from Experiment 2—subjects 
correctly answered a similar proportion of visual detail questions for the view, photo-
whole and photo-part objects, F(2, 82) = 0.19, p = .83, ηp2 = .01. 
Finally, to explore subjects’ ability to remember which objects they photographed 
and which they viewed, we ran a 3 (Action: view, photo-whole, photo-part) × 2 
(Retrieval Cue: name-cue, photo-cue) repeated measures ANOVA on the proportion of 
objects that subjects correctly attributed to their source. This analysis revealed no main 
effect of action, F(2, 82) = 1.01, p = .37, ηp2 = .02, but a main effect of retrieval cue, 
F(1, 41) = 10.23, p = .003, ηp2 = .20, and an interaction, F(2, 82) = 4.49, p = .01, ηp2 = 
.10. As was the case in Experiment 2, this interaction means that the type of retrieval cue 
had a different effect depending on the action taken. To investigate further, we ran a 
one-way repeated measures ANOVA to look at the effect of action on source accuracy 
in the name-recognition test. The analysis revealed no effect of action, F(2, 82) = 0.52, p 
= .60, ηp2 = .01, indicating that subjects were equally likely to attribute view, photo-
whole and photo-part objects to the correct source when given name cues. A one-way 
repeated measures ANOVA exploring the effect of action on source accuracy in the 
photo-recognition test revealed a main effect, F(2, 82) = 3.88, p = .03, ηp2 = .09. As in 
Experiment 2, post hoc Bonferroni-corrected comparisons showed that subjects 
attributed more photo-part objects than view objects to the accurate source: Mphoto-part = 
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49%, Mview = 36%, t(41) = 2.62, p = .01, d = 0.51. Subjects attributed a similar 
proportion of the view and photo-whole objects to the correct source. 
Experiment 4 
Recognition 
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA revealed that action had an effect on the 
proportion of objects correctly recognised as old, F(2, 82) = 4.51, p = .01, ηp2 = .10. Post 
hoc Bonferroni-corrected comparisons indicated one reliable difference: Subjects 
correctly recognised a greater proportion of the photo-part objects than the photo-whole 
objects as having been part of the museum tour: Mphoto-part = 78%, Mphoto-whole = 65%, 
t(41) = 2.82, p = .01, d = 0.54. 
Experiment 5 
Recognition 
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA on subjects’ correct old recognition 
showed an effect of action, F(2, 82) = 6.74, p = .002, ηp2 = .14. Post hoc Bonferroni-
corrected comparisons indicated one reliable difference: As in Experiment 4, subjects 
correctly recognised a greater proportion of the photo-part objects than the photo-whole 
objects as having been part of the museum tour: Mphoto-part = 80%, Mphoto-whole = 66%, 
t(41) = 3.53, p = .001, d = 0.63. 
